Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The district court entered a preliminary injunction concerning four provisions of Arizona S. B. 1070, enacted in 2010: Section 3 makes failure to comply with federal alien-registration requirements a state misdemeanor; 5(C)makes it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to seek or engage in work in Arizona; 6 authorizes state and local officers to arrest without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe a person has committed any offense that makes the person removable from the U.S.; and 2(B) requires officers conducting a stop, detention, or arrest to attempt, in some circumstances, to verify immigration status. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding that Sections 3, 5(C), and 6 preempted. Section 3 intrudes on the field of alien registration, in which Congress has left no room for even complementary state laws. Section 5(C)’s criminal penalty is an obstacle to the federal regulatory system. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 makes it illegal for employers to knowingly hire, recruit, refer, or employ unauthorized workers, 8 U. S. C. 1324a(a)(1)(A),(a)(2); requires employers to verify prospective employees' status; and imposes criminal and civil penalties on employers, but only imposes civil penalties on aliens who seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment. Congress decided against criminal penalties on unauthorized employees. Section 6 creates an obstacle to federal law by attempting to provide state officers with additional arrest authority, which they could exercise with no instruction from the federal government. Generally, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain in the U.S. It was improper to enjoin section 2(B) before state courts construed it and without some showing that its enforcement actually conflicts with federal law. The mandatory nature of the status checks does not interfere with the federal scheme. Consultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system. It is not clear yet that 2(B), in practice, will require state officers to delay release of detainees for no reason other than to verify immigration status. That would raise constitutional concerns and would disrupt the federal framework, but the section could be read to avoid these concerns. View "Arizona v. United States" on Justia Law

This case concerned the BIA's policy for deciding when resident aliens could apply to the Attorney General for relief from deportation under a now-repealed provision of the immigration law. The Court held that the BIA's policy for applying section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(c), in deportation cases was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). The Court concluded that the BIA's comparable-grounds rule was unmoored from the purposes and concerns of the immigration laws. It allowed an irrelevant comparison between statutory provisions to govern a matter of the utmost importance -whether lawful resident aliens with longstanding ties to this country could stay here. And contrary to the Government's protestations, it was not supported by text or practice or cost considerations. Therefore, the BIA's approach could not pass muster under ordinary principles of administrative law.View "Judulang v. Holder" on Justia Law

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and various business and civil rights organizations (collectively, "Chamber") filed a federal preenforcement suit against those charged with administering the Legal Arizona Workers Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 23-211, 212, 212.01, which provided that the licenses of state employers that knowingly or intentionally employed unauthorized aliens could be, and in certain circumstances, must be, suspended or revoked. The law also required that all Arizona employers use E-Verify, an internet-based system employers could use to check the work authorization status of employees. At issue was whether federal immigration law preempted those provisions of Arizona law. The Court held that Arizona's licensing law fell within the confines of the authority Congress chose to leave to the states and therefore, was not expressly preempted where the Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA"), 8 U.S.C. 1324a(h)(2), prohibited states from imposing civil or criminal sanctions on those who employed unauthorized aliens but preserved state authority to impose sanctions through licensing and similar laws. The court also held that Arizona's requirement that employers use E-Verify did not conflict with the federal scheme and in no way obstructed achieving the aims of the federal program.View "Chamber of Commerce of United States of America, et al. v. Whiting" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States without being admitted or paroled. The next year, Petitioner was detained after an Immigration and Customs Enforcement raid at her place of employment. Petitioner filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, asserting that she would be a target of a prominent gang’s violence if she were to return to El Salvador because of the gang’s unsuccessful efforts to recruit her son. An immigration judge (IJ) concluded that Petitioner was not entitled to relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ’s decision, concluding that Petitioner failed to show that she would be persecuted as a result of her kinship. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the evidence of future persecution based on Petitioner’s membership in her nuclear family was too speculative to show a well-founded fear of future persecution. View "De Abarca v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Brazil, was charged with removability for being convicted, after his admission into the United States, of two crimes involving moral turpitude. The crimes were committed in 2009 and 2011. During a hearing before an Immigration Judge (IJ) Petitioner’s attorney admitted that Petitioner was removable as charged. Petitioner proceeded to collaterally attack his previous two convictions and succeeded in securing a new trial with respect to his 2011 conviction. Petitioner was subsequently charged with removability on the basis of his 2009 conviction for having been convicted of a single crime involving moral turpitude. Petitioner denied that he was removable and challenged his removability on grounds that his 2009 conviction was not for a crime involving moral turpitude. The IJ found Petitioner removable, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, noting that Petitioner’s prior counsel had already conceded that both the 2009 and 2011 convictions were for crimes involving moral turpitude, rendering Petitioner removable. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in holding Petitioner to his attorneys’ concessions of removability and in determining that Petitioner was removable based upon his 2009 conviction. View "Lima v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ali Shah entered the country in 2002. His removal proceedings lasted for well over ten years. He had the benefit of two de novo hearings before two different IJs, and his appeals were considered by the BIA on multiple occasions and petitions for review to the Third Circuit. Shah's motion for a change of venue was granted and this matter was transferred from Philadelphia to Boston in 2009. The focus of this appeal before the First Circuit Court of Appeals centered on the circumstances that followed the change of venue. Petitioner argued on appeal that the BIA did not properly address either of his arguments going to earlier adverse credibility findings. He made a series of arguments in support of reopening that were never presented to the BIA. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Shah's motion to reopen and the First Circuit did not have jurisdiction to consider freshly minted arguments not presented to the agency, so it both dismissed portions of petitioner's petition for lack of jurisdiction and denied the petition for review as to other claims. View "Shah v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioners were brothers and natives and citizens of Guatemala. While they lived in Guatemala, their father was kidnapped and murdered by the family of a business associate. Petitioners had paid a ransom to the kidnappers, but threats against Petitioners continued, and Petitioners fled to the United States. Petitioners subsequently filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal, asserting that they were persecuted on account of their membership in a particular social group, which they defined as their immediate family. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied the applications, concluding that the harm Petitioners suffered in Guatemala was not on account of their membership in a protected social group and that it was less likely than not that they would be tortured by government authorities upon returning to their home country. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the BIA’s conclusion as to the asylum claim was legally flawed and not supported by the record. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Aldana-Ramos v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 1999, Petitioner admitted to a single count of shoplifting in Massachusetts state court. In 2012, Petitioner admitted to an amended charge of larceny by inducement. The following year, Petitioner was charged with removability as an alien who has been convicted of or admits to having committed "a crime involving moral turpitude.” Petitioner applied for special rule cancellation, arguing that he fell within the petty offense exception because his shoplifting conviction was not a crime involving moral turpitude. The Immigration Judge denied Petitioner’s application. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Petitioner’s appeal, concluding that the IJ properly found that Petitioner’s shoplifting conviction was, in addition to the larceny conviction, a crime involving moral turpitude, making him ineligible for the petty offense exception. The First Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA did not provide a comprehensive analysis to support its conclusion Petitioner’s shoplifting conviction was also a crime involving moral turpitude, and therefore, the case must be remanded to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Mejia v. Holder" on Justia Law

In August 2011, the Department updated the special procedures that establish the minimum wages and working conditions employers must offer U.S. sheepherders, goatherders, and open-range (cattle) herders before hiring foreign herders. Plaintiffs, U.S. workers experienced in herding claimed that the Department administers the temporary worker visa program in a way that gives herding operations access to inexpensive foreign labor without protecting U.S. workers. The court concluded that the district court erred in holding that plaintiffs lacked both Article III and prudential standing to bring this action where plaintiffs were injured by the Department's promulgation of the Training and Employment Guidance Letters (TEGLs) and fell within the zone of interests protected by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. 1188(a)(1). On the merits, the court concluded that plaintiffs were entitled to entry of summary judgment in their favor where the Department violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553, by promulgating TEGLs without providing public notice and an opportunity for comment. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Mendoza, et al. v. Harris, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Guatemala, entered the United States without inspection sometime in 1999 or 2000. In 2006, Petitioner was charged with removability. In 2011, Petitioner conceded removability and filed an application for withholding of removal, arguing that he would be targeted for extortion and violence by Guatemalan gangs because he had stayed in the United States for an extended period and thus would be perceived as wealthy upon his return to Guatemala. An Immigration Judge denied Petitioner’s application, concluding that Petitioner had failed to show that he was a member of a particular social group and could not show a “clear probability” that he would likely be persecuted upon returning to Guatemala. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA’s judgment was reasonable and consistent with the Court’s past precedent, as well as with its own. View "Sam v. Holder" on Justia Law