Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit granted Petitioner's petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) denial of his motion to reopen his removal proceedings and to remand to the immigration judge (IJ) for further consideration, holding that the BIA abused its discretion.Petitioner sought reconsideration due to the fact that he had been placed on a waiting list by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for a U-1 nonimmigrant visa pursuant to the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (VTVPA), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(U). In denying Petitioner's motion to reopen his removal proceedings, the BIA gave two reasons for its denial. The First Circuit reversed and remanded the case, holding that the BIA abused its discretion because it failed to render a reasoned decision that accords with its own precedent and policies and failed to consider the position of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement. View "Benitez v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

In 2007, petitioner Alejandro Garcia Mendoza pled guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance. He moved to withdraw the plea on grounds his counsel did not advise him as required by Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S. 356 (2010). Petitioner also argued he did not need to show prejudice under RCW 10.40.200. The Court of Appeals concluded petitioner was raising two claims: a constitutional claim that was exempt from the time bar, and a statutory claim that was not. It dismissed his challenge as mixed without reaching the merits. The Washington Supreme Court concluded petitioner made one claim for relief: ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to advise him of the immigration consequences of his plea. The Court rejected petitioner’s argument that under RCW 10.40.200 he did not need to show prejudice to bring this claim, but since he made a prima face showing of ineffective assistance in a challenge that is time exempt, the dismissal of his petition was vacated and this matter was remanded back to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Garcia-Mendoza" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit dismissed the petition for review, holding that the use of an unauthorized social security number, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7)(B), constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) such that petitioner is ineligible for cancellation of his removal to Mexico.Reviewing de novo, the court explained that, under Fifth Circuit precedent, a section 408(a)(7)(B) offense categorically constitutes a CIMT because it necessarily involves intentional deception. The court concluded that the offender's deceptive intent is dispositive. Even assuming arguendo that the conviction requires a further aggravating element beyond deceptive intent, the court was satisfied that such an element is present where a conviction under section 408(a)(7)(B) necessarily involves conduct that obstructs the function of government. Therefore, petitioner's application for cancellation of removal is pretermitted. View "Munoz-Rivera v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

E.F.L., a Mexican citizen, has lived in the U.S. for nearly 20 years. She has endured extreme domestic abuse. In 2018, DHS discovered E.F.L.’s undocumented presence, reinstated an earlier removal order, and scheduled her removal. E.F.L. applied for withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Convention Against Torture and also filed a self‐petition under the Violence gainst Women Act (VAWA) with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). An IJ and the BIA denied E.F.L.’s application for withholding of removal. The Seventh Circuit declined to review that decision.Although E.F.L.’s VAWA petition remained pending, DHS sought to execute E.F.L.’s removal order. E.F.L. filed a habeas petition, seeking injunctive relief, arguing that DHS would violate the Due Process Clause and the Administrative Procedure Act by executing E.F.L.’s removal order while her VAWA petition remains pending. The district court dismissed E.F.L’s habeas petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; 8 U.S.C. 1252(g) provides that no court has jurisdiction to review DHS’s decision to execute a removal order. While her appeal was pending, USCIS approved E.F.L.’s VAWA petition. E.F.L. submitted adjustment of status and waiver applications. She has not yet received work authorization. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that the district court lacked jurisdiction. View "E. F. L. v. Prim" on Justia Law

An alien may seek to avoid deportation by showing a clear probability that, if deported, he will be persecuted because of his race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group. If an alien claims he will be persecuted because of his membership in a political social group, that political social group must be "particular."The Fourth Circuit granted the petition for review in part and remanded the BIA's final order of removal, concluding that the BIA's determination that "Salvadoran MS-13 members" lacks particularity is unreasonable. In this case, the BIA's description of the particularity requirement in Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208, 221–22 (BIA 2014), impermissibly conflates it with the social distinction requirement; the BIA's flawed particularity articulation informed its rejection of the political social group in W-G-R-; and the BIA unreasonably grounded its rejection of the political social group in W-G-R- in part on the fact that it could further subdivide the group in any number of ways. Therefore, the court remanded petitioner's withholding claim for the BIA to consider the IJ's other holdings with respect to that claim. However, because the record does not compel a different understanding of the evidence, the court denied the petition for review of petitioner's claim under the Convention Against Torture. View "Amaya v. Rosen" on Justia Law

Baan Rao Thai Restaurant and plaintiffs seek review of a consular officer's decision to deny visas for plaintiffs, asserting their claims fall within one of the consular nonreviewability doctrine's narrow exceptions.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint on the merits, rejecting plaintiffs' contention that the Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations between the United States and Thailand expressly provides that judicial review is available. The court concluded that access provisions were longstanding and well understood at the time the U.S.-Thailand Treaty was entered into—and that understanding was that the provisions relate to procedural rights. In this case, plaintiffs' argument seeks to fashion a longstanding, common and well understood treaty provision into something it is not. The court also explained, as recently clarified by the United States Supreme Court, that a dismissal pursuant to the consular nonreviewability doctrine is a dismissal on the merits. View "Baan Rao Thai Restaurant v. Pompeo" on Justia Law

Nkomo came to the U.S. from Zimbabwe in 1985 and became a lawful permanent resident in 1992. In 2017, she was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, an aggravated felony. In removal proceedings, Nkomo applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. Nkomo’s U.S. citizen husband, Witkowski, then filed an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative. Witkowski was incarcerated; it was difficult for him to attend an interview. The IJ granted a continuance of Nkomo’s removal proceedings. Nkomo informed DHS that the IJ had adjourned proceedings until February 22, 2018, to allow for adjudication of the I-130 petition. DHS confirmed that it required Witkowski's presence. With the I-130 petition still pending, the IJ denied Nkomo’s removal objections. The BIA affirmed. Nkomo unsuccessfully moved to remand, arguing that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction because she was given a defective notice to appear.DHS did not set a date to interview Witkowski about the I-130 petition until Nkomo petitioned for a writ of mandamus. In March 2019. Nkomo attended the interview, but Witkowski’s presence was waived. DHS granted the petition. Nkomo moved to reopen her removal proceedings, emphasizing the government’s delay and that she was likely to succeed on the merits because she could show extreme hardship. The BIA denied the motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after the removal order. The Third Circuit vacated. Nkomo put the BIA on notice of her equitable tolling claim and the Board itself raised the issue. The BIA’s suggestion that it did not have the authority to make decisions on equitable grounds was “perplexing.” View "Nkomo v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former alien detainee, filed suit alleging that CoreCivic's work programs are not voluntary. Plaintiff claimed that CoreCivic forced her to clean detention facilities, cook meals for company events, engage in clerical work, provide barber services for fellow detainees, maintain landscaping, and other labors. Furthermore, if she refused, CoreCivic would impose more severe living conditions, physical restraints, and deprivation of basic human needs.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of CoreCivic's motion to dismiss under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), 18 U.S.C. 1589(a). The court concluded that sections 1589(a) and 1595 impose civil liability on "[w]hoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person by any one of, or by any combination of" four coercive methods. The court rejected CoreCivic's contention that this language does not capture labor performed in work programs in a federal immigration detention setting. The court explained that nothing in the text supports this claim; CoreCivic is clearly an entity covered by the term "whoever;" and it has clearly "obtain[ed]" the labor of these alien detainees. The court rejected CoreCivic's remaining claims to the contrary and declined to apply the rule of lenity. Because on its face section 1589 unambiguously protects labor performed in work programs in federal immigration detention facilities, the court concluded that the "judicial inquiry is complete." View "Gonzalez v. CoreCivic, Inc." on Justia Law

Gear, a native of Australia, moved to Hawaii to work. Gear’s employer applied for, and Gear received, an “H-1B” nonimmigrant visa. Gear later returned from visiting Australia with a rifle. Gear was fired and needed a new visa. Gear created a new company and obtained a new H-1B visa. A DHS agent learned Gear was present on an H-1B visa and bragged about owning firearms, and obtained a search warrant. Before the search, Gear stated, “he couldn’t possess a firearm … because he was not a U.S. citizen.” Gear stated his ex-wife had shipped a rifle and gun safe to Hawaii but he claimed they had been discarded because “he couldn’t have it.” Gear eventually admitted that the gun and safe were in the garage.He was charged under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5)(B) for possessing a firearm while being an alien who had been admitted under a nonimmigrant visa. The jury was instructed the government had to prove Gear “knowingly possessed” the rifle, that had been transported in foreign commerce, and that Gear had been admitted under a nonimmigrant visa. Before Gear was sentenced, the Supreme Court decided Rehaif, holding that under section 922(g), the government must prove the defendant “knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.”The Ninth Circuit affirmed Gear’s conviction. While the government must prove the defendant knew he had a nonimmigrant visa, the erroneous jury instructions did not affect Gear’s substantial rights because the record overwhelmingly indicates that he knew it was illegal for him to possess a firearm. View "United States v. Gear" on Justia Law

In 1990, Muthana was appointed as the First Secretary of the Permanent Mission of Yemen to the U.N. In 1994, Yemen terminated Muthana and required him to surrender his diplomatic credentials and Muthana's daughter, Hoda, was born in New Jersey. In 1995, the U.N. notified the State Department that Yemen had terminated Muthana from his diplomatic post. Muthana, his wife, and Hoda’s older siblings became naturalized citizens. Muthana applied for Hoda’s U.S. passport, which issued in 2005. In 2014, Hoda traveled to Syria and joined ISIS as a spokeswoman, advocating the killing of Americans. She married two ISIS fighters in succession and had a child, Doe. In 2016, the State Department revoked Hoda’s passport. In 2018, Hoda and Doe fled to a camp in Syria. Secretary of State Pompeo issued a statement that Hoda is not a U.S. citizen. The president tweeted his approval. Muthana alleged these statements effectively revoked his daughter’s and grandson’s U.S. citizenship.The D.C. Circuit affirmed the rejection of his claims. Hoda’s father possessed diplomatic immunity when she was born, rendering her ineligible for citizenship by birth under the Fourteenth Amendment and her son ineligible for 8 U.S.C. 1401(g) citizenship. A child born in the U.S. to a foreign diplomat is not born “subject to the jurisdiction” of the U.S. The court dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, Muthana’s claim seeking to compel the U.S. to assist in bringing Hoda and Doe to the U.S. The court dismissed, for lack of standing, Muthana's request for a declaratory judgment that if he sent money and supplies to his daughter and grandson, he would not violate the prohibition on providing material support for terrorism, 18 U.S.C. 2339B; Muthana failed to allege a personal injury to his constitutional rights. View "Muthana v. Pompeo" on Justia Law