Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Brazil, entered the United States without inspection in 2004 to be with his son, Gustavo, a U.S. citizen. Petitioner sought cancellation of removal, claiming his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to Gustavo. The immigration judge (IJ) found Petitioner credible but determined he failed to meet the high burden of proving such hardship. The IJ noted Gustavo's behavioral issues but found no evidence of medical or learning disabilities and concluded that Gustavo's mother, who was his primary caretaker, would continue to support him.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision on two grounds: first, Gustavo had turned 21 while the appeal was pending, disqualifying him as a qualifying relative; second, the BIA agreed with the IJ's hardship determination. Petitioner then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.The First Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision, which had adopted the IJ's reasoning. The court noted that it could only review legal questions and not factual determinations. Petitioner argued that the BIA failed to state the standard of review, applied the wrong standard, ignored relevant factors, cherry-picked evidence, and improperly required expert reports. The court found no merit in these arguments, noting that the BIA's decision was consistent with its precedent and that the BIA had appropriately reviewed the IJ's findings for clear error and the hardship determination de novo.Ultimately, the First Circuit held that the agency did not err in its hardship determination, finding that Petitioner failed to prove that Gustavo's hardship would be substantially beyond the ordinary hardship expected when a close family member is removed. The petition for review was denied. View "Goncalves Leao v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The Department of Labor (DoL) issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in 2019 to amend its 2010 regulations regarding the H-2A visa program. In January 2021, during the final days of the Trump Administration, the DoL announced a final rule and submitted it to the Office of the Federal Register (OFR) for publication. However, the rule was withdrawn by the DoL under the Biden Administration before it was made available for public inspection. In 2022, the DoL issued a new rule based on the 2019 NPRM.The National Council of Agricultural Employers (NCAE) challenged the withdrawal of the 2021 rule and the promulgation of the 2022 rule, arguing that the 2021 rule was unlawfully repealed. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that the NCAE lacked standing to challenge the withdrawal of the 2021 rule but had standing to challenge the 2022 rule. The court denied the NCAE's request for a preliminary injunction and later granted the DoL's cross-motion for summary judgment, determining that the 2021 rule had not become final because it was never made available for public inspection by the OFR.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and held that the rulemaking process culminated in the 2022 rule. The court determined that a substantive rule is not final until the OFR makes it available for public inspection. Since the 2021 rule was withdrawn before it became final, the DoL did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by issuing the 2022 rule without a new round of notice and comment. The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "National Council of Agricultural Employers v. DOL" on Justia Law

Sunshine State Regional Center, Inc. (Sunshine State) is an EB-5 regional center that was designated in 2014. The EB-5 program allows immigrants to obtain visas by investing in job-creating enterprises in the U.S. The EB-5 Reform and Integrity Act of 2022 (the Act) introduced an annual fee for regional centers to fund the EB-5 Integrity Fund, aimed at preventing fraud. Sunshine State, which is not currently sponsoring new investment projects, argued that it should not be subject to this fee because it was designated before the Act was passed.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Sunshine State’s motion for summary judgment and granted, in part, the motion to dismiss filed by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The district court found that the Act’s text did not exempt pre-Act regional centers from the Integrity Fund Fee and that the structure of the Act suggested the opposite.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Act’s language and structure indicate that all regional centers, regardless of when they were designated, are subject to the Integrity Fund Fee. The court reasoned that the term “designated under subparagraph (E)” includes both pre- and post-Act regional centers because the Act governs the entire EB-5 program, and any designation for that program must now operate under subparagraph (E). The court also rejected Sunshine State’s argument that imposing the fee would be retroactive, stating that the fee is prospective and applies to the ongoing status of being a designated regional center.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, upholding the imposition of the Integrity Fund Fee on Sunshine State. View "Sunshine State Regional Center, Inc. v. Director, US Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

Juan Carlos Bejar-Guizar was spotted by U.S. Border Patrol agents walking along a divided highway near the U.S.-Mexico border in San Diego. The agents noticed that Bejar-Guizar had muddy legs and boots, suggesting he had recently crossed the Tijuana River. He admitted to the agents that he was in the United States unlawfully. Bejar-Guizar was subsequently convicted of unlawful entry into the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1).The United States District Court for the Southern District of California convicted Bejar-Guizar. He appealed, arguing that the Border Patrol agents lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him and that his admissions of alienage were not sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence under the doctrine of corpus delicti.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Border Patrol agents had reasonable suspicion to briefly detain Bejar-Guizar based on the totality of the circumstances, including his proximity to the border, the time of day, and his muddy appearance. The court also held that Bejar-Guizar's admissions of alienage were sufficiently corroborated by circumstantial and other evidence, including his prior deportation and the consistency of his statements. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, upholding Bejar-Guizar's conviction. View "USA V. BEJAR-GUIZAR" on Justia Law

In October 2018, Veronica Pineda De Aquino used a false identity to apply for a U.S. passport, submitting fraudulent documents. Investigators, with the cooperation of the real identity holder, A.E., determined Pineda was a Mexican citizen who had entered the U.S. in 1999. In June 2023, a grand jury indicted Pineda for making a false statement in a passport application and using another person’s social security number. Pineda initially pled not guilty but later entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to the first count in exchange for the dismissal of the second count.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas accepted Pineda’s guilty plea but deferred the decision on the plea agreement until reviewing the presentence investigation report (PSR). The PSR detailed Pineda’s difficult background and calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 0 to 6 months of imprisonment. At sentencing, the district court adopted the PSR without objection but varied upward, sentencing Pineda to 32 months of imprisonment, citing the seriousness of her offense and the need for deterrence. The court dismissed the second count as per the plea agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Pineda argued that the district court erred by not expressly accepting or rejecting the plea agreement and by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence. The appellate court found that the district court constructively accepted the plea agreement and that any error was not plain. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Pineda above the Guidelines range, considering the aggravating factors and the need for deterrence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. De Aquino" on Justia Law

Robert Lanoue, a Canadian citizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States, pleaded guilty to submitting false claims to the government under 18 U.S.C. § 287. He operated a scuba school that was part of a government program funded by the post-9/11 GI Bill, which reimbursed him for teaching veterans. Lanoue admitted to submitting false and fraudulent claims, resulting in a loss of over $3 million to the Department of Veterans' Affairs. Following his conviction, the government initiated removal proceedings, arguing that his crime was an aggravated felony involving fraud or deceit with losses exceeding $10,000.The Immigration Judge found that Lanoue's crime met the criteria for an aggravated felony and denied his request for a waiver of inadmissibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld this decision, leading Lanoue to petition for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that Lanoue's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 287 categorically involved deceit, as the statute requires knowingly submitting false claims to the government. The court also found that the government had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the loss exceeded $10,000, based on Lanoue's stipulation and plea agreement indicating losses between $1.5 and $3.5 million.Lanoue's argument for a retroactive waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) was rejected. The court noted that to qualify for such a waiver, a lawful permanent resident must have been convicted or admitted to the crime at the time of reentry, which was not the case for Lanoue.The Third Circuit held that filing false claims under 18 U.S.C. § 287 is an aggravated felony involving deceit, and the government sufficiently proved the loss amount. Consequently, Lanoue is removable and ineligible for a waiver. The court denied his petition for review. View "Lanoue v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

Hector David Tipan Lopez, a native of Ecuador, suffered persecution by a local gang, the Lobos, due to his efforts to encourage young drug addicts to stop using drugs after converting to Evangelical Christianity. The gang targeted him multiple times, robbing, beating, and threatening him, and he did not seek medical care or report these incidents to the police due to distrust. Fearing for his life, he entered the United States in February 2023 and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings after his arrest for domestic violence. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found him credible but denied his applications, ruling that his religion, race, and political opinions were not central reasons for his persecution. The IJ also concluded that Ecuadorian authorities would not acquiesce to his torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA applied an incorrect legal standard by using a subordination-based test and an animus-based test for determining the nexus between Tipan Lopez's persecution and his religion. The court remanded the religious-nexus question to the BIA with instructions not to apply these tests. The court also remanded the CAT claim for the BIA to determine whether Ecuador can protect Tipan Lopez from torture, as the BIA did not make this determination. The court denied the petition for review regarding the BIA's findings on race and political opinion. View "Lopez v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

The case involves two organizations, Doc Society and International Documentary Association (IDA), which promote documentary filmmaking globally. They challenged a policy by the Secretary of State requiring visa applicants to disclose their social media information from the past five years. The plaintiffs argued that this policy violated the First Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act, claiming it impeded their core activities and harmed their members.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that the plaintiffs had organizational standing but dismissed their claims on the merits, stating they failed to state a claim under the First Amendment or the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not adequately allege that a favorable decision would redress their claimed injuries. The court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not provide specific allegations showing that their partners and members would return to their prior use of social media or reconsider their willingness to travel to the United States if the policy were vacated. The court reversed the district court's determination that the plaintiffs had standing, vacated the remainder of the district court's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings, including whether the plaintiffs should be granted leave to amend their complaint. View "Doc Society v. Rubio" on Justia Law

N.S. was arrested for robbery and destruction of property and was released on his own recognizance by a Magistrate Judge. However, before he could leave the courthouse, U.S. Marshals detained him based on an ICE detainer. N.S. filed a class complaint alleging that the Marshals acted beyond their statutory authority by making a civil immigration arrest, violating the Administrative Procedure Act.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia certified the proposed class and granted N.S.'s request for a permanent injunction, prohibiting Marshal Dixon and his agents from arresting and detaining criminal defendants in the Superior Court for suspected civil immigration violations. The court held that the Marshals were not authorized to make civil immigration arrests as they had not undergone the required training. The court also found that the 2002 Order delegating authority to the Marshals lacked sufficient legal support.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Marshals were not authorized to make civil immigration arrests due to the lack of required training. However, the court found that the class-wide injunction issued by the district court was barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), which prohibits lower courts from enjoining the operation of certain immigration provisions. The court vacated the injunction and remanded the case to the district court to reconsider the appropriate remedy. View "N.S. v. Dixon" on Justia Law

Victor Manuel Castro-Aleman, originally from El Salvador, was brought to the United States illegally in 1973 as a child. Over the years, he had multiple encounters with law enforcement, including four DUI convictions in Virginia between 2009 and 2014. In 2016, while serving a sentence for his fourth DUI, he was visited by ICE agents and subsequently issued a Notice to Appear in removal proceedings. He was ordered removed by an Immigration Judge (IJ) after failing to submit an asylum application and not appealing the removal order. Castro-Aleman reentered the United States illegally and was discovered in Virginia in 2023, leading to his indictment for illegal reentry.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Castro-Aleman's motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that his 2016 removal order was invalid due to due process violations. The district court found that he had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal the removal order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Castro-Aleman failed to demonstrate that his removal order was "fundamentally unfair" under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(3). The court found that even if there were due process violations, such as the IJ's failure to inform him adequately of his right to appeal, Castro-Aleman could not show actual prejudice. His extensive criminal history and admissions during the removal hearing established multiple independent grounds for his removability, making any appeal futile. Consequently, the court affirmed the denial of his motion to dismiss and upheld his conviction for illegal reentry. View "United States v. Castro-Aleman" on Justia Law