Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Sharma entered the U.S. in 1997, on a nonimmigrant visitor visa. In 2011, he was charged as removable. Sharma sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, alleging that he had been threatened by the Senior Superintendent of the Ludhiana, Punjab Police, Saini, based on Sharma’s investigation of the disappearance of Sharma's client. In 1997, days after a protest against Saini, police came to Sharma’s office, took Sharma’s files, tied Sharma’s hands, blindfolded him, put him in a van, and made threats, By phone, Saini told Sharma to “worry about [his] family,” and if he continued to investigate the disappearance. Sharma’s captivity lasted 18-19 hours. He does not identify any resulting physical injuries.After he left India, the police “initially harassed” Sharma’s wife. As of Sharma’s hearing, Saini worked as Chairman of the Punjab Police Housing Corporation. Sharma’s daughters live in Australia, Sharma’s wife splits her time between India, Australia, and the U.S.. Sharma’s son lives in India. None of Sharma’s family members has ever been physically harmed. The IJ found Sharma’s application timely, given changed circumstances, and his testimony “generally” credible but concluded that Sharma’s past harm did not rise to the level of persecution. The IJ denied voluntary departure based on Sharma’s 2011 DUI conviction. The BIA affirmed. The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review. Sharma failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, given the family’s “travel history.” View "Sharma v. Garland" on Justia Law

Sura served in the Salvadoran Army and helped local police arrest gang members, including members of MS-13. In February 2016, MS-13 members told him that they had an order for him to disappear. He did not report it to the police because he was concerned that some police officers were also MS-13 members. Sura continued his military service until it was completed, later testifying that he did not want to be AWOL. In May 2016, four men were murdered five kilometers from where Sura was stationed. According to an Interpol Red Notice, an arrest warrant was issued for Sura and others asserting that they murdered four MS-13 gang members.Sura entered the U.S. months later and was removed after stating that he had no fear of returning to El Salvador. Eight days later, he re-entered and was placed in withholding-only proceedings after expressing a fear of returning to El Salvador. Sura applied for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. Sura denied any prior knowledge of either arrest warrant and any role in the murders. Sura testified that he feared returning to El Salvador and being placed in custody based on false charges, where he would be vulnerable to MS-13 and his former colleagues who framed him.The IJ ordered Villalobos Sura removed, finding him statutorily ineligible for withholding of removal under the serious nonpolitical crime bar. The IJ found Sura’s testimony insufficiently credible and that the isolated threat did not amount to past persecution. The BIA affirmed. The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review. The Interpol Red Notice, among other evidence, created a serious reason to believe Sura committed a serious nonpolitical crime before entering the U.S., rendering him ineligible for withholding of removal. View "Villalobos-Sura v. Garland" on Justia Law

Miriyeva, a citizen of Azerbaijan, lawfully entered the U.S. and sought naturalization under 8 U.S.C. 1440. She enlisted in the U.S. Army through the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest program, under which noncitizens have an expedited path to citizenship by serving honorably in the military without first having lawful permanent residence. In 2018, USCIS approved Miriyeva’s application. Before the agency scheduled Miriyeva’s oath of citizenship ceremony, the Army sent her to basic training. During training, a medical condition ended her service. The Army described Miriyeva’s separation as “uncharacterized” since her service ended while she was still at “entry-level.” After her medical discharge, Miriyeva scheduled her oath ceremony but the agency reversed its approval of her naturalization application because the military did not describe her separation as “honorable.”Miriyeva argued that the military refers to “uncharacterized” as “separated under honorable conditions,” when required to do so and that the Army’s policy of treating an uncharacterized separation as not under honorable conditions violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the Constitution’s Uniform Rule of Naturalization Clause, and the Due Process Clause. The district court dismissed Miriyeva’s declaratory judgment suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 1421(c), which precluded Miriyeva’s Administrative Procedure Act and constitutional claims; her Declaratory Judgment Act claim failed without a different, standalone source of jurisdiction. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. Miriyeva strayed from the statutory path for judicial review of claims intertwined with denied naturalization applications. View "Miriyeva v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

In 2002, Meza was served with a notice to appear, at a removal hearing, 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(1), charging that he entered the country “at or near Brownsville, Texas,” and that he was “not then admitted or paroled after inspection by an Immigration Officer,” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). An agent had observed him “wading the Rio Grande River.” An IJ ordered Meza removed in absentia. Meza neither appeared at his removal hearing nor filed a timely petition for review in the Eleventh Circuit. He remained in the U.S. In 2017, Meza applied for an adjustment of status. USCIS denied the application for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that Meza was not an arriving alien, so the immigration courts had exclusive jurisdiction over the application. Meza argued that a checkbox on his notice to appear labeled him as an arriving alien and that immigration officers had paroled him into the U.S.The D.C. Circuit agreed with the district court that it lacked jurisdiction to review USCIS’s decision because Meza had not exhausted his administrative remedies. To succeed, Meza must show that he was an arriving alien, even though the IJ concluded otherwise; he seeks to contest a question of fact arising from his removal proceeding, which he could have done only by filing a timely petition for review of his removal order in the Eleventh Circuit. View "Meza v. Renaud" on Justia Law

Flores-Rodriguez, a Mexican citizen, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1989 when he was two years old. Arrested by DHS in 2010, he stated that he was a citizen and had a U.S. birth certificate. He later sought adjustment of status based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen and claimed he never knowingly made a false claim, having been raised to believe he was a citizen. At a 2012 hearing, the IJ stated that, if DHS pursued a false claim of citizenship charge, and that charge was sustained, Flores-Rodriguez would not be eligible for adjustment. At a 2014 hearing, the IJ recommended that Flores-Rodriguez testify on that issue. Flores-Rodriguez did so; Flores-Rodriguez’s wife and brother also testified. The IJ and BIA concluded that Flores-Rodriguez was ineligible for adjustment.The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review. Flores-Rodriguez was not put on notice that his alleged false claim of citizenship would be at issue in his 2014 hearing. By then, his alleged false claim of citizenship had not been raised by the IJ for two years; the last time it had been discussed the IJ implied it would only be dispositive if DHS sustained a charge against him, but no charge was ever brought. Because Flores-Rodriguez was not given notice, his attorney was not prepared to discuss it; he was unable to submit testimony from his purported midwife, a copy of his U.S. birth certificate, or his parents’ testimony. View "Flores-Rodriguez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Guerrier, a citizen of Haiti, does not speak English. Guerrier entered the U.S. unlawfully. He was apprehended and issued an expedited removal order. He was referred to an asylum officer for a credible fear interview, during which he agreed to proceed without an attorney. After the interview, he asked for a list of lawyers. The asylum officer found that Guerrier failed to establish a credible fear of persecution. Guerrier requested review by an immigration judge (IJ). Guerrier appeared without counsel, stating that he had not received a list of lawyers. The IJ stated that he was not entitled to representation and that he had already received the list of attorneys as an attachment to the paperwork for the review. Guerrier responded, “Maybe I did not see it. I don’t know if it’s the fact that I don’t speak English that I don’t understand it ... I don’t understand what’s going on.” The IJ responded, “that’s not something that I can control,” and proceeded with the hearing, ultimately agreeing with the negative credible fear decision. He entered an order for expedited removal.Guerrier acknowledged that courts typically lack jurisdiction to review direct challenges to expedited removal orders but argued that he raised a colorable constitutional claim. The Ninth Circuit dismissed his petition for review. The Supreme Court’s 2020 “Thuraissigiam” holding abrogated any “colorable constitutional claim” exception to the jurisdictional limits on reviewing challenges to expedited removal orders, 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I). View "Guerrier v. Garland" on Justia Law

Gonzalez-Hernandez, a citizen of El Salvador, arrived in the U.S. at age six. In 1992, he became a lawful permanent resident. In 2001, Gonzalez-Hernandez pled guilty under Texas law to “Deadly Conduct,” knowingly discharging a firearm at or in the direction of one or more individuals or a habitation, building, or vehicle while being reckless as to whether that habitation, building, or vehicle is occupied. A Notice to Appear (NTA) charged Gonzalez Hernandez as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) as an alien who committed an aggravated felony defined by 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) as a crime of violence. Gonzalez-Hernandez unsuccessfully sought withholding of removal. Gonzalez-Hernandez was removed to El Salvador, where he remains. In 2018, the Supreme Court held (Dimaya) that 18 U.S.C. 16(b) (defining “crime of violence”) as incorporated into 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) is unconstitutionally vague.An IJ denied a “Motion to Reconsider and Terminate in Light of Sessions v. Dimaya” as untimely because it was not filed within 30 days of the final administrative order of removal nor within 30 days of the date Gonzalez-Hernandez learned of the change in the law. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review, noting the differences between a motion to reopen and a motion to reconsider and upholding the BIA decision not to consider the motion as one to reopen, although, taking tolling into account, it was timely filed before the 90-day statutory deadline. View "Gonzalez-Hernandez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Matias, a native of El Salvador, unlawfully entered the U.S. in 2014. El Salvadoran authorities considered him a member of MS-13, a violent gang. In Maryland, Matias pleaded guilty to assault in the first degree after being involved in a shooting that authorities determined was retaliation for MS-13 gang activity, and identified Matias as an MS-13 “affiliate.” ICE detained Matias in 2018. Matias requested to be housed with a gang aligned with MS-13. An IJ denied him bond and later denied Matias relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and ordered him removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal. The Ninth Circuit denied his petition for review in 2021.Matias moved the BIA to reopen his case so that it could consider “new developments” regarding his request for CAT relief: claimed political changes in El Salvador and an alleged text from an MS-13 gang member labeling him a “snitch” and saying he will be killed if he returns to El Salvador. The BIA denied his request for an emergency stay. Matias filed a habeas petition, asking the court to enjoin the government from removing him until the BIA ruled on his motion to reopen. The district court denied his motion. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court, which denied Matias’s motion for a temporary restraining order, determining that 8 U.S.C. 1252(g)’s jurisdictional limits barred his claims. View "Rauda v. Jennings" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision ordering petitioner removed. The IJ had granted petitioner relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), finding that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured by al-Shabaab if he were returned to Ethiopia. However, the BIA concluded that the IJ's factual conclusions were clearly erroneous because they were based on a hypothetical chain of occurrences and not a plausible view of the facts and record in the case.The court concluded that the BIA applied the correct legal standard and did not engage in impermissible factfinding. In this case, the BIA cabined itself to reviewing the record and concluded that the evidence could not support the IJ's conclusions about petitioner's likelihood of torture and the Somalian government's acquiescence; it did not reweigh the evidence or find its own facts; and it committed no legal or factual error. View "Mohamed v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's order denying petitioner and her two daughters' motion to reopen and remand. After petitioners sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, their petition was denied. Petitioners then applied for a U nonimmigrant status and moved for the Board to administratively close their appeal pending review of the U visa.In this case, the government has conceded petitioners' prima facie eligibility for U visa status as well as their due diligence in seeking it. The court concluded that the BIA abused its discretion in two respects: it departed from established policy when it failed either to apply the Sanchez Sosa factors or to remand to allow the IJ to do so, and it failed to provide a rational explanation for its decision, including its treatment of this court's binding precedent in Caballero-Martinez v. Barr, 920 F.3d at 549. Accordingly, the court vacated the BIA's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gonzales Quecheluno v. Garland" on Justia Law