Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Edgardo Vasquez Castaneda, a citizen of El Salvador, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that his ongoing civil detention during his ongoing withholding-only proceedings was unlawful. He had been ordered removed to El Salvador but had instigated withholding-only proceedings claiming a fear of torture if returned to El Salvador. The length of his detention, pending the resolution of those proceedings, had exceeded the six-month period deemed presumptively reasonable under Zadvydas v. Davis. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the petition.Vasquez Castaneda failed to show that his removal from the U.S. was not significantly likely to happen in the foreseeable future. The court reasoned that ongoing withholding-only proceedings, even lengthy ones, do not present the same risk of "indefinite and potentially permanent" detention at issue in Zadvydas. Furthermore, the court rejected Vasquez Castaneda's assertion that due process requires another bond hearing before an immigration judge given his circumstances. The court emphasized that Vasquez Castaneda's ongoing detention was directly tied to the proceedings he voluntarily initiated and that these proceedings would eventually conclude. The court also noted that Vasquez Castaneda had received ample process since his detention began, including a bond hearing, numerous custody reviews by ICE, and the very habeas proceedings in question. View "Castaneda v. Perry" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the asylum petition of a Zambian woman, Milly Kalulu. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had previously dismissed her appeal of a removal order. Kalulu, who identifies as a lesbian, claimed past persecution in Zambia on account of her sexual orientation.The Ninth Circuit agreed with the BIA that substantial evidence supported the agency’s adverse credibility determination, meaning that the agency was justified in not believing Kalulu’s testimony. The court found that Kalulu had been inconsistent in her testimony regarding when she made plans to remain in the United States and her alleged fear of future persecution if she returned to Zambia. Her demeanor during the removal hearing also contributed to the adverse credibility determination.However, the Ninth Circuit identified errors in the agency’s evaluation of the documents Kalulu provided as evidence to support her claims of past persecution. The court found that the agency had misread some of these documents and had improperly discounted their evidentiary value based on these misreadings.The court therefore granted Kalulu's petition for a review of the BIA's decision and instructed the agency to reconsider whether the documents, when properly read, independently prove Kalulu’s claims of past persecution. The court made no determination as to whether these documents do provide such proof or whether Kalulu merits any of the relief for which she applied. View "KALULU V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Kwok Sum Wong, a citizen of China and Hong Kong native, petitioned for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming a decision by an Immigration Judge (IJ) that found him removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The IJ had found Wong removable because he had been “convicted” of “two crimes involving moral turpitude.” Wong's offenses were theft by deception under New Jersey law and second-degree forgery under New York law. The BIA determined that a "conviction" under immigration law hinges on whether the offenses were criminal proceedings with “minimum constitutional protections”, including proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and certain rights such as the right to a speedy trial and protection against double jeopardy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the BIA’s interpretation of “conviction” was not arbitrary or capricious and that the “minimum constitutional protections” test to ascertain a “conviction” retroactively applies to Wong’s case. The court further held that second-degree forgery under New York law is a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), and that the statutory phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” is not unconstitutionally vague. The court thus denied the petition for review. View "Wong v. Garland" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Loing Yar, a native and citizen of South Sudan who entered the United States as a refugee, appealed an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that denied his claim under the Convention Against Torture for deferral of his removal to South Sudan. Yar was convicted of distributing methamphetamine in the United States, which is considered an aggravated felony, leading to the initiation of removal proceedings against him. Yar sought relief from removal, claiming he would be likely tortured if he was returned to South Sudan due to his membership in the minority Nuer tribe and his relationship to his father, an advocate for South Sudanese independence who died under suspicious circumstances.An immigration judge initially granted deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, but the BIA vacated this decision, concluding that the potential harm identified by the immigration judge did not rise to the level of torture, as defined by the law. The BIA further asserted that the likelihood of detention or imprisonment alone does not amount to torture, and the indeterminate "chance" of future upheaval or ethnic cleansing did not meet the legal standard of "more likely than not" under the regulations implementing the Convention.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied Yar's petition for review, affirming the BIA's decision. The court found no error in the BIA's legal conclusion that Yar failed to establish a likelihood of torture upon return to South Sudan. The court agreed with the BIA's interpretation of the Convention Against Torture, emphasizing that the definition of torture is a legal issue and whether a predicted factual outcome meets the definition of "torture" is a question of law. View "Yar v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a father, Rene S., who appealed against the jurisdictional and dispositional orders which removed his daughter, F.V., from his custody. F.V. had traveled to the United States from Honduras with her father when she was nine years old, but when they were unable to cross the border together, she entered the United States alone. She was placed with her maternal uncle in California by immigration authorities, who obtained her mother's consent for the placement. The juvenile court sustained allegations that F.V.'s uncle sexually abused her. The court asserted jurisdiction based on the parents allowing F.V. to enter the U.S. unaccompanied with no plan in place for her care.At the disposition stage, the juvenile court indicated it was inclined to return F.V. to her mother in Honduras. However, the court declined to place F.V. with her father, finding his housing situation was unstable and F.V. did not want to relocate to Texas, where her father now lived. As a result, F.V. remained in foster care.The California Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's orders, holding that there was insufficient evidence of future risk to F.V. to support jurisdiction. The court noted that at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, F.V. was no longer in her uncle's custody, and there was no indication that her mother and father would allow her uncle access to her. Given that the father was now in the U.S. and able to care for her, and the mother wanted her back in Honduras, the court found it unlikely that the circumstances leading to F.V.'s entry into the U.S. alone would recur. View "In re F.V." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Sandeep and Sarvani Thigulla, were lawful nonimmigrant workers seeking to become lawful permanent residents (LPRs) in the United States and had applied for approval of their Form I-485 applications with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). When the Department of State decreased the number of applications it would adjudicate, the Thigullas sought a temporary restraining order against the Director of USCIS, compelling the prompt adjudication of their applications under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court denied this order, and the Thigullas appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit dismissed the case due to a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court found that the decision to delay adjudicating the Thigullas' applications falls under the Attorney General’s discretionary authority as stated in 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) and that this authority is protected from judicial review by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that this interpretation went against congressional intent, citing clear textual evidence in the statute. The court concluded that it lacked the jurisdiction to review the decision to delay adjudication of the applications, even under the Administrative Procedure Act. Consequently, the court dismissed the case and remanded it to the district court for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Thigulla v. Jaddou" on Justia Law

Fody Daniel Membreno-Rodriguez, a native and citizen of Honduras, sought review of the denial of his motion to reopen his removal proceedings by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Initially, Membreno-Rodriguez was deemed inadmissible to the United States due to lack of a valid entry document but was granted parole. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), all of which were denied. After marrying a U.S. citizen, Membreno-Rodriguez moved to reopen his immigration proceedings to pursue adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident. However, the BIA denied the motion on grounds of his inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the BIA's decision that Membreno-Rodriguez was ineligible for adjustment of status under § 1255(a) since he had conceded his inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). The court also noted that his parole status had no effect on his status as an applicant for admission into the United States. Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Membreno-Rodriguez's motion to reopen for failing to demonstrate his prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status. View "Membreno-Rodriguez v. Garland" on Justia Law

A former restaurant owner from Mexico, Alma Reyes Galeana, and her three daughters sought asylum and withholding of removal in the United States after fleeing violent threats from gangs in Mexico. Reyes Galeana claimed that, as a Mexican business owner, she was a member of a "particular social group" that deserved protection from deportation under federal law. However, both the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals rejected this argument, asserting that "Mexican business owners" do not constitute a specific social group.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the Board's decision and agreed with the lower courts' rulings. The court ruled that Reyes Galeana's proposed social group of "Mexican business owners" failed on grounds of particularity and social distinction. The court held that this group was neither specifically defined nor perceived as socially distinct in Mexican society. Furthermore, the court maintained that being a target for extortion, a common threat faced by business owners, does not establish membership in a particular social group. The court also found that Reyes Galeana failed to provide evidence that Mexican society perceives business owners as a distinct class of persons subject to persecution.Consequently, the court denied her petition for review, affirming the Board's decision that Reyes Galeana does not qualify for asylum or withholding of removal as a member of a particular social group. View "Galeana v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves Wendy Miguel-Peña and her minor daughter, natives and citizens of El Salvador, who entered the United States without authorization. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, and an immigration judge found them removable and ineligible for asylum or protection under the Convention Against Torture. They appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which also dismissed their appeal.Miguel-Peña and her daughter then sought review of the Board's order, alleging error in denying their motion to terminate removal proceedings and denial of Miguel-Peña’s asylum claim based on a lack of connection between alleged persecution and a protected ground, and a finding that “women business owners in El Salvador” is not an immutable particular social group. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied the petition, finding that the petitioners failed to exhaust their claim-processing arguments under the law, and that the Board of Immigration Appeals did not err in its analysis of the asylum claim.Specifically, the court found substantial evidence supporting the Board's findings that the alleged persecution was not based on an anti-gang political opinion or membership in a particular social group. The court also agreed with the Board's conclusion that the proposed social group of "women business owners in El Salvador" was not immutable, and therefore, not a cognizable social group under asylum law. View "Miguel-Pena v. Garland" on Justia Law

Hector Herrera-Elias, a Honduran citizen, entered the United States unlawfully and was charged with removability. In response, he petitioned for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, claiming he feared persecution and torture in Honduras due to his involvement with the MS-13 gang and his sexual orientation. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found him ineligible for asylum due to an untimely application, and deemed him barred from asylum and withholding of removal due to his having committed a serious nonpolitical crime (transporting firearms and drugs for criminal organizations in Honduras). The IJ also found that Herrera-Elias failed to prove that he would likely face torture if returned to Honduras.Upon appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's decision, concluding that Herrera-Elias knowingly participated in serious criminal activity and that no duress exception applied to the serious nonpolitical crime bar. One panel member dissented, arguing that Herrera-Elias's age and limited involvement in gang operations should not constitute a serious nonpolitical crime.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the BIA's judgment. The court found substantial evidence supporting the IJ’s and BIA’s findings regarding Herrera-Elias's involvement in serious nonpolitical crime. Additionally, the court rejected Herrera-Elias's attempt to introduce a duress exception to the serious nonpolitical crime bar, noting that the elements of this bar and the persecutor bar (where the duress exception has been debated) are different, and that Herrera-Elias did not explain how duress is relevant to this specific bar. View "Hererra-Elias v. Garland" on Justia Law