Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The petitioner, who entered the United States without authorization in 2006, lived with his wife and three children, all of whom are U.S. citizens. He was the primary financial provider for the family, earning significantly more than his wife and providing health insurance for the household. The family faced removal proceedings after the petitioner was arrested for driving on a suspended license and leaving the scene of an accident. The petitioner argued that his removal would cause his children exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, citing their emotional distress and the family’s financial dependence on him.An immigration judge found that the petitioner met all statutory requirements for cancellation of removal except for the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard. The judge determined that, while the family would experience financial and emotional difficulties, these did not rise above what is typically expected in removal cases. The petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which affirmed the immigration judge’s decision, assuming for the sake of argument that all three children were qualifying relatives.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case, holding that it had jurisdiction to consider legal questions related to the application of the hardship standard. The court applied a deferential standard of review, as suggested by recent Supreme Court precedent, and concluded that the immigration judge’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and were not clearly erroneous. The court held that the petitioner had not demonstrated that his removal would result in hardship substantially beyond what is ordinarily expected in such cases. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit denied the petition for review. View "Santos Mendoza v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Guatemalan citizen who had been present in the United States since 2007 conceded removability for entering the country without admission or parole. He applied for cancellation of removal, which requires, among other things, at least ten years of continuous physical presence and a qualifying U.S. citizen relative who would suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” if he were removed. The Immigration Judge found that he met the good moral character and criminal history requirements but concluded he had not established the necessary continuous presence or that his U.S. citizen son was a qualifying relative, partly due to lack of documentation. The judge also found that, even if the son qualified, the hardship did not exceed what is ordinarily expected from a parent’s removal.The petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the Immigration Judge’s findings regarding the qualifying relative and hardship, dismissing the appeal. After the Immigration Judge’s decision but before the BIA’s decision, the petitioner’s U.S. citizen daughter was born. Following the BIA’s dismissal, he moved to reopen his case, arguing that his daughter’s birth was new evidence supporting his eligibility for relief. The BIA denied the motion, reasoning that the daughter’s birth was not “new” evidence because it occurred while the appeal was pending, and also found insufficient evidence of hardship. A motion for reconsideration was also denied, with the BIA reiterating its interpretation of “former hearing” and again finding no exceptional hardship.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed only the denial of the motion for reconsideration. The court held that “new” evidence for a motion to reopen is evidence unavailable at the last hearing before the Immigration Judge, not before the BIA. However, because the BIA considered the new evidence and found it insufficient, the court found the BIA’s error harmless and denied the petition for review. View "Suchite-Salguero v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

A Venezuelan citizen entered the United States in 2019 on a B-2 visitor visa and applied for asylum before his visa expired. He remained in the country after his visa lapsed, leading to removal proceedings. The petitioner claimed he feared persecution in Venezuela due to his political activities as an opponent of the ruling party, his membership in the Primero Justicia Party, and his activism against the Maduro regime. He recounted being shot by a paramilitary group known as the “colectivos” in 2015, receiving threats, and participating in numerous protests. He also described incidents involving tear gas at demonstrations and threats relayed through neighbors, but acknowledged periods of living unharmed in Venezuela and traveling freely between Venezuela and the United States.An Immigration Judge found the petitioner’s testimony credible but denied relief, concluding that the harms he experienced, individually and collectively, did not rise to the level of persecution required for asylum. The judge also found no well-founded fear of future persecution, noting the petitioner’s ability to travel and live in Venezuela without incident for extended periods. The judge further determined that the petitioner did not meet the higher standard for withholding of removal and failed to show a likelihood of torture necessary for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision, agreeing that the petitioner had not suffered past persecution or established a well-founded fear of future persecution, and that he did not face a particularized risk of torture. The petitioner then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the agency’s findings. The court concluded that the petitioner did not demonstrate past persecution, a well-founded fear of future persecution, or eligibility for withholding of removal or CAT protection. View "Rubio v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A woman from El Salvador, after her husband fled to the United States due to gang threats, was subjected to repeated extortion and threats of violence, including sexual extortion, by gang members who targeted her because she was a woman living alone with her children. Despite seeking help from local police, she was told to comply with the gang or flee. After enduring escalating threats and payments, she eventually fled to the United States with her children.Upon arrival, she retained an attorney to represent her in her asylum proceedings. She informed her attorney of both the financial and sexual extortion she faced, but he failed to include the sexual extortion in her application and proposed a legal theory for asylum based on a particular social group (PSG) that was foreclosed by existing precedent. The immigration judge, sitting in the Immigration Court, found the proposed PSG not cognizable and denied her claim, concluding the gang’s motivation was financial rather than based on group membership. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, adopting the immigration judge’s reasoning and denying her appeal.Represented by new counsel, she moved to reopen her case before the Board of Immigration Appeals, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) and proposing alternative, plausible PSGs. The Board denied the motion, finding no IAC and concluding her harm was not due to a protected characteristic. She then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review.The Fourth Circuit held that noncitizens who retain counsel in removal proceedings have a Fifth Amendment right to a fundamentally fair hearing, which can be violated by ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found her original attorney’s performance objectively unreasonable and prejudicial, as alternative PSGs could have led to a different outcome. The court granted the petition for review, reversed the Board’s denial of her motion to reopen, vacated the denial of her asylum and withholding claims, and remanded for a new hearing. View "Guandique-De Romero v. Bondi" on Justia Law

An employee of a multinational information technology company alleged that his employer engaged in fraudulent practices by obtaining less expensive L-1 and B-1 visas for foreign workers who, according to him, should have been sponsored under the more costly H-1B visa program. He claimed this allowed the company to avoid paying higher application fees and payroll taxes owed to the U.S. government. The employee also asserted that after he reported these alleged practices internally, the company retaliated against him by imposing unrealistic performance goals, removing him from a key client account, and ultimately terminating his employment.After the employee filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the government declined to intervene. The district court dismissed the employee’s first amended complaint, holding that he failed to state a claim for a reverse false claim under the FCA because the company was not obligated to pay higher payroll taxes or application fees for visas it never sought. The court also dismissed the retaliation claim, finding that the employee’s reports concerned only potential statutory and regulatory violations, not FCA-protected activity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the reverse false claim, concluding that the employer had no established obligation under the FCA to pay higher payroll taxes or H-1B visa fees for visas it did not apply for. However, the appellate court reversed the dismissal of the retaliation claim, holding that the employee sufficiently alleged he engaged in protected activity under the FCA and that the employer retaliated against him for this conduct. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the retaliation claim. View "United States v. Tata Consultancy Services, LTD" on Justia Law

David Fiddler, a Jamaican national who entered the United States as a child, was convicted in Illinois of first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder, resulting in a lengthy prison sentence. He suffers from severe schizophrenia, which has led to repeated hospitalizations. After the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him in 2021, Fiddler sought deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), arguing that, if returned to Jamaica, he would likely become homeless, lack access to mental health care, and face violence from police or private individuals, with the acquiescence of authorities, due to his mental illness.An Immigration Judge (IJ) initially denied Fiddler’s CAT claim, finding insufficient evidence that he would face a substantial risk of torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded for further analysis, but the IJ again denied relief, concluding that while Fiddler was likely to become homeless and vulnerable, the evidence did not show a substantial risk of torture or that Jamaican officials would act with the specific intent required under the CAT. The BIA affirmed, holding that Fiddler had not demonstrated that harm he feared would be inflicted with the specific intent to torture, nor that Jamaican officials would acquiesce in torture by private actors. After a further remand and another BIA affirmation (with one dissent), Fiddler petitioned for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and denied the petition. The court held that Fiddler failed to establish it was more likely than not he would be tortured with the specific intent required by the CAT, either by government officials or with their acquiescence. The court found the BIA’s analysis consistent with CAT standards and concluded that the evidence did not compel a contrary result. View "Fiddler v Bondi" on Justia Law

Two noncitizens, one from Egypt and one from Guatemala, each entered the United States in the 1990s and were granted asylum after claiming persecution in their home countries. Both later committed criminal offenses—one was convicted of stalking and child endangerment, the other of multiple driving while intoxicated offenses. As a result, the Department of Homeland Security initiated proceedings to terminate their asylum status, arguing that their convictions constituted “particularly serious crimes.” Immigration Judges in both cases terminated their asylum status and ordered their removal, but the petitioners sought to adjust their status to lawful permanent resident under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b).In the first case, the Immigration Judge initially granted the adjustment application, reasoning that the statute did not explicitly require current asylum status. The Department of Homeland Security appealed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reversed, relying on its decision in Matter of T-C-A-, which held that only those with current asylum status are eligible for adjustment. In the second case, the Immigration Judge denied the adjustment application on the same grounds, and the BIA affirmed. Both petitioners then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the statutory language and the relevant context, including neighboring provisions and legislative history. The court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) requires a noncitizen to have current asylum status to be eligible for adjustment to lawful permanent resident status. The court concluded that a past grant of asylum is insufficient if that status has since been terminated. Accordingly, the court denied both petitions for review. View "Wassily v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The defendant, a Mexican citizen, was first brought to the United States as a child. He was discovered by federal officials in Texas in 2015 and deported later that year. In 2020, he was again found in the United States and arrested on outstanding warrants. He was convicted in state court for drug-related offenses and sentenced to five years in prison. While serving this sentence, he was screened by immigration authorities and subsequently indicted for illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). In 2024, he pleaded guilty to the federal charge without a plea agreement. The district court sentenced him to 24 months in prison and one year of supervised release, adopting special conditions recommended in the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), including requirements to report to immigration authorities and seek work authorization.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas confirmed at sentencing that the defendant and his counsel had reviewed the PSR, which contained the special conditions. The court orally adopted the PSR and its appendix, imposed the recommended conditions, and provided the defendant an opportunity to object. The defendant’s counsel objected only to the relationship between the federal and state offenses, not to the special conditions. The written judgment included all the conditions from the PSR. The defendant appealed, arguing that the written judgment conflicted with the oral pronouncement regarding the special conditions of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case for plain error, as the defendant had notice and an opportunity to object at sentencing but did not do so. The court held that the district court satisfied the oral-pronouncement requirement by adopting the PSR and providing notice and opportunity to object. Therefore, there was no conflict between the written judgment and the oral pronouncement, and the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Quezada-Atayde" on Justia Law

A married couple, both citizens of Mexico, have lived in the United States for over twenty years without legal status. They have two U.S.-born children, one of whom, I.L., has a learning disability, ADHD, and requires ongoing medical and educational support. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against the couple, who conceded inadmissibility but sought cancellation of removal, arguing that deportation would cause their son an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” due to his special needs and the alleged lack of adequate services in Mexico.An immigration judge found both parents credible and agreed they met the first three statutory requirements for cancellation of removal, but concluded they did not satisfy the hardship requirement. The judge acknowledged the difficulties I.L. would face but determined these did not rise to the high threshold set by the statute. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the judge’s decisions in separate, but materially identical, rulings, agreeing that the hardship standard was not met.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the Board’s application of the hardship standard under the substantial-evidence standard, as clarified by recent Supreme Court precedent. The court held that the Board’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, given the record showed that some medical and educational services were available in Mexico and that the Board applied the correct legal standard. The court denied the petitions for review, holding that the Board’s application of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) is reviewable for substantial evidence, and that the Board’s decisions in these cases met that standard. View "Lopez-Martinez v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Two students challenged the University of California’s policy that prohibits the employment of undocumented students who lack federal work authorization. The University’s longstanding practice allowed employment of undocumented students with Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status, as they have federal work authorization, but excluded those without such authorization. After the federal government stopped accepting new DACA applications, the number of undocumented students without work authorization increased. The University considered changing its policy but ultimately decided against it, citing significant risks of federal enforcement under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) and related regulations, and dissolved a working group tasked with exploring alternatives.The students filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, arguing that the University’s policy was an abuse of discretion and violated the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) by discriminating based on immigration status. The court initially denied the petition, but the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case back, instructing the appellate court to reconsider. The University argued that its policy was based on risk assessment rather than a definitive interpretation of IRCA, and that even if the policy was discriminatory, the risk of federal enforcement justified its continuation.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, held that the University’s policy facially discriminates based on immigration status and that, under state law, such discrimination is only permissible if required by federal law, which the University did not establish. The court concluded that the University abused its discretion by relying solely on litigation risk as a justification for its policy. The court issued a writ of mandate directing the University to reconsider its policy using proper legal criteria. View "Munoz v. The Regents of the University of Cal." on Justia Law