Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Petitioner's habeas corpus petition after the Dominican Republic requested Petitioner for extradition, holding that the United States failed to file the necessary documents to support an extradition request.Upon receipt and review of the Dominican Republic's request to extradite Petitioner, the United States filed an extradition compliant. A federal magistrate judge certified Petitioner as eligible for extradition. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the Dominican Republic failed to provide the required documentation in its extradition request and that his extradition would violate the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT) because the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had previously found that he qualified for CAT relief. The district court granted relief, finding both that the extradition was barred by the BIA's CAT determination and that the extradition request did not satisfy the documentary requirements of the Dominican Republic-United States Extradition Treaty. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court erroneously determined that the United States was bound by the BIA's prior determination awarding Petitioner CAT relief; but (2) the district court properly found that the documentation was insufficient to support an extradition request under the treaty. View "Aguasvivas v. Pompeo" on Justia Law

Singh, a citizen of India, came to the U.S. in 1991, then 22 years old. He obtained a temporary transit visa for work on a ship, Singh drove cabs instead. He has taken periodic trips back to India. In 1997 and 2005 he entered into "sham" marriages. Charged as removable for remaining in the country illegally, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B), Singh sought cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1), arguing that his removal would harm his children (U.S. citizens), born in 2011 and 2013, and mother, a legal permanent resident, who owns a convenience store and has a good relationship with his U.S.-citizen brothers,The IJ denied Singh’s application finding that Singh failed to prove that he had continuously been present in the U.S. for a 10-year period immediately prior to the date that he was served with his “notice to appear” and failed to prove “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship." The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied relief. Reviewing the hardship claim as a mixed question of law and fact, the court noted that Singh did not dispute that his mother’s and children’s health conditions were insufficiently serious to create that hardship; BIA precedent holds that diminished educational options alone do not establish the required hardship. Singh did not show that his children would be deprived of all opportunity to obtain any education. Singh failed to exhaust his remedies with respect to a claim of unconstitutional bias by the IJ. View "Singh v. Rosen" on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review challenging the BIA's denial of equitable tolling to petitioner's motion to reopen in light of Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2016). A panel of this court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded.The Board had concluded that petitioner did not demonstrate due diligence because he waited approximately eight months after the Fifth Circuit decided Lugo-Resendez to file his current motion. Now considering the merits, the Fifth Circuit explained that the Board's conclusion applies with even grater force in light of the conclusion in Londono-Gonzalez v. Barr, 978 F.3d 965, 968 (5th Cir. 2020), that Lugo-Resendez did not constitute an extraordinary circumstance that stood in the way of aliens seeking equitable tolling. Furthermore, petitioner presented no viable alternative from which he can show compliance with the 90-day filing deadline even with the benefit of equitable tolling. View "Ovalles v. Rosen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a United States citizen, and his daughter, a citizen and resident of Sierra Leone, filed suit challenging the denial of their visa to the daughter. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, holding that the doctrine of consular nonrevieawability plainly prohibits the court from questioning the consular officer's visa determination. The court explained that the Supreme Court has unambiguously instructed that absent some clear directive from Congress or an affirmative showing of bad faith, the government must simply provide a valid ineligibility provision as the basis for the visa denial. In this case, the government met this obligation by providing 8 U.S.C. 1201(g) and 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (an anti-fraud and misrepresentation provision) as the statutory bases for denial of the visa application. Furthermore, not only did the consular officer provide the applicable statutory provisions as the bases for the visa denial, but the officer went further than necessary by explaining her decisionmaking—she found the daughter had proffered a falsified passport and lied about her age. View "Sesay v. United States" on Justia Law

Herrera's husband fraudulently used the identity of a lawful permanent U.S. resident (LPR) to become a citizen. Herrera obtained LPR status as the wife of a citizen and became a citizen. Herrera's four children are U.S. citizens. In 2011, Herrera was convicted of second-degree theft. The government discovered Herrera’s false statement. She pleaded guilty to naturalization fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1425(a). The district court revoked her citizenship and restored her to LPR status, 8 U.S.C. 1451(e).If an alien commits fraud or misrepresents a material fact to gain a benefit under the immigration laws, she may be deported, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i); 1227(a)(1)(A). Herrera sought a waiver available to aliens who committed immigration fraud but are the parent of a citizen and separately sought cancellation of removal as an LPR. DHS added a charge of removability for convictions of crimes involving moral turpitude based on Herrera's theft conviction, then withdrew the charge of removability for immigration fraud. The BIA affirmed that she was ineligible for a fraud waiver because she was no longer charged under the fraud provision and was ineligible for cancellation of removal because she had obtained her LPR status by fraud.The Eighth Circuit denied relief, rejecting Herrera’s argument that DHS could not withdraw the fraud charge because it had already been sustained by the IJ. The government is permitted to adjust the charges against an alien during the immigration court case. View "Gonzalez v. Rosen" on Justia Law

Proclamation No. 9945, which restricts entry of immigrant visa applicants who cannot demonstrate that they either (1) will acquire qualifying healthcare coverage within 30 days of entry or (2) have the ability to pay for reasonably foreseeable healthcare expenses, was within President Trump's statutory authority.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order enjoining the Proclamation's implementation. The panel assumed that, to the extent plaintiffs have Article III standing, they may assert an ultra vires cause of action to challenge the Proclamation on constitutional and statutory grounds. Because the panel concluded that plaintiffs' claims are likely to fail on the merits, the panel has no obligation to reach the consular nonreviewability issue and declined to do so.The panel held that the Proclamation is a lawful exercise of the President's delegated authority under section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) where it comports with the textual limitations of section 212(f) as set forth in Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2407 (2018). Furthermore, plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on their claims that the Proclamation conflicts with other statutes such as the Affordable Care Act, the Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act, the public charge provision of the INA, and the Violence Against Women Act. Finally, the panel rejected the district court's contention that, to the extent section 212(f) allows the President to impose additional entry restrictions based on "domestic policymaking" concerns, section 212(f) itself violates the nondelegation doctrine. Contrary to what the district court concluded, the panel stated that it makes no difference whether the additional entry restrictions are imposed under section 212(f) based on assertedly domestic policy concerns. Therefore, the panel concluded that the district court abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction enjoining the Proclamation's implementation. View "Doe v. Trump" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit dismissed a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal because petitioner had been convicted of an aggravated felony. In this case, the IJ and BIA found that petitioner's Florida convictions for money laundering and workers' compensation fraud were aggravated felonies because each conviction involved fraud or deceit in which the amount of loss to the victim exceeded $10,000 under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). The court held that substantial evidence in the record, including petitioner's admission of guilt and a concomitant plea agreement, fully supports the agency's finding of the loss amount. View "Garcia-Simisterra v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision dismissing petitioner's appeal of the IJ's finding of removability based on his past drug convictions. Under the Special Agricultural Worker program (SAW), agricultural workers meeting certain qualifications could obtain lawful temporary resident status, after which they were automatically adjusted to lawful permanent residency on a set schedule. Petitioner had obtained lawful permanent resident status through SAW, but it turns out that before he applied for SAW temporary resident status, he had been convicted of two drug offenses that would have rendered him ineligible for admission into the United States.The panel held that, under SAW, an alien who was inadmissible at the time of his adjustment to temporary resident status because of disqualifying convictions may be removed after his automatic adjustment to permanent resident status, despite the Attorney General never having initiated termination proceedings while the alien was a temporary resident. The panel rejected petitioner's argument that SAW's limitations on administrative and judicial review prevent the government from seeking his removal. Finally, the panel concluded that Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442 (2020), provided no support for petitioner's assertion that under provisions unique to SAW, he could only be removed for his drug convictions during the period of his temporary residency. View "Hernandez Flores v. Rosen" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit dismissed as moot a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming petitioner's motions for continuance pending resolution of his T visa application, withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, as well as the BIA's dismissal of his appeal. After the BIA's decision, petitioner's T visa application was denied and he was removed to Mexico. The court dismissed the petition as moot because the court can no longer grant petitioner any effectual relief. The court reasoned that, even if it decided that the BIA erred in denying petitioner withholding of removal, he would still be subject to the February 2012 removal order and thus inadmissible to the United States. Furthermore, in his supplemental letter, petitioner identifies no collateral legal consequence from the denial of withholding. View "Mendoza-Flores v. Rosen" on Justia Law

This case relates to the consent decree incorporating the Flores Agreement, a 1997 settlement agreement between the United States and a class of all minors subject to immigration detention. The Agreement established nationwide standards for the detention, release, and treatment of minors by U.S. immigration authorities. The Agreement, by its own terms, terminates after the government's publication of final regulations implementing the Agreement. In 2019, the government issued final regulations represented as implementing, and thus terminating, the Agreement. The district court then concluded that the new regulations, on the whole, were inconsistent with the Agreement, enjoining the regulations from taking effect and denying the government's motion to terminate the Agreement.The Ninth Circuit held that the provisions of the new regulations relating to unaccompanied minors are consistent with the Agreement except to the extent that they require ORR to place an unaccompanied minor in a secure facility if the minor is otherwise a danger to self or others and to the extent they require unaccompanied minors held in secure or staff-secure placements to request a hearing, rather than providing a hearing to those minors automatically unless they refuse one.The panel also held that some of the regulations regarding initial detention and custody of both unaccompanied and accompanied minors are consistent with the Agreement and may take effect. However, the remaining new regulations relating to accompanied minors depart from the Agreement in several important ways. Therefore, the panel affirmed the district court's order enjoining those regulations. The panel further held that the district court correctly concluded that the Agreement was not terminated by the adoption of the regulations. Finally, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the government's motion to terminate the Agreement, as the government has not demonstrated that changed circumstances, such as an increase in family migration, justify terminating the Agreement's protections. View "Flores v. Rosen" on Justia Law