Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Daniel Awuku-Asare appealed a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision to affirmed his removal order. Awuku-Asare entered the country on a nonimmigrant F-1 visa and could lawfully remain in the United States so long as he complied with the conditions of his visa. Relevant here, maintaining an F-1 visa status requires maintaining a full course of study at an approved educational institution. But Awuku-Asare did not comply with this full-course-of-study requirement because he was incarcerated for approximately 13 months for a crime of which he was ultimately acquitted. In an issue of first impression for the Tenth Circuit, Awuku-Asare argued that “the failure to maintain status must be attributable to the nonimmigrant to render him [removable],” and that because of circumstances beyond his control caused the lapse in his status, he was not removable. The Tenth Circuit determined the plain meaning of the relevant statute did not support Awuku-Asare's interpretation, therefore his arguments were rejected and the BIA's decision affirmed. View "Awuku-Asare v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial of Petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that substantial evidence did not support the BIA's decision.The immigration judge (IJ) determined that Petitioner was not a credible witness and therefore found that he had failed to establish his burden of proof with respect to his application. The BIA dismissed Petitioner's appeal, thus declining to remand the case in light of new evidence submitted for the first time on appeal. The First Circuit vacated the BIA's decision, holding that the IJ's adverse credibility finding was not supportable. View "Cuesta-Rojas v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's denial of his motion to terminate or remand proceedings, and his application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review on the basis of an evidentiary issue with respect to the CAT claim and otherwise denied the petition.The panel concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner's claim, argued for the first time before the panel, that because he never received his 2001 notice of hearing, jurisdiction never vested in the immigration court and his removal proceedings should thus be terminated. The panel explained that precedent squarely forecloses the termination argument that petitioner actually presented to the BIA. The panel also concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the denial of petitioner's motion to seek cancellation of removal based on the alleged "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" his removal would cause to his mother, a legal permanent resident. The panel explained that there is nothing in the record to indicate that there was relevant evidence that the BIA failed to consider in making its hardship decision. The panel concluded that petitioner failed to establish membership in a cognizable social group and is therefore ineligible for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C.1231(b)(3). In regard to the CAT claim, the panel concluded that substantial evidence supports the BIA's determination that petitioner failed to establish that past torture occurred with the consent or acquiescence of a public official as required by 8 C.F.R. 1208.18(a)(1). The panel remanded the CAT claim to the BIA for reconsideration in light of the fact that the IJ took judicial notice of, and relied upon, the Country Report. View "Aquilar-Osorio v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's motion to reopen removal proceedings on the ground that petitioner did not demonstrate a relevant change in country conditions. Petitioner sought to reopen his 2003 removal proceedings based on a "hybrid change in personal circumstances and country conditions" since 2003, so that the agency could consider a new petition for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The panel concluded that petitioner did not present any evidence demonstrating that relevant conditions in Mexico changed since his 2003 removal order, and a change in personal circumstances alone is not sufficient to support a motion to reopen his removal proceedings. The panel further concluded that, even assuming petitioner's changed personal conditions could affect his anticipated experience upon return to his country of removal, by regulation the BIA is not required to grant a motion to reopen based on changed conditions absent a change in that country's conditions. Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to reopen. View "Alonso Rodriguez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's mother married a U.S. citizen in 1999 and divorced him in 2004 because of his violent behavior. Plaintiff had run away the year before, when she was 15, to escape the abuse. At issue is whether, after the divorce, plaintiff remained a "child" of her mother's ex-husband. Plaintiff's mother died shortly after the divorce and could not file a petition under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) on plaintiff's behalf. Plaintiff had to petition on her own behalf, and the agency rejected her application because a self-petition may be filed only by someone who "is the child" of an abusive U.S. citizen. Because, in the agency's view, plaintiff lost stepchild status in 2004, and only a person who "is" a child of an abusive parent may seek relief, the agency denied her application. However, the agency and the district court, relying on Matter of Mowrer, 17 I&N Dec. 613, 615 (1981), both concluded that even after divorce, a person remains a stepchild as long as "a family relationship has continued to exist as a matter of fact between the stepparent and stepchild."The Seventh Circuit held that, in the context of VAWA, "stepchild" status survives divorce. The court explained that someone who is a stepchild during a marriage remains one after divorce, when termination of "stepchild" status would defeat application of the substantive rule that abused stepchildren are entitled to an immigration benefit. The court clarified that Mowrer does not interpret VAWA. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Arguijo v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

Lopez, a citizen of Guatemala, entered the U.S. in the 1990s without admission or parole. In 2003, the government charged her with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and sent Lopez a Notice to Appear that contained a warning in English that if she failed to attend the hearing, the IJ could order her removal, and she might be arrested as a result. Lopez failed to appear at her removal hearing. The IJ ordered her removal in absentia. Immigration officials detained Lopez a few years later. In 2017, Lopez moved to reopen her removal proceedings, claiming that she was the derivative beneficiary of her husband’s pending application for protection under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA).The IJ denied Lopez’s motion, finding Lopez’s NACARA-based claims untimely and that her motion failed to include required documents. The IJ also declined to exercise its discretionary authority to sua sponte reopen Lopez’s removal proceedings. The BIA affirmed, rejecting Lopez’s additional argument on appeal that the 2004 removal order should be rescinded because the Notice to Appear was delivered in English, not in her native language. The Seventh Circuit rejected a petition for review and dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, Lopez’s challenge to the BIA’s decision not to sua sponte reopen her case under its discretionary authority, View "Lopez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision upholding an IJ's denial of petitioner's applications for asylum and withholding of removal. Petitioner claims that she suffered past persecution and has a well-founded fear of future persecution based on her membership in the proposed particular social groups of "Salvadoran women who refuse to be girlfriends of MS gang members" and "Salvadoran women who refuse to be victims of violent sexual predation of gang members."The panel concluded that substantial evidence supports the BIA's dismissal of her past persecution claim. The panel explained that substantial evidence supports the BIA's determination, including its specific reliance on the IJ's findings, that the threats here do not amount to past persecution. In this case, petitioner's neighbor issued vague threats, confronted her several times over a period of weeks, did not perform any acts of violence, and never followed through on any of his threats. Therefore, although condemnable, these threats were not so overwhelming so as to necessarily constitute persecution. The panel also concluded that substantial evidence supports the BIA's determination that petitioner's proposed particular social groups are not distinct in Salvadoran society. Finally, petitioner's argument that the BIA conducted an inadequate inquiry into the record regarding social distinction is unavailing. View "Villegas Sanchez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's order upholding the IJ's decision to deport and remove petitioner to Somalia and denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The court concluded that the BIA did not err in determining that petitioner's second-degree felony assault conviction is a particularly serious crime that bars statutory withholding of removal. The court also concluded that the IJ and the BIA did not err in finding that the particularly serious crime bar foreclosed petitioner's relief for withholding of removal under the CAT. Finally, the court need not address the likelihood that petitioner will be tortured because substantial evidence supports the IJ and the BIA's finding that his torture would not be directed by or acquiesced to by the Somali government. View "Jama v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

There is no conflict between the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Bail Reform Act (BRA) that prevents DHS from civilly detaining a criminal defendant after she has been granted pretrial release pursuant to the BRA.As a preliminary matter, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court's December order is appealable under the BRA, 18 U.S.C. 3145 and 3731. The court explained that the September release order released defendant from criminal detention under the BRA and, considered by itself, the court would lack jurisdiction over the September release order because it was issued by a magistrate judge and not a district court. However, the December order was the district court's affirmation of the September release order in response to defendant's motion to clarify her release status.On the merits, the court concluded that the district court correctly rejected the applicability of 8 U.S.C. 1226(e) and 1252(g) in its December order, explaining it was "not attempting to review or set aside any decision or action to commence removal proceedings" but was instead "attempting to enforce the Magistrate Judge's [September release] Order." The court considered decisions by six other circuits that have addressed the issue and concluded that pretrial release under the BRA does not preclude pre-removal detention under the INA. The court explained that, fundamentally, the BRA and INA concern separate grants of Executive authority and govern independent criminal and civil proceedings. The court concluded that the remaining claims lacked merit and vacated the district court's December order precluding ICE from detaining defendant pending completion of her criminal proceedings. View "United States v. Baltazar-Sebastian" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying Petitioner's request to reopen removal proceedings based on changed country circumstances, holding that the BIA's failure to assess whether certain changes were sufficient was arbitrary and capricious.Petitioner, a native and citizen of Albania, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, arguing that he and his family had been persecuted due to Petitioner's support of the Democratic Party in Albania and that the family had a well-founded fear of future persecution. An immigration judge denied relief, and the BIA affirmed. Petitioner later asked the BIA to reopen his case on the ground that government corruption had deteriorated in Albania. The BIA denied the request. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the BIA "exercised its judgment in an arbitrary, capricious, or irrational manner." View "Lucaj v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law