Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision upholding an IJ's denial of petitioner's applications for asylum and withholding of removal. Petitioner claims that she suffered past persecution and has a well-founded fear of future persecution based on her membership in the proposed particular social groups of "Salvadoran women who refuse to be girlfriends of MS gang members" and "Salvadoran women who refuse to be victims of violent sexual predation of gang members."The panel concluded that substantial evidence supports the BIA's dismissal of her past persecution claim. The panel explained that substantial evidence supports the BIA's determination, including its specific reliance on the IJ's findings, that the threats here do not amount to past persecution. In this case, petitioner's neighbor issued vague threats, confronted her several times over a period of weeks, did not perform any acts of violence, and never followed through on any of his threats. Therefore, although condemnable, these threats were not so overwhelming so as to necessarily constitute persecution. The panel also concluded that substantial evidence supports the BIA's determination that petitioner's proposed particular social groups are not distinct in Salvadoran society. Finally, petitioner's argument that the BIA conducted an inadequate inquiry into the record regarding social distinction is unavailing. View "Villegas Sanchez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's order upholding the IJ's decision to deport and remove petitioner to Somalia and denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The court concluded that the BIA did not err in determining that petitioner's second-degree felony assault conviction is a particularly serious crime that bars statutory withholding of removal. The court also concluded that the IJ and the BIA did not err in finding that the particularly serious crime bar foreclosed petitioner's relief for withholding of removal under the CAT. Finally, the court need not address the likelihood that petitioner will be tortured because substantial evidence supports the IJ and the BIA's finding that his torture would not be directed by or acquiesced to by the Somali government. View "Jama v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

There is no conflict between the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Bail Reform Act (BRA) that prevents DHS from civilly detaining a criminal defendant after she has been granted pretrial release pursuant to the BRA.As a preliminary matter, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court's December order is appealable under the BRA, 18 U.S.C. 3145 and 3731. The court explained that the September release order released defendant from criminal detention under the BRA and, considered by itself, the court would lack jurisdiction over the September release order because it was issued by a magistrate judge and not a district court. However, the December order was the district court's affirmation of the September release order in response to defendant's motion to clarify her release status.On the merits, the court concluded that the district court correctly rejected the applicability of 8 U.S.C. 1226(e) and 1252(g) in its December order, explaining it was "not attempting to review or set aside any decision or action to commence removal proceedings" but was instead "attempting to enforce the Magistrate Judge's [September release] Order." The court considered decisions by six other circuits that have addressed the issue and concluded that pretrial release under the BRA does not preclude pre-removal detention under the INA. The court explained that, fundamentally, the BRA and INA concern separate grants of Executive authority and govern independent criminal and civil proceedings. The court concluded that the remaining claims lacked merit and vacated the district court's December order precluding ICE from detaining defendant pending completion of her criminal proceedings. View "United States v. Baltazar-Sebastian" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying Petitioner's request to reopen removal proceedings based on changed country circumstances, holding that the BIA's failure to assess whether certain changes were sufficient was arbitrary and capricious.Petitioner, a native and citizen of Albania, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, arguing that he and his family had been persecuted due to Petitioner's support of the Democratic Party in Albania and that the family had a well-founded fear of future persecution. An immigration judge denied relief, and the BIA affirmed. Petitioner later asked the BIA to reopen his case on the ground that government corruption had deteriorated in Albania. The BIA denied the request. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the BIA "exercised its judgment in an arbitrary, capricious, or irrational manner." View "Lucaj v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

Ethiopian native, petitioner Thewodros Wolie Birhanu petitioned the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA dismissed Birhanu’s appeal of the Immigration Judge's (“IJ”) decision finding him removable. The BIA and the IJ found: (1) Birhanu was removable as an alien convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude (“CIMTs”) not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct; (2) he was not entitled to asylum or withholding of removal because his convictions qualified as particularly serious crimes; and (3) he was not entitled to relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Tenth Circuit dismissed Birhanu's claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act as unexhausted, and denied the balance of his petition for review on the merits. View "Birhanu v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit held that the categorical approach does not require a petitioner seeking cancellation of removal to demonstrate both that the state offense he was convicted of is broader than the federal offense and that there is a realistic probability that the state actually prosecutes people for the conduct that makes the state offense broader than the federal offense. Rather, the categorical approach requires a petitioner seeking cancellation of removal to demonstrate that the state offense he was convicted of is broader than the federal offense.In this case, the BIA erred in finding that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal on the basis of his Florida conviction for possession of marijuana. The court explained that the Florida statute is unambiguously broader than the federal law referenced in 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(C), and this was all that petitioner was required to show under the categorical approach. Furthermore, because the BIA did not properly consider the IJ's alternative grounds for denying relief, those issues are not properly before the court. The court granted the petition for review, vacated, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gonzalez v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

8 U.S.C. 1151(f)(2) incorporates the age-reduction formula in 8 U.S.C. 1153(h)(1), which deducts processing time from the age of an F2A visa beneficiary. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that plaintiff's daughter was statutorily under 21 years old when plaintiff naturalized and thus the daughter qualifies for an immediate-relative visa. At issue in this appeal was whether the term "age" in section 1151(f)(2) incorporates the age-reduction formula set forth in section 1153(h)(1). Based on the text, structure, purpose, and legislative history of the Child Status Protection Act, the court held that it does. View "Cuthill v. Blinken" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action brought by former ICE civil detainees, seeking wages owed under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for work performed while detained. The district court dismissed based on the grounds that this circuit and others have declined to extend the FLSA to custodial settings.The court concluded that appellants' claims are foreclosed by this circuit's precedent and the well-established principles governing the interpretation of the FLSA. The court explained that the FLSA was enacted to protect workers who operate within "the traditional employment paradigm," and persons in custodial detention—such as appellants—are not in an employer-employee relationship but in a detainer-detainee relationship that falls outside that paradigm. The court noted that the FLSA was a congressional creation, and its expansion is a matter for Congress as well. The court explained that what appellants propose is a fundamental alteration of what it means to be an "employee," and if Congress wishes to apply the FLSA to custodial detentions, it is certainly free to do so. View "Ndambi v. CoreCivic, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's conclusion that petitioner was not eligible for asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that the Board erred in adopting the IJ's rationale regarding the corroborating evidence in this case; the Board committed legal error in concluding that petitioner had not established past persecution; and the Board committed legal error in concluding that petitioner had not established a nexus between her persecution and her particular social group. The court explained that the evidence established that petitioner's relationship with her husband's nuclear family was at least one central reason for her persecution and, likely, was the dominant reason. The court remanded for the Board to further consider petitioner's asylum claim so that she may receive the benefit of the presumption that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution if she returns to Honduras. View "Arita-Deras v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's dismissal of petitioner's appeal of an IJ's denial of his applications for asylum and withholding of removal from Somalia. The panel held that the restricted-residence exception applies when the country's authorities are unable or unwilling to protect the applicant from persecution by nongovernmental actors. The panel concluded that the Board erred by determining that petitioner did not qualify for a firm-resettlement exception because the persecution he suffered was perpetrated by nongovernment actors. On remand, the Board should consider whether petitioner was firmly resettled in South Africa.The panel also held that petitioner suffered past persecution in Somalia on account of a protected ground. In this case, the record evidence would compel any reasonable factfinder to conclude that petitioner suffered persecution on account of a protected ground because Al Shabaab was motived by their own political and religious beliefs, rather than petitioner's. The panel explained that Al-Shabaab's accusation that petitioner and his brother were featuring Islamically forbidden, "Satanic" films provided direct evidence of their political and religious motive. Even if the brothers did not feature the films out of their own political or religious convictions, Al-Shabaab at the very least imputed those beliefs to them. The panel also remanded to give the government an opportunity to rebut the presumption of future persecution triggered by petitioner's showing of past persecution on account of a protected ground. View "Abdi Asis Ali Aden v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law