Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Immigration Law
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In 2015, Hernandez-Serrano, age 16, entered the U.S. without inspection and was placed in removal proceedings. A year later, a Tennessee juvenile court made findings that rendered Hernandez-Serrano potentially eligible for “Special Immigrant Juvenile” status, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J), for which he applied. Hernandez-Serrano unsuccessfully sought administrative closure of his removal case pending a decision. In 2018, the IJ ordered Hernandez-Serrano removed to El Salvador. Hernandez-Serrano appealed to the BIA. Weeks later, his application for Special Immigrant Juvenile status was granted. Hernandez-Serrano challenged only the IJ’s denial of his motion for administrative closure, The BIA denied his motion, holding that the IJ lacked authority to close Hernandez-Serrano’s case administratively under 8 C.F.R. 1003.10, 1003.1(d) as interpreted in a 2018 Attorney General decision that “immigration judges and the Board do not have the general authority to suspend indefinitely immigration proceedings by administrative closure.”The Sixth Circuit denied relief. The authority of IJs to take certain actions “[i]n deciding the individual cases before them” does not delegate general authority not to decide those cases at all. The court noted that in more than 400,000 cases in which an alien was charged with being subject to removal, IJs or the BIA have closed cases administratively, removing them from the docket without further proceedings absent some persuasive reason to reopen it. As of October 2018, more than 350,000 of those cases had not been reopened. “Adjudicatory default on that scale strikes directly at the rule of law.” View "Hernandez-Serrano v. Barr" on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether a father's adopted child could qualify as his "legitimate" child for the purposes of section 1010(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act when the child was not his biological child. Mr. Schreiber and his wife were U.S. citizens living in Kansas. In 2012, Mrs. Schreiber's niece moved from her native South Korea to Kansas to live with the Schriebers and attend high school. In 2014, the Schreibers adopted the niece under Kansas law with the consent of the child's parents. Kansas issued the child a new birth certificate listing the Schreibers as her parents. In 2015, Mr. Schreiber filed a petition to have his adopted child classified as his "child" for the purposes of the Act. The Board of Immigration Appeals determined legitimization only applied to a parent's biological children. The Tenth Circuit concluded the BIA correctly interpreted the Act's plain meaning, and thus, did not err in ruling that a parent's non-biological child could not be his "legitimized" child within the meaning of the Act. Furthermore, the Court concluded the district court properly declined to review Mr. Schreiber's "late-blooming" gender-discrimination challenge to the BIA's final agency action. View "Schreiber v. Cuccinelli" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order stating that the opinion, concurrence, and dissent filed November 19, 2019 are amended by the opinion, concurrence, and dissent filed concurrently with the order, and denying on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc; and (2) an amended majority opinion, concurrence, and dissent.In the amended opinion, the panel granted the petition for review of an ICE order reinstating petitioner's prior order of removal and held that that: (1) 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1) establishes a thirty-day deadline for seeking review of reinstatement orders; (2) because petitioner timely challenged his reinstatement order, the court had jurisdiction to consider a collateral attack on his underlying removal order contending that the execution of that order resulted in a gross miscarriage of justice; (3) petitioner established a gross miscarriage of justice because his removal order lacked a valid legal basis when it was executed; and (4) there is no diligence requirement that limits the time during which such a collateral attack may be made. View "Vega-Anguiano v. Barr" on Justia Law

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The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the IJ's and BIA's decisions denying relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner claimed that the Somali government will acquiesce in his torture by Al-Shabaab, a terrorist organization.The court held that substantial evidence supported the IJ's and BIA's findings that the Somali government would not acquiesce in any torture of petitioner by Al-Shabaab. In this case, the record does not show that the Somali government has willfully turned a blind eye to Al-Shabaab's activities. Rather, the Somali government and its allies have battled Al-Shabaab, retaken territory from it, and worked to maintain order. Furthermore, the Somali government is using its amnesty program as part of its fight against Al-Shabaab as a tool to encourage defections. Finally, petitioner's argument that the Somali government and Al-Shabaab act in concert to torture people is wholly without record support. The court stated that the fact that the Somali government has not successfully ended the threat posed by Al-Shabaab violence is insufficient to establish that the torture would be with the consent or acquiescence of a government official. View "Moallin v. Barr" on Justia Law

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Shuhaiber, who is confined to a wheelchair, sued the Illinois Department of Corrections under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. He alleged that the Stateville Center failed to accommodate his disability by confining him to a cell unsuited to the use of a wheelchair and that he was transported to physical therapy in vans that were not ADA-compliant, leaving him to depend on an officer to lift him. The district court dismissed the complaint, determining that Shuhaiber failed to allege that he was deprived of access to facilities or services or that the vans caused him to miss medical appointments.Shuhaiber appealed and sought permission to proceed without prepaying the requisite filing fee. Meanwhile, Shuhaiber, a native of the United Arab Emirates, had been transferred to DHS custody for removal from the United States. Shuhaiber, as a frequent filer of federal lawsuits, had accumulated more than three strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act for filing frivolous lawsuits and would have had to prepay the filing fee to appeal the dismissal of his claims. Doubting that Shuhaiber was still a “prisoner,” the district court granted his motion to proceed in forma pauperis.The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the appellate filing-fee bar does not apply where the appellant is being held by immigration authorities and no longer is a “prisoner” within the meaning of the PLRA. The district court was, nonetheless, right to dismiss his claims. View "Shuhaiber v. Illinois Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's application for protective status pursuant to the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner is a former gang member who has belonged to various violent gangs, including La Mara Salvatrucha, commonly known as MS-13.Addressing two initial matters, the panel concluded that the Board's defiance of the panel's previous decision in this matter and disagreement with the panel's holding that the IJ did not find petitioner's expert, a specialist in gang activity in Central America and governmental responses to gangs, credible was ill-advised. The panel also disagreed with the Board's conclusion that the expert's testimony did not warrant full weight because he did not submit the underlying evidence to the IJ. Finally, the panel held that the Board's decision to give the expert's opinion reduced weight because it was not corroborated by other evidence in the record was erroneous. The panel remanded to the Board and directed it to give full weight to the expert's testimony regarding the risk of torture petitioner faces if removed to El Salvador. View "Castillo v. Barr" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioners' motion to reopen. Petitioners contend that ineffective assistance of a non-attorney notario who advised them not to attend their hearing caused them to be ordered removed in absentia.The panel concluded that the BIA erred by treating petitioners' failure to show prejudice caused by the alleged ineffective assistance as a basis for denying their motion to reopen proceedings. The panel explained that a showing of prejudice is not required when ineffective assistance leads to an in absentia order of removal. Therefore, in light of this conclusion, the panel need not reach the BIA's decision denying petitioners' motion to reopen proceeding to allow petitioners to apply for cancellation of removal. View "Sanchez Rosales v. Barr" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition to review a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his requests for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Naturalization Act and for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that substantial evidence supported the BIA's decision.Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) Petitioner failed to establish that he had been persecuted or had a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; and (2) the record did not compel a conclusion that state actors would be complicit in torturing him in the future. View "Celicourt v. Barr" on Justia Law

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Petitioners appealed the dismissal of their petitions for habeas corpus. Petitioners claimed that their due process rights had been violated by failure to honor the parole notice, that federal statutes and regulations created a right to parole based on the parole notices they had received, that the parole notices should be honored under customary international law, and that a legitimate expectation of parole had been created. Within two weeks after the petition was filed, ICE released petitioners from custody but not on parole. The district court determined that petitioners' release from detention rendered the habeas petition moot, and ordered that the government provide petitioners or their attorneys with written notice that their parole had been terminated. The district court subsequently dismissed the habeas petition.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal and rejected petitioners' argument that their inability to seek work authorization is a collateral consequence that should allow them to maintain their petition. The court was not convinced that aliens who are released from ICE custody can maintain a habeas petition by showing collateral consequences. Furthermore, even if they could demonstrate collateral consequences, they have not done so here because any work authorization is subject to USCIS discretion. View "Bacilio-Sabastian v. Barr" on Justia Law

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Wambura, a citizen of Tanzania, was a lawful U.S. permanent resident. Wambura pled guilty to a conspiracy to fraudulently secure a mortgage and obtain federally subsidized rent using a stolen identity. He was sentenced to 60 months' imprisonment and ordered to pay $434,867.65 in restitution. Removal proceedings (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)) asserted that Wambura had been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct and had been convicted of an aggravated felony relating to an offense that involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victims exceeds $10,000.Wambura applied for asylum and withholding of removal and for protection under Convention Against Torture. The IJ concluded that Wambura was removable based on his aggravated felony and moral turpitude convictions and, because of those convictions, was ineligible for cancellation of removal or asylum. Due to the length of his sentence, Wambura was ineligible for withholding of removal. Pursuing deferral of removal under CAT, Wambura testified about his involvement with an opposition political party and claimed that his father told him he is being followed by the secret police. The IJ asked for corroborating evidence. Wambura claimed he was unable to provide it because he was unable to access his email account. The BIA affirmed a denial of relief.The Fourth Circuit remanded. Once the requirements for removability are met, the government does not have the burden to prove that the amount of loss caused by the fraud conviction is $10,000 or more for purposes of asylum and withholding of removal. An IJ is not required to provide an alien with advance notice of the need to offer corroborating evidence but must make a finding as to whether such corroborating evidence was reasonably available if it was not provided. View "Wambura v. Barr" on Justia Law