Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

In 1997, Romero, a citizen of Guatemala, was granted voluntary departure, having entered the U.S. without documentation. In 2011, Romero was removed. He returned almost immediately. When he was taken into custody, DHS notified Romero of its intent to reinstate his prior removal order. Romero expressed a fear of returning to Guatemala and was referred to an asylum officer, 8 C.F.R. 208.31(b). Finding that Romero had “a reasonable fear of persecution,” the asylum officer referred the matter to an IJ.The Notice of Referral to Immigration Judge provided the place of the hearing, noting that the date and time were “To Be Determined.” Romero subsequently received a Notice of Withdrawal-Only Hearing that included the date, time, and place. The IJ denied withholding of removal. Before the BIA, Romero cited the Supreme Court’s 2018 “Pereira” decision, and argued that “[a] notice of referral to [an] immigration judge is an analogous document to a notice to appear and must contain a location and a date and time for a removal hearing in order to create jurisdiction for an immigration court.”The BIA rejected Romero’s jurisdictional challenge, reasoning that it lacked the authority to grant the relief Mejia Romero sought – termination of the proceedings – in a withholding proceeding. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. Romero’s Notice of Withholding-Only Hearing included the information required by the regulations. Pereira’s holding is not readily transferable to 8 C.F.R. 1003.14. View "Romero v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

In 2002, at the age of seven, Sanchez, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. without inspection. In 2012, he obtained Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status; DHS periodically granted him renewals. In 2019, Sanchez was charged in New Jersey with sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a child. USCIS revoked Sanchez’s DACA status. DHS took him into custody and charged him as being present without having been admitted or paroled, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii).Sanchez applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and for relief under the Convention Against Torture. The IJ denied asylum, finding that Sanchez failed to meet the one-year filing deadline or show extraordinary circumstances; denied withholding of removal, finding the proposed social group was not cognizable; and denied his CAT claim, finding he did not demonstrate at least a 50 percent chance he would be tortured upon his return to Mexico. Two weeks after the IJ ordered Sanchez’s removal, his state criminal charges were dismissed.The BIA denied remand, citing then-Attorney General Sessions’ 2018 Castro-Tum holding that, under the regulations governing the Executive Office of Immigration Review, IJs and the BIA do not have the general authority to indefinitely suspend immigration proceedings by administrative closure unless a regulation or a previous judicially approved settlement expressly authorizes such an action. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded. The relevant regulations confer the general authority to administratively close cases to IJs and the BIA. View "Sanchez v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's request for cancellation of removal. The court concluded that petitioner's grant of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) did not obviate the need for him to demonstrate that he was "admitted" in order to be eligible for cancellation of removal. In this case, 8 U.S.C. 1254a(e) does not excuse section 1229b(a)'s admission requirement for TPS recipients.The court also concluded that petitioner's grant of TPS is not an "admission" for purposes of cancellation of removal. The court explained that its holding in Velasquez v. Barr, 979 F.3d 572, 578 (8th Cir. 2020), is thus limited to adjustment of status and does not bear on whether TPS is an admission for cancellation-of-removal purposes. Furthermore, the fact that section 1254a(f)(4) expressly provides that TPS time counts for these specific purposes indicates it does not apply for other purposes—like cancellation of removal. View "Artola v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision dismissing petitioner's appeal of the IJ's order determining that her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) was abandoned, under 8 C.F.R. 1003.47(c). The IJ's decision was based on petitioner's failure to submit required biometrics or establish good cause for her failure to do so.The panel concluded that the IJ did not abuse its discretion in deeming petitioner's application as abandoned where the IJ twice warned petitioner if she did not provide her biometrics before the next hearing her application would be deemed abandoned, and petitioner did not follow the instructions. Furthermore, petitioner failed to request a continuance before her merits hearing to complete her biometrics and her counsel failed to show good cause for requesting such a continuance. The panel also concluded that the IJ did not abuse its discretion denying petitioner's final request for more time to obtain an attorney. Because petitioner's application for relief was properly found abandoned, the BIA correctly deemed moot any challenge to the denial of petitioner's previous request for a continuance to obtain evidentiary support for her application. Finally, petitioner was not deprived of a neutral arbiter. View "Gonzalez-Veliz v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 1994, K.A., a citizen of Nigeria, entered the U.S. without documentation. In 1997, he married a U.S. citizen. He subsequently committed second-degree robbery (N.J. Stat. 2C:15-1) and received a 10-year sentence, and committed third-degree possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school (2C:35-7), resulting in a five-year sentence. K.A. was paroled in 2008. During removal proceedings, K.A. was stopped for DUI and was charged with using inmates’ personal information to submit fraudulent tax returns. K.A. unsuccessfully sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The Third Circuit denied K.A.’s petition for review.In 2014, Nigeria criminalized same-sex sexual relationships. K.A. had begun a sexual relationship with his male cellmate. K.A. realized that his “identity as a bisexual man [was] permanent” and moved to reopen his immigration proceedings, arguing changed country conditions in Nigeria. He asserted that his New Jersey drug conviction no longer qualified as an aggravated felony and expressed fear that he would be subjected to persecution as a member of the LGBT community. The BIA denied K.A.’s motion. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. The 2000 New Jersey robbery conviction constitutes an aggravated felony “theft offense” under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), which constitutes a “particularly serious crime,” sections 1158(b)(2)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B), and disqualifies an alien from seeking asylum. A conviction for a particularly serious crime coupled with a prison sentence of at least five years bars withholding of removal. View "K. A. v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit denied the petition for review challenging the Board's denial of petitioner's asylum application. Petitioner challenges only the IJ's alternative basis for denial of his petition—the exercise of discretion to deny asylum. The court concluded that petitioner failed to address the separate and dispositive determination that his application is statutorily time-barred, despite the government pointing out this deficiency in its brief. Consequently, this failure is fatal to his petition.The court also denied the petition for review challenging the Board's denial of petitioner's application for withholding of removal. The court concluded that petitioner failed to establish any of the elements necessary for withholding of removal where the record does not show that he is likely to suffer persecution due to his experience as a witness to an incident of gang violence twenty years ago—much less that there is no substantial evidence to support the IJ's determination to that effect. In this case, the Board's conclusion that petitioner would not suffer future harm upon return to Mexico was supported by substantial evidence. View "Guzman-Garcia v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal affirming the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to vacate his 2002 conviction under Cal. Pen. Code 1473.7, holding that Defendant demonstrated a reasonable probability that if he had been properly advised by counsel about the immigration consequences of his plea, he would not have pleaded guilty to an offense subjecting him to mandatory deportation.Defendant was six years old when he came to the United States and lacked any meaningful ties to Mexico, his country of birth. In 2002, Defendant pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine precursors with intent to manufacture. Defendant's counsel did not advise Defendant as to the actual immigration consequences of his plea. Defendant later obtained an order to expunge his conviction. In 2018, Defendant filed a motion to vacate his conviction under section 1473.7. The trial court denied the motion without considering whether Defendant suffered prejudice from counsel's failure to provide adequate advise. The court of appeal affirmed, determining that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance but that Defendant suffered no prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant demonstrated a reasonable probability that if he had been properly advised about the immigration consequences of his plea he would not have pleaded guilty to the offense. View "People v. Vivar" on Justia Law

After being placed in removal proceedings, petitioner sought a U visa. However, petitioner could not acquire the visa without a waiver of inadmissibility. Petitioner requested that waiver from USCIS, but USCIS denied the request.The Fourth Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal, concluding that the DOJ's regulations empower the IJ to consider petitioner's application for an inadmissibility waiver under 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(3)(A)(ii). The court explained that an IJ's ability to grant a section 1182(d)(3)(A)(ii) waiver is consistent with the statutory and regulatory scheme, which entrusts IJs with the responsibility to determine a petitioner's admissibility in removal proceedings, as well as the forms of relief available. The court remanded for the IJ to determine what relief, if any, to which petitioner is entitled, including whether an inadmissibility waiver is appropriate. View "Jimenez-Rodriguez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Nonpermanent resident aliens ordered removed from the U.S. may obtain discretionary relief if, among other things, they can establish their continuous presence in the country for at least 10 years, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1). The “stop-time rule” included in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) provides that the period of continuous presence “shall be deemed to end . . . when the alien is served a notice to appear” in removal proceedings; “notice to appear” is defined as “written notice . . . specifying” certain information, such as the charges and the time and place at which the removal proceedings will be held. A notice that omits any required information does not trigger the stop-time rule.The government ordered the removal of Niz-Chavez and sent him a document containing the charges against him. Weeks later, it sent another document, providing the time and place of his hearing. The government argued that because the documents collectively specified all statutorily required information for “a notice to appear,” Niz-Chavez’s continuous presence in the country stopped when he was served with the second document.The Supreme Court held that a notice to appear sufficient to trigger the stop-time rule is a single document containing all the information about an individual’s removal hearing specified in section 1229(a)(1). In addition to the statute’s use of the article, “a” and the singular noun, “notice,” its structure and history support requiring the government to issue a single notice containing all the required information. Administrative inconvenience never justifies departing from a statute’s clear text. View "Niz-Chavez v. Garland" on Justia Law

After petitioner was convicted of drug and firearm offenses in Georgia, the state pardoned him. However, DHS sought to remove petitioner based on his convictions before the pardon. The IJ ordered petitioner's removal and the BIA dismissed the appeal.The Fourth Circuit dismissed in part and denied in part the petition for review, concluding that petitioner failed to exhaust his argument that pardoned offenses do not qualify as convictions under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. The court also concluded that a pardon waives only the removal grounds specifically enumerated in the Act, and petitioner's pardon does not waive all of the removal grounds proven by the government. View "Tetteh v. Garland" on Justia Law