Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

In August 2010, Defendant Byron Ventura-Perez pled guilty in Colorado to illegal reentry after having been deported subsequent to an aggravated-felony conviction. Defendant raised two issues on appeal: (1) he contended the district court miscalculated his offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines; and (2) he contended that when the court imposed his sentence, it improperly refused to consider sentencing disparities created by fast-track programs in other districts. Finding no error in the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence.

Defendant appealed his conviction under 8 U.S.C. 1326(b) for illegal reentry into the United States after being deported. On appeal, defendant challenged his conviction based on a collateral attack of the underlying removal order. The court held that a defect in defendant's 1997 immigration proceedings, that he was not meaningfully informed of his eligibility for voluntary departure, violated his due process rights. However, the district court did not consider fully whether defendant suffered prejudice. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court to consider this issue.

Petitioner petitioned for review of the BIA's decision that he be removed based on having committed an aggravated felony. Petitioner was charged and convicted of felonious sexual intercourse without consent. Petitioner did not "necessarily" commit the aggravated felony of rape, rather than a lesser crime. Because the court was not convinced that petitioner pled guilty to a crime that can be categorized as rape under 18 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), the court granted the petition for review and reversed the BIA's decision, remanding to the BIA.

Defendant appealed the district court's grant of the government's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the government provided clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence that left no issue in doubt that defendant, a naturalized citizen, obtained his citizenship illegally. The court held that the district court improperly weighed the evidence in concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the government could strip defendant of his citizenship. The existence and nature of the cooperation agreement were the subjects of pending Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, requests, and further evidence should have been allowed. Because of the importance of citizenship, which in turn conferred significant rights and responsibilities, the government bore a heavy burden when it sought to take away an individual's citizenship. The court also vacated the district court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss for improper venue, and remanded with instructions that the district court conduct the proper inquiry consistent with the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(33).

Petitioner, a native of Liberia, was admitted as a visitor in 1980. In, 1983, he became a lawful permanent resident. In 1988, he pled guilty to criminal sexual conduct. In 1995, Minnesota enacted a predatory offender registration statute. Petitioner initially complied, but in 1998, pled guilty to failing to register. In 2009, DHS began removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after his date of admission and alleging that his 1998 conviction, coupled with his 1988 conviction, made him removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme. Several months later, petitioner asserted for the first time that he was admitted in 1980, not 1983, but did not support his assertion with any evidence. The IJ ordered him removed. The BIA dismissed. The Third Circuit vacated, reversing the treatment of petitioner's conviction under the predatory offender registration statute. The court remanded with instructions to allow him to supplement the record to show that he was legally admitted in 1980 and to enter an order that he is not removable.

Petitioner appealed from the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief after finding that he did not derive citizenship from his father. The district court ruled that petitioner was not in his father's "legal custody" when his father naturalized. The court concluded that the district court erred because it relied on an unenforceable Dominican Republic custody award where New York had jurisdiction to determine custody. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

The Mexican nationals in consolidated cases re-entered the U.S. without authorization, having been removed following conviction of crimes. Charged with being in the U.S. after having been deported (8 U.S.C. 1326(a)), they requested reductions in sentence because the district did not have a "fast track" program under which they could receive leniency in exchange for a guilty plea. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of the argument. A district court need not address the argument unless the defendant has shown that he is similarly situated to those who would actually receive the benefit in a fast-track district. A defendant must promptly plead guilty, agree to the factual basis proffered by the government, execute an enforceable waiver of specific rights before or during the plea colloquy, establish that he would be eligible for a fast‐track sentence in at least one district offering the program, and submit the likely imprisonment range in that district.

Defendant-Appellant Juan Manuel Cardenas-Mireles pled guilty to the offense of illegal reentry after deportation. At sentencing, he moved for a downward variance notwithstanding an adult criminal record involving 44 convictions and four deportations. The district court denied the motion, instead sentencing Defendant at the top of the applicable guidelines range. Defendant appealed his sentence on two grounds: (1) the district court committed procedural error by relying on an impermissible sentencing rationale to lengthen his sentence (namely, that remaining incarcerated was in Defendant's own best interests due to his health and mental state); (2) his sentence is substantively unreasonable. Finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to a sentence within the guidelines, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions.

Defendant, a native of Mexico, became a lawful permanent resident of the U.S. in 1978. In 1996, he filed an Application for Naturalization, disclosing that he had been arrested for a marijuana crime in the 1980s, and for disorderly conduct and trespassing in the 1990s, but that all charges had been dismissed. He did not reveal was that he had recently committed additional marijuana-related offenses for which he had not yet been charged. In 1998 he became a citizen and, weeks later, was charged with possession with intent to distribute 196 pounds of marijuana (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)) and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana (21 U.S.C. 846). His sentence of 88 months was affirmed on appeal. Approximately three years after defendant was released from prison, the government sought to revoke his naturalization (8 U.S.C. 1451(a)). The district court granted judgment in favor of the U.S., finding that defendant was barred from establishing good moral character. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, declining to commit a "loophole" for those who evade detection and conviction until after they are naturalized.

Defendant-Appellant Carrillo-Rodriguez pleaded guilty to the offense of illegal reentry after deportation subsequent to an aggravated felony conviction. At sentencing, he moved for a downward variance from the applicable United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) range based on the staleness of his prior felony. The district court declined to grant it, instead sentencing Defendant at the bottom of the applicable guidelines range. Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that it was substantively unreasonable. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant Defendant's request for a downward variance, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the court's judgment.