Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Murugan, a member of Sri Lanka’s Tamil minority, claims that he left Sri Lanka and entered the U.S. without authorization because of incidents involving the Sri Lankan Army. One incident involved overnight detention and questioning. Another incident, involving four days of detention and interrogation while tied to a chair included kicking and slapping. After his release, Murugan was hospitalized and attended mental health counseling. Murugan did not report his arrest to the police or any other government authority. Finally, soldiers came to Murugan’s home, arrested him, and threatened to take him to an army torture camp. After six hours of detention, Murugan was released. Murugan’s parents told him that his life was in danger and that people who had been previously arrested with him had been re-arrested and sent to the torture camp.In removal proceedings, Murugan applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture relief. He alleged past persecution and well-founded fear of future persecution based on an imputed political opinion and membership in the particular social groups of Tamils and returned asylum seekers. He testified that he feared he would be arrested at the airport, tortured, and killed. The IJ and BIA rejected his claims. The Eleventh Circuit denied a petition for relief, noting that Murugan had not exhausted some of his arguments before the BIA and that the agency applied the correct legal standards. The factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. View "Murugan v. United States Attorney General" on Justia Law

Plancarte, a licensed nurse from Mexico, obtained the position after the Mayor of Arteaga recommended her to the director of the hospital “because I had treated cartel members before in silence and the Mayor wanted” her to continue to work on cartel members. Plancarte recounted incidents during which armed men forcibly took her to “treat” people. She saw violence and rape; her family was threatened with violence. During one incident, a man “snatched” Plancarte’s infant son from her arms; another man pointed his gun at her mother and her son. Another time, they beat her until she bled, kidnapped her son, and forced her into a vehicle; after complying with their orders, she got her son back and fled to the U.S.The BIA affirmed the denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Ninth Circuit remanded for a determination of whether the likelihood of torture if Plancarte were returned to Mexico is sufficient to warrant CAT relief. The Board’s rejection of Plancarte’s proposed particular social group of “female nurses” on the ground that “nursing” is not an immutable characteristic was unreasonable. Even if Plancarte ceased employment as a nurse, she would still be a nurse; the cartel targeted Plancarte precisely because of her special skills. The Board’s decision ignored uncontradicted record evidence showing both acquiescence and direct involvement by government officials. View "Plancarte-Sauceda v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit previously granted a petition for review of the BIA's denial of asylum and withholding where Dai, a citizen of China, alleged that he was beaten, arrested, jailed, and denied food, water, sleep, and medical care because he tried to stop the police from forcing his wife to have an abortion. The court held that neither the IJ nor the BIA made a finding that Dai's testimony was not credible.The Supreme Court held that the “deemed-true-or-credible rule” was irreconcilable with the Immigration and Nationality Act, which provides that a reviewing court must accept administrative findings as conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary. If the BIA’s reasons for rejecting an alien’s credibility are reasonably discernible, it must be understood as having rebutted the presumption of credibility.On remand, the Ninth Circuit reversed its prior order, finding that the BIA implicitly considered Dai’s statutory rebuttable presumption of credibility on appeal to have been conclusively rebutted. By statute, an alien must satisfy the trier of fact that his factual claim is credible and also persuasive. Even if the BIA treats an individual’s testimony as credible, the agency need not find his evidence persuasive or sufficient to meet the burden of proof. The agency’s findings of fact and conclusions are demonstrably reasonable; no reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary View "Dai v. Garland" on Justia Law

In an action concerning the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) created by the Secretary of DHS on December 20, 2018, and purportedly rescinded by DHS in a memorandum on June 1, 2021, the district court concluded that DHS's purported rescission of MPP violated, inter alia, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).After determining that the States' claims are justiciable, the Fifth Circuit denied the Government's motion for an emergency stay pending appeal of the district court's permanent injunction enjoining and restraining DHS from implementing or enforcing the June 1 Memorandum and ordering DHS to enforce and implement MPP in good faith. The court held that DHS failed to satisfy the four Nken stay factors. The court concluded that the Government is not likely to succeed on either its APA arguments or its 8 U.S.C. 1225 arguments, let alone that the Government is likely to succeed on both. Therefore, the Government has not come close to a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits. In this case, the Secretary failed to consider several relevant factors and important aspects of the problem, including the States' legitimate interests, MPP's benefits, potential alternatives to MPP, and section 1225's implications. Furthermore, the Government's counterarguments are unpersuasive.The court also concluded that the Government has not shown that it will be irreparably injured absent a stay pending appeal; the States have suffered, and will continue to suffer, harms as a result of the termination of MPP; and the Government is also wrong to say that a stay would promote the public interest by preserving the separation of powers. Finally, the court rejected the Government's contention that a stay is warranted because the district court should have remanded without vacating the June 1 Memorandum or issuing an injunction. View "Texas v. Biden" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court granting Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordering the immigration judge (IJ) to conduct a second bond hearing, holding that remand was required.Petitioner, who entered the United States without being admitted or paroled, was arrested and detained pending a determination of her removability. Petitioner was subsequently denied bond at a hearing in which the IJ placed the burden on Petitioner to prove that she was neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk. The district court ordered the IJ to conduct a second bond hearing at which the government bore the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner was either a danger or a flight risk. After a second hearing, the IJ released Petitioner on bond. The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the government need not prove a detainee's flight risk by clear and convincing evidence; and (2) the judgment is otherwise affirmed. View "Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition challenging the denial of petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture following a determination by an IJ that he was not credible. The IJ concluded that petitioner was attempting to bolster his application through false testimony and determined that petitioner was not credible.The court explained that, while a factual omission is ordinarily less probative of credibility than an inconsistency, the omission here concerned material information that petitioner would be expected to have divulged earlier in the process. In this case, petitioner's inclusion on a blacklist was the difference between him being the victim of a discrete instance of harassment at the hands of local police on the one hand and the target of a coordinated campaign by national officials to persecute petitioner because of his religion on the other. Therefore, how petitioner knew that he was on that list, then, was critical to his application. Because petitioner failed to raise these facts earlier, and given petitioner's father also omitted this information from his letter, the court concluded that there was substantial evidence supporting the agency's adverse credibility determination. View "Jian Liang v. Garland" on Justia Law

Germain was admitted to the U.S. in 2007 as a lawful permanent resident. Roughly 10 years later, he was convicted of conspiracy to commit an offense to defraud the government, 18 U.S.C. 371, and three counts of making a false statement in an immigration application, 18 U.S.C. 1546(a). Charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony based on his section 1546(a) convictions, Germain argued that those convictions did not qualify as “aggravated felonies” under 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). He sought cancellation of removal. under section 1229b(a). Germain argued that the parenthetical “(related to document fraud)” in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(P) limited the qualifying 1546(a) convictions to those expressly involving document fraud.The IJ ordered Germain removed, reasoning that 1546(a) was divisible because it enumerated four distinct offenses in its four paragraphs. Applying the modified categorical approach, the IJ determined that Germain’s indictment showed that he had pleaded guilty to three counts of making a false statement of material fact on an immigration application, all of which qualified as aggravated felonies because they were offenses described in 1546(a). The BIA dismissed Germain’s appeal. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed his petition for review. All four paragraphs of section 1546(a) relate to document fraud and the plain text and structure of the Act demonstrate that the parenthetical “(relating to document fraud)” is merely descriptive of 1546(a), rather than limiting. View "Germain v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted in part and denied in part a petition challenging the BIA's finding that petitioner's conviction for theft of a vehicle under California Vehicle Code 10851(a) is an aggravated felony, which renders him ineligible for certain forms of relief. The panel has held, and the parties do not dispute, that section 10851(a) is overbroad because it criminalizes a broader swath of conduct than the generic theft offense.Applying the framework described in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248–49 (2016), the panel held that section 10851(a) is indivisible in its treatment of accessories after the fact. Because section 10851(a) does not categorically match the generic theft offense, a conviction under section 10851(a) is not an aggravated felony. The panel overruled Duenas-Alvarez v. Holder, 733 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2013), on the ground that it was irreconcilable with Mathis. Therefore, in petitioner's case, he has not been convicted of an aggravated felony and the panel remanded for consideration of his requests for asylum and cancellation of removal. In a concurrently filed memorandum, the panel denied petitioner's requests for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. View "Lopez-Marroquin v. Garland" on Justia Law

Sharma entered the U.S. in 1997, on a nonimmigrant visitor visa. In 2011, he was charged as removable. Sharma sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, alleging that he had been threatened by the Senior Superintendent of the Ludhiana, Punjab Police, Saini, based on Sharma’s investigation of the disappearance of Sharma's client. In 1997, days after a protest against Saini, police came to Sharma’s office, took Sharma’s files, tied Sharma’s hands, blindfolded him, put him in a van, and made threats, By phone, Saini told Sharma to “worry about [his] family,” and if he continued to investigate the disappearance. Sharma’s captivity lasted 18-19 hours. He does not identify any resulting physical injuries.After he left India, the police “initially harassed” Sharma’s wife. As of Sharma’s hearing, Saini worked as Chairman of the Punjab Police Housing Corporation. Sharma’s daughters live in Australia, Sharma’s wife splits her time between India, Australia, and the U.S.. Sharma’s son lives in India. None of Sharma’s family members has ever been physically harmed. The IJ found Sharma’s application timely, given changed circumstances, and his testimony “generally” credible but concluded that Sharma’s past harm did not rise to the level of persecution. The IJ denied voluntary departure based on Sharma’s 2011 DUI conviction. The BIA affirmed. The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review. Sharma failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, given the family’s “travel history.” View "Sharma v. Garland" on Justia Law

Sura served in the Salvadoran Army and helped local police arrest gang members, including members of MS-13. In February 2016, MS-13 members told him that they had an order for him to disappear. He did not report it to the police because he was concerned that some police officers were also MS-13 members. Sura continued his military service until it was completed, later testifying that he did not want to be AWOL. In May 2016, four men were murdered five kilometers from where Sura was stationed. According to an Interpol Red Notice, an arrest warrant was issued for Sura and others asserting that they murdered four MS-13 gang members.Sura entered the U.S. months later and was removed after stating that he had no fear of returning to El Salvador. Eight days later, he re-entered and was placed in withholding-only proceedings after expressing a fear of returning to El Salvador. Sura applied for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. Sura denied any prior knowledge of either arrest warrant and any role in the murders. Sura testified that he feared returning to El Salvador and being placed in custody based on false charges, where he would be vulnerable to MS-13 and his former colleagues who framed him.The IJ ordered Villalobos Sura removed, finding him statutorily ineligible for withholding of removal under the serious nonpolitical crime bar. The IJ found Sura’s testimony insufficiently credible and that the isolated threat did not amount to past persecution. The BIA affirmed. The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review. The Interpol Red Notice, among other evidence, created a serious reason to believe Sura committed a serious nonpolitical crime before entering the U.S., rendering him ineligible for withholding of removal. View "Villalobos-Sura v. Garland" on Justia Law