Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

In these consolidated appeals, plaintiffs, two immigrants who admit that they are subject to valid removal orders, filed suit alleging that the government cannot remove them because that would interfere with their "regulatory rights" to remain in the United States while they apply for waivers.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that plaintiffs' applications do not give the court subject matter jurisdiction to interfere with the execution of their removal orders. The court explained that plaintiffs' claims fall squarely within 8 U.S.C. 1252(g)'s jurisdictional bar where the action being challenged is the government's execution of plaintiffs' removal orders. In this case, section 1252(g) strips the court of jurisdiction to hear the claims brought by plaintiffs, and the statute does not offer any discretion-versus-authority distinction of the sort they claim. Because Congress stripped federal courts of jurisdiction over such claims, the court affirmed the district court's dismissals. View "Camarena v. Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement" on Justia Law

In 2007, Juan Rodriguez, a non-citizen, entered a plea agreement in San Diego County that avoided any adverse immigration consequences. After the plea was entered, but before sentencing, Rodriguez was arrested and jailed for another crime in Riverside County. As a result of that arrest, Rodriguez did not appear at the scheduled sentencing hearing. He later agreed to be sentenced in absentia, and the court imposed a sentence subjecting Rodriguez to deportation. Deportation proceedings were initiated after Rodriguez’s release from custody and remain ongoing. In 2019, after amendments to Penal Code section 1473.7, Rodriguez moved to vacate his conviction on the grounds that he had not been sufficiently advised of the immigration consequences he faced. After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the motion. Rodriguez challenged that decision, asserting the court erred by finding he meaningfully understood he would become deportable as a result of the plea. The Court of Appeal concluded the evidence supported Rodriguez’s motion. The Court thus reversed and remanded with directions to the trial court to grant Rodriguez’s motion to vacate the conviction. View "California v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner argues that he was tortured in Italy when he was subjected for more than six years to solitary confinement and other restrictive conditions in Italy’s 41-bis prison regime, and that he would more likely than not be tortured if removed to Italy. The court concluded that the conditions petitioner alleged he faced or would face do not rise to the level of torture as that term is used under the CAT and its implementing regulations at 8 C.F.R. 1208.18. In this case, although the court recognized that petitioner developed various persisting mental ailments while in 41-bis detention, the court cannot agree that he faced severe mental pain and suffering of the kind envisioned in section 1208.18(a)(4)(ii) View "Gallina v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

In 1990, 18-year-old Perez entered the U.S. from Mexico without inspection. She was apprehended and was personally served with an Order to Show Cause, ordering her to appear for a deportation hearing at a time and place “to be set.” She was released on her own recognizance. A hearing was set for July 1992. The immigration court sent notice of the hearing to the New York address Perez provided upon being released. A second notice was sent by certified mail and a receipt bearing the signature of “Rebeca Perez” arrived at the immigration court. Perez insists that she never received either notice.The IJ found her deportable in her absence and sent Perez the decision. No appeal followed. In 2018, Perez moved to reopen those proceedings. The intervening 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), increased the requirements for the document used to initiate “removal,” mandating a Notice to Appear specifying the time and place of a hearing, 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(1). IIRIRA also created new discretionary relief, “cancellation of removal,” available to certain non-citizens in active removal proceedings who demonstrate 10 years of continuous physical presence in the U.S. Under the “stop-time rule,” the period of continuous physical presence ends when a non-citizen receives a Notice to Appear. In 2018, the Supreme Court held (Pereira) that a Notice to Appear omitting the time and place of a removal hearing does not trigger the stop-time rule.The immigration judge, the BIA, and the Seventh Circuit denied relief. Pereira did not apply because Perez received an Order to Show Cause; Pereira concerned Notices to Appear. Perez was not in removal proceedings but had faced deportation proceedings. View "Perez-Perez v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit granted in part a petition for review of the the BIA's order upholding the IJ's decision to terminate petitioner's withholding of removal status, deny his application for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and deny his motion to remand based on new evidence. The court explained that once an alien is found to have committed a particularly serious crime, the agency no longer needs to engage in a separate determination to address whether the alien is a danger to the community. Therefore, the IJ and the BIA did not err in failing to consider petitioner's likelihood of future misconduct.The court found that the BIA's categorical ban on evidence concerning mental health issues is arbitrary and capricious. The court reaffirmed its position that all reliable information pertaining to the nature of the crime, including evidence of mental health conditions, may be considered in a particularly serious crime analysis. The court lacks jurisdiction to review petitioner's claim that the IJ and BIA erred in finding his testimony not credible because the claim relates to the termination of petitioner's statutory withholding of removal. To the extent that such adverse credibility determination impacted petitioner's claim for relief under CAT, the court concluded that the IJ supported her determination with specific, cogent reasons for her disbelief. The court upheld the finding that petitioner had not established that he was more likely than not to be tortured upon his return to Iraq. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review for further consideration of petitioner's mental health evidence in determining whether he is barred from withholding of removal based on a particularly serious crime. The court otherwise denied the petition. View "Shazi v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging USCIS's denial of their application to adjust their immigration status to lawful permanent residents under the diversity visa program. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and dismissed the case, holding that the case was moot prior to the entry of the district court's final judgment. The court joined its sister circuits in concluding that a claim challenging the denial of a diversity visa status adjustment application becomes moot after the relevant fiscal year expires. In this case, plaintiffs' claim was moot at the time they filed their initial complaint. View "Ermuraki v. Renaud" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged in a two-count superseding indictment with violating 18 U.S.C 1546(a) by allegedly using a fraudulent order of supervision to obtain a driver's license from the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Florida DHSMV). Defendant moved to dismiss the superseding indictment for failing to state an offense under section 1546(a), arguing that the term "authorized stay" means "lawful presence" in the United States and that no federal statute or regulation expressly identifies an order of supervision as "evidence of authorized stay in the United States." The district court dismissed the superseding indictment after concluding that an order of supervision does not qualify as a document "prescribed by statute or regulation . . . as evidence of authorized stay . . . in the United States" as required by section 1546(a).Based on a review of the statutes and regulations, the Eleventh Circuit held that an order of supervision falls within the plain and ordinary meaning of section 1546(a)'s "other document" clause. The court explained that the Form I-220B, Order of Supervision, itself is a document prescribed by the federal immigration statutes and regulations as showing that an alien has legal permission to stay in the United States. Furthermore, separate and apart from the immigration statutes and regulations, an order of supervision is a document prescribed by certain federal entitlement regulations as evidence of legal permission to stay in the United States. The court also held that defendant's proposed statutory interpretations are not supported by section 1546's language and structure. The court explained that "authorize stay" as used in section 1546(a) is not defined by terms of art for immigration laws governing alien admissibility. Furthermore, section 1546(a)'s "other document" provision does not require an order of supervision to be expressly listed or otherwise identified as evidencing authorized stay in the United States. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order dismissing the superseding indictment and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Ardon Chinchilla" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The panel held that petitioner's proposed social group comprised of "minor Christian males who oppose gang membership" is not cognizable. The panel also held that petitioner failed to establish the requisite nexus between any harm and his membership in the Santos-Ponce family, or that he would more likely than not be tortured by the Honduran government or with government acquiescence. Finally, the panel held that substantial evidence supports the BIA's conclusion that petitioner is not eligible for CAT protection where there is no claim or evidence that petitioner was harmed, much less tortured in the past by any government officials, or anyone acting under the acquiescence of the government. View "Santos-Ponce v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for judicial review seeking to set aside the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and other relief, holding that the BIA's decision must be upheld.On appeal, Petitioner's principal assignment of error challenged the denial of his asylum claim. Petitioner specifically argued against the adverse credibility determination of the immigration judge (IJ), which the BIA upheld. The First Circuit denied the petition for review, holding (1) the IJ's adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence in the record, and therefore, the BIA's denial of Petitioner's asylum claim must be upheld; (2) because Petitioner failed to satisfy the standard required for asylum, his claim for withholding of removal necessarily failed; and (3) Petitioner's claim for CAT protection is deemed abandoned. View "Zaruma-Guaman v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

In this civil action brought by plaintiffs seeking to enjoin policies governing searches of electronic devices at the United States' borders, the First Circuit found no violations of either the Fourth Amendment or the First Amendment.The border search policies challenged her allow border agents to perform basic searches of electronic devices without reasonable suspicion and advanced searches with reasonable suspicion. The First Circuit joined the Eleventh Circuit in holding that advanced searches of electronic devices at the border do not require a warrant or probable cause and joined the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in holding that basic border searches of electronic devices are routine searches that may be performed without reasonable suspicion. The Court then affirmed in part, reversed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the district court, holding that the court erred in narrowing the scope of permissible searches of electronic devices at the border. View "Alasaad v. Wolf" on Justia Law