Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Carlos Gomez-Ruotolo, a native citizen of Venezuela, was brought to the United States in 2001 and became a lawful permanent resident. He was convicted twice in Virginia for crimes involving minors: once for attempted sexual battery and another for electronic solicitation of a minor. Based on these convictions, he was found removable as a noncitizen convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude and was denied relief by the Board of Immigration Appeals. Gomez-Ruotolo appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, arguing that his crimes were not morally turpitudinous and that he should receive protection against removal under the Convention Against Torture.The court disagreed. It held that attempted sexual battery and electronic solicitation of a minor both involved moral turpitude, thus making Gomez-Ruotolo deportable under immigration law. The court also affirmed the agency's decision to deny Gomez-Ruotolo protection under the Convention Against Torture, agreeing that he had not shown he was more likely than not to face torture in Venezuela. Therefore, the court denied Gomez-Ruotolo's petition for review. View "Gomez-Ruotolo v. Garland" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the petitioner, Silvia Tapia Coria, sought review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of her motions for remand and administrative closure. The Immigration Judge (IJ) had found Coria removable and denied cancellation of removal based on her conviction of a controlled substance offense. On appeal to the BIA, she requested remand based on her eligibility to become a derivative beneficiary of her husband’s pending U visa application, and also sought administrative closure of her proceedings.The court considered whether its jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial was limited by the “criminal alien bar” under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), as Coria was indisputably removable due to a covered criminal offense. She did not advance any constitutional claim or question of law that would have provided an exception to the criminal jurisdictional bar under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). The court held that its jurisdiction, under this circuit’s “on the merits” exception to the criminal jurisdictional bar, did not extend to this case.The court concluded that the “on the merits” exception was clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning and theory of Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683 (2020). Under Nasrallah, a “final order of removal” includes all IJ or BIA rulings that “merge into final orders of removal,” meaning all matters on which the validity of the final order is contingent, and judicial review does not extend to factual challenges to the final removal order. Thus, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review Coria’s challenge to the BIA’s factual finding regarding the speculative nature of her obtaining derivative U visa relief. View "CORIA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the United States considered whether an Immigration Judge's (IJ) determination of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" for the cancellation of removal of a noncitizen was reviewable by an appellate court. The case arose when Situ Kamu Wilkinson, a noncitizen from Trinidad and Tobago, applied for cancellation of removal, arguing that his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his U.S.-born son. The IJ denied Wilkinson's application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Third Circuit then dismissed Wilkinson's petition for review, holding it lacked jurisdiction to review the IJ's hardship determination.However, the Supreme Court held that the Third Circuit erred in its decision. It held that the IJ's determination is a mixed question of law and fact, and therefore reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D), as per the precedent set in Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr. The Court emphasized that the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard is a legal standard applied to facts, not a factual inquiry.However, the Court also noted that while the question of whether established facts satisfy the statutory eligibility standard is subject to judicial review, the underlying facts in any determination on cancellation of removal remain unreviewable. The Court reversed the Third Circuit's decision, vacated its judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Wilkinson v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Madera County, California, denying Francisco Carrillo's motion to vacate his conviction and sentence under section 1473.7 of the Penal Code. The motion was based on the claim that Carrillo did not meaningfully understand the adverse immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence.Carrillo, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of assault with a firearm following a trial. He was sentenced to serve 301 days in jail and granted formal probation for five years. However, when Carrillo later admitted to a probation violation and received an additional 90 days in jail, his total term of imprisonment exceeded one year, thereby qualifying his conviction as an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), leading to mandatory deportation.Arguing that he did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence, Carrillo filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence under section 1473.7 of the Penal Code. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Carrillo failed to demonstrate that he suffered prejudicial error due to his lack of understanding, as he did not show a reasonable probability that he would have acted differently had he been aware of the immigration consequences.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's order but modified it to be without prejudice. This means that Carrillo could file another motion asserting grounds not raised in his initial motion. The appellate court agreed that Carrillo did not understand the potential immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence. However, it found that Carrillo failed to prove that this misunderstanding prejudiced his decisions at trial or during his sentencing hearing. View "People v. Carrillo" on Justia Law

The case concerns a review petition filed by Mariela Gricelda Chun Mendez and her minor son, natives and citizens of Guatemala. They sought review of the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which upheld the Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The petitioners had fled Guatemala due to violence between their village and the neighboring municipality over land and water rights.The BIA had affirmed the IJ's findings that Chun Mendez did not establish extraordinary circumstances to excuse the late filing of her asylum application and that she did not demonstrate membership in the particular social group (PSG) she had defined for the agency. The court, after a careful review of the case, denied the petition.Chun Mendez claimed she was a member of the PSG of "communal landowners of Ixchiguán, Guatemala that refused to cooperate with criminal gangs." However, she conceded that she did not communally own the land. The court agreed with the government that Chun Mendez failed to exhaust her claim of imputed membership in the PSG before the BIA.Additionally, Chun Mendez alleged that the IJ and BIA failed to meaningfully assess her asylum and withholding of removal claims based on her race as an indigenous woman of Mam descent. However, the court found these race-based claims unexhausted, as Chun Mendez did not raise any race-based claim before the BIA. Consequently, the court denied the petition for review. View "Chun Mendez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Gloris Sarai Vasquez-Rivera, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States without authorization in 2014, at the age of nine. She was served with a notice to appear in removal proceedings and charged as a noncitizen present in the country without being admitted or paroled after inspection by an immigration officer. Vasquez-Rivera applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, citing fear of gang violence in El Salvador.Vasquez-Rivera proposed four social groups for her asylum and withholding of removal claims: Salvadoran women and girls whose parents live outside the country; her family; family members of persons targeted for gang recruitment whose family is threatened when they refuse to join the gangs; and young Salvadoran women considered to be property of the gangs. Both the Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) found that three of these groups were not cognizable under federal immigration law. As for her family, the BIA assumed it constituted a distinct social group but agreed with the IJ that Vasquez-Rivera did not establish a nexus between this group and the harm she experienced and fears.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided to grant in part and deny in part the petition for review. It found that the BIA's conclusions regarding the nexus required for the family-as-a-particular-social-group claim lacked support in the record and amounted to improper de novo factfinding. The case was remanded to the BIA for further proceedings, applying circuit nexus precedent to Vasquez-Rivera’s asylum claim and claim for withholding of removal based on her membership in her family. The court upheld the BIA’s determination that Vasquez-Rivera had failed to establish eligibility for Convention Against Torture protection. View "Vasquez-Rivera v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case revolves around an appeal by Karnail Singh, who was charged with using a fraudulently procured passport and making false statements to immigration officials. Singh pleaded guilty to using a fraudulently procured passport in exchange for a lower sentencing range and the dismissal of the false-statement count. After his plea, the government initiated proceedings to revoke his citizenship. In response, Singh petitioned for a writ of coram nobis, requesting the district court to set aside his conviction, arguing he would not have pled guilty had he known his plea could affect his citizenship. The district court denied his petition, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court ruled that Singh's plea was knowing and satisfied due process, regardless of whether he understood it could impact his citizenship. They found that the district court complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires the court to inform the defendant that a conviction may have immigration-related consequences.Singh also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing his attorney incorrectly informed him that his plea would only affect his citizenship if he committed another crime. The court rejected this claim, citing lack of evidence that Singh would have chosen to go to trial if he had received different advice from his counsel.Finally, the court rejected Singh's argument that the district court should have held a hearing before ruling on his coram nobis petition, stating that the record clearly showed Singh was not entitled to coram nobis relief. View "United States v. Singh" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) regarding whether a money laundering conspiracy conviction constitutes a "particularly serious crime" that would bar withholding of removal under immigration law.The petitioner, David Annor, a citizen of Ghana and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, had pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, related to a romance fraud scheme. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Annor, who sought withholding of removal and deferral under the Convention Against Torture. The Immigration Judge (IJ) and the BIA both determined that Annor's conviction constituted a "particularly serious crime", thus barring his eligibility for withholding of removal.Upon review, the Fourth Circuit found that the BIA had erred in two ways. Firstly, it had incorrectly applied its own precedent by analysing the elements of the wrong statute, instead of the correct one under which Annor was convicted. Secondly, it failed to consider whether the nature of Annor's offense indicated that he posed a danger to the community, a key factor in determining if a crime is "particularly serious".Consequently, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings in accordance with its opinion. View "Annor v. Garland" on Justia Law

Jesus Gabriel Navarro Guadarrama, a Mexican citizen, pursued a review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision dismissing his appeal for adjustment of status and the subsequent denial of his motion to reconsider. Navarro Guadarrama contended that the Board used an incorrect legal standard in considering his application.Navarro Guadarrama entered the U.S. in 1995 and was later convicted of several crimes. His criminal record led to the initiation of removal proceedings against him. Navarro Guadarrama applied for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i), which enables an alien illegally in the U.S. to seek relief from removal if they meet certain requirements. His application was denied by an Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board due to his criminal record and evidence of bad character.Navarro Guadarrama petitioned the court to review the Board's decision. He argued that the Board used the legal standard from a previous case, Matter of Mendez-Moralez, which applies to aliens requiring waivers, instead of Matter of Arai, which applies to those who don't require waivers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to consider Navarro Guadarrama’s petitions for review and that the Board did not apply the wrong legal standard. The court found that even if the Board cited the "wrong" case, there was no indication that, in substance, it applied the wrong standard. Therefore, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Guadarrama v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendant, Melchor Orozco-Orozco, was appealing his conviction for being a previously removed alien found in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Orozco had previously been removed from the U.S. following a conviction for carjacking under California Penal Code § 215, which had been classified as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).The appellate court examined whether this classification was correct. It found that the California Supreme Court had determined that a person could commit carjacking under § 215 without the intent to steal required by a generic theft offense. This court held that Orozco's carjacking conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony under the INA because § 215 was not a categorical match for a “theft offense.”The appellate court reversed the district court's order denying Orozco's motion to dismiss his indictment in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) and sent the case back to the lower court for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's order denying Orozco's motion to dismiss his indictment on equal protection grounds. View "USA V. OROZCO-OROZCO" on Justia Law