Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit denied the petitions for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's request for deferral and the BIA's denial of petitioner's motion to reopen his immigration case. The court rejected petitioner's due process claim that the agency failed to consider all relevant evidence. The court also held that the BIA did not err in determining that petitioner had failed to show he was more likely than not to be tortured based on his Christian faith if removed to Bangladesh. In this case, substantial evidence supports the Board's determination that petitioner failed to show that the Bangladeshi government acquiesces in torture, and substantial evidence supports the Board's determination that petitioner's evidence of forcible land evictions does not demonstrate the government's acquiescence in torture.The court also held that the Board did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to reopen where plaintiff offers nothing, beyond conclusory statements, to support his claim that the newly-offered evidence was not available at the time of his hearing in 2018. Furthermore, the new evidence was unlikely to alter the IJ's decision. View "Ahmed v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's denial of Appellant's petition for guardianship of her nephew, holding that the district court evaluated under the incorrect standard Appellant's request for predicate factual findings necessary for an individual to apply for Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services of the Department of Homeland Security.In her petition, Appellant requested that the district court make the predicate factual findings for an individual to apply for SIJ status, including a finding that reunifying her nephew with his mother in his country of origin was not viable due to abuse or neglect. The district court denied the request after applying the heightened standard of proof applicable in proceedings for the termination of parental rights under Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 128. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a party requesting predicate factual findings under Nev. Rev. Stat. 3.2203 need only show that such findings are warranted by a preponderance of the evidence. View "In re Guardianship of B.A.A.R." on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and ordering his removal from the United States to El Salvador. The court held that substantial evidence supported the findings that petitioner was not entitled to asylum and withholding of removal. In this case, the record does not compel the conclusion that the Salvadoran government was unwilling or unable to control MS-13. Therefore, the court must uphold the IJ and BIA's conclusion that petitioner does not qualify as a refugee under 8 U.S.C. 1102(a)(42)(A), and is ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal.The court also held that substantial evidence in the record supports the BIA's determination that petitioner was not eligible for CAT protection, and the BIA did not otherwise err in dismissing the appeal of the IJ's denial of petitioner's CAT application. In this case, the IJ did not commit legal error, much less an obvious one, in finding that petitioner failed to establish that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured in El Salvador with the consent or acquiescence of the government. View "Portillo-Flores v. Barr" on Justia Law

A.A., a Syrian citizen, fled involuntary military service in a government-controlled Militia (Jaysh al-Sha’bi), arrived in New York, surrendered to U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). An IJ granted A.A. deferral of removal under the CAT, finding that A.A. was likely to be tortured if he returned to Syria, but denied his applications for asylum and for withholding of removal, concluding that the Militia is a “Tier III” terrorist organization under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III); any alien who provides “material support” to a Tier III organization is barred from receiving asylum and withholding of removal. The IJ concluded that A.A. provided material support because, during his service, A.A. trained to use an assault weapon, performed guard duty, and performed errands for his superiors. The BIA rejected A.A.’s argument that the Militia is beyond the scope of the Tier III provision.The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. Although the definition of “organization” does not specifically refer to state actors, the Tier III provision encompasses state actors, including the Militia. There is no statutory exception for individuals, like A.A., who are forced to provide material support to terrorist organizations; while the administrative duress exemption might have afforded A.A. relief, it did not, and A.A. has no right to judicial review of that decision. View "A.A. v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction granted to Plaintiffs in this case, holding that the district court abused its discretion in finding that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their arguments challenging United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) policy of civilly arresting individuals attending court on official business.In 2018, ICE issued a directive formalizing its policy of arresting allegedly removable noncitizen in and around state courthouses when they appeared for judicial proceedings. Plaintiffs sued ICE, the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and three DHS officials (collectively, Defendants), challenging the directive and ICE's policy. The district court determined that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their argument that ICE lacked statutory authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101-1537, to conduct such arrests and preliminarily enjoined ICE from implementing the directive or otherwise civilly arresting individuals attending court on official business anywhere in Massachusetts. The First Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case, holding that Plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits, and the district court's contrary ruling was based on a material error of law. View "Ryan v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement" on Justia Law

Jaimes-Cardenas, a citizen of Mexico, first entered the U.S. without inspection in 2008, He married a U.S. citizen, Flora, who was addicted to methamphetamines. Flora was violent and abusive. One incident led to Jaimes-Cardenas’s arrest, after which he voluntarily returned to Mexico. Months later, he returned to the U.S. Flora was pregnant with their first child. Flora became increasingly abusive and started selling drugs. She left Jaimes-Cardenas and their children, who were placed in foster care. The police found methamphetamine in Jaimes-Cardenas's apartment. Despite Flora’s statement that the methamphetamine was hers, police charged Jaimes-Cardenas with possession, manufacture, and delivery of methamphetamine, and with hindering prosecution for his failure to report Flora. Jaimes-Cardenas’s counsel informed him that he would likely face ICE detention and removal if he fought the case. He pleaded to possession of methamphetamine.DHS charged him as inadmissible for entering without inspection, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), and having been convicted of a law or regulation related to a controlled substance offense, section 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). Jaimes-Cardenas applied for special cancellation of removal for victims of domestic violence 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(2). The BIA and the Ninth Circuit upheld the IJ's determination that the authority provided for the domestic violence waiver, even if granted, does not waive the section 1182](a)(2) controlled substance offense but only applies to crimes of domestic violence and stalking or violations of a domestic violence protective order. View "Jaimes-Cardenas v. Barr" on Justia Law

In Al-Saadoon I, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of petitioners' (husband and wife) petitions for naturalization because husband engaged in unlawful employment and thus the couple never lawfully adjusted to permanent resident status. Petitioners then filed a Supplement A to Form I-485 with USCIS to adjust their status to lawful permanent residents nunc pro tunc.The court affirmed the district court's denial of petitioners' requests for nunc pro tunc adjustment to lawful permanent resident status, holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction to review a discretionary denial of an adjustment of status application. The court explained that, because petitioners failed to adjust their status to lawful permanent residents, they cannot meet the requirements for naturalization. To the extent that petitioners attempt to relitigate the determination that they were unlawfully admitted to permanent resident status in 2002, they are barred by res judicata. The court also held that the district court correctly dismissed petitioner's Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program claim. Finally, petitioners' Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) claim fails because they did not assert a claim for relief under RFRA in their petition. View "Al-Saadoon v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted the government's unopposed motion to amend the decision, vacated the previous opinion, and issued this opinion with the government's requested amendment.After determining that it has jurisdiction to consider the petition for review, the court held that the BIA erred by retroactively applying the stop-time rule to petitioner's pre-Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) conviction. The court held that neither IIRIRA section 309(a) nor 309(c)(5) mandates retroactivity, and that the BIA's interpretation of the stop-time rule does not warrant Chevron deference. In this case, by pleading guilty, petitioner gave up constitutionally protected rights with the reasonable expectation that his resulting sentence would not affect his ability to remain present in this country. The court explained that applying the stop-time rule retroactively would add a new and unforeseen consequence to his guilty plea by rendering him ineligible for cancellation of removal. Accordingly, the court reversed the BIA's decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rendon v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Romero, a citizen of Mexico, sought admission to the U.S. at a Houston airport in 2011. Relying on a fraudulent passport, he claimed to be a U.S. citizen. Romero was removed to Mexico. In 2013, Romero re-entered and was again removed. In 2013, Romero re-entered and evaded officials for six years. An alien subject to reinstatement of a removal order may seek withholding of removal if the alien has a reasonable fear of persecution based on his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion and may seek relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). During a “reasonable fear” interview, Romero, represented by counsel, testified that he is afraid to return to Mexico because Valencia, the father of Romero’s wife’s daughter and an alleged cartel member, will harm him. He stated that he has never been harmed, nor does he fear harm in Mexico based on his race, religion, sex, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. Romero had been threatened by Valencia by phone but Valencia never acted on the threats. Romero did not report the threats to the police.An IJ affirmed the asylum officer’s determination that Romero did not have a reasonable fear of torture as required for CAT relief or reasonable fear of persecution as required for withholding of removal. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review, concluding that the findings were supported by substantial evidence. View "Romero v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) to petitioner. Petitioner claims that he is a member of a minority Somali clan who fled Somalia after members of a majority clan forced him to work as a slave for over two years, beat him, and killed his brother.The panel held that the BIA's adverse credibility determination is not supported by substantial evidence. In light of the totality of the circumstances and in the context of the administrative record presented to the panel, the panel held that the evidence in this case compels the conclusion that petitioner's testimony was credible. The panel stated that neither of the two grounds that the BIA relied on supported its adverse credibility determination: first, that petitioner's testimony was nonresponsive or lacking detail, which indicated a lack of candor; and second, petitioner omitted from his asylum application information regarding his sisters' rapes. Rather, the panel explained that the record showed that petitioner gave responsive and detailed answers, and that the omission about his sisters' rapes was not probative of petitioner's credibility and was not inconsistent with petitioner's statements. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Iman v. Barr" on Justia Law