Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Marqus, a citizen of Iraq, was admitted to the U.S. as a refugee in 2012 and later adjusted his status to Lawful Permanent Resident. In 2017, he was convicted of attempted criminal sexual conduct. In removal proceedings, against the government’s objections, the IJ admitted three expert declarations concerning country conditions. Marqus believes that he would be tortured if he were to return to Iraq because he is Chaldean Christian; was previously tortured by and deserted from the Iraqi military; was previously targeted, abused, and threatened by the El Mahdi army; and lacks documentation to travel within Iraq without being stopped and tortured. The IJ determined that Marqus was ineligible for withholding of removal because the “particularly serious crime” bar applied, 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) or for protection under the Convention Against Torture. The BIA dismissed his appeal and denied his request to consider new evidence: an additional country-conditions expert declaration, the Department of State 2017 Human Rights Report on Iraq, and the 2017 International Religious Freedom Report on Iraq.The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part but remanded. It is not clear that the new evidence materially changes Marqus’s chances of obtaining CAT relief but that evidence, particularly the reports, could be significant. Without an analysis by the BIA of why this evidence is immaterial, it is impossible to determine whether the BIA abused its discretion. View "Marqus v. Barr" on Justia Law

After USCIS denied plaintiff's application for lawful-permanent-resident status by finding that he failed to continuously maintain lawful status prior to the filing of his application and was thus ineligible for an adjustment of status pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1255(c)(2), plaintiff filed suit alleging that his lapse in lawful status was excused.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the USCIS and held that plaintiff was ineligible for adjustment of status to lawful-permanent-resident status because he failed to establish that his lapse in lawful immigration status was "through no fault of his own or for technical reasons." The panel held that a "technical violation" occurs under 8 C.F.R. 245.1(d)(2)(ii) only if the violation is a consequence or effect of USCIS's inaction on a pending application. In this case, a "technical violation" occurs only if the alien's application to maintain lawful status is ultimately granted. The panel concluded that the text is not "genuinely ambiguous" and noted that it need not grant Auer deference. The panel stated that plaintiff's lapse in lawful status was not caused by USCIS's inaction. Rather, plaintiff's lapse resulted from his substantive ineligibility for an extension of his B-1 visa. View "Attias v. Crandall" on Justia Law

Sathanthrasa is a citizen of Sri Lanka and a Tamil, an ethnic minority group that has been persecuted by government forces and the paramilitary Karuna Group. In 2007, Sathanthrasa’s brothers were kidnapped. Sathanthrasa reported the kidnappings to the Human Rights Commission without ascribing blame to the Karuna Group. The Karuna Group abducted and beat him; he suffered “internal injur[ies].” Days later, his father was beaten by men looking for Sathanthrasa, who fled but was picked up by armed officers, detained, and interrogated. Over the next six years, kidnappings remained commonplace. While acquiring the funds needed to leave, Sathanthrasa lived openly with his wife and children. Upon entering the U.S., Sathanthrasa sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. An IJ granted Sathanthrasa withholding of removal, citing the likelihood that Sathanthrasa would be “tortured or persecuted” if he returned to Sri Lanka but denied Sathanthrasa’s petition for asylum “as a matter of discretion,” stating that Sathanthrasa’s history did not amount to past persecution and that Sathanthrasa's explanation for the delay was “unpersuasive.” Only asylum provides a pathway to legal permanent resident status and a basis to petition for admission of family members. The Third Circuit vacated. When a petitioner is denied asylum but granted withholding, the denial of asylum “shall be reconsidered,” and the IJ must consider the “reasons for the denial” and “reasonable alternatives available” to the petitioner for family reunification, 8 C.F.R. 1208.16(e). The IJ failed to consider those factors, thereby abusing his discretion. View "Sathanthrasa v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The district court decided that the government was not authorized under 8 C.F.R. 241.14(d) to continue holding petitioner in immigration detention pending his removal from the United States and ordered the government to release him. The government appealed and argued that section 241.14(d) is not inconsistent with its authorizing statute, 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(6), and that it provides adequate procedural due process.The Second Circuit granted the government's motion for a stay pending appeal, holding that the government has made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its argument that the district court erred in holding that section 241.14(d) is inconsistent with section 1231(a)(6) and does not provide adequate procedural due process. The court also held that the government has made a strong showing of a likelihood of success on its argument that the district court erred in holding that section 241.14(d) is not a permissible reading of section 1231(a)(6). Furthermore, considerations of irreparable harm and the equities favor a stay of petitioner's release pending appeal. View "Hassoun v. Searls" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review challenging petitioner's removal for committing two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT). The panel held that the BIA did not err in concluding that a California Penal Code 646.9(a) criminal stalking conviction qualifies as a CIMT because a section 646.9(a) offense is categorically a CIMT. The panel stated that the BIA's reliance on In re Ajami, 22 I. & N. Dec. 949 (B.I.A. 1999), to determine that a section 646.9(a) criminal stalking conviction constitutes a CIMT is entitled to Skidmore deference, rather than Chevron deference. Pursuant to the panel's review of the statutory text and in light of its CIMT precedents, the panel concluded that section 646.9 does not plainly and specifically criminalize conduct outside the contours of the federal definition of a CIMT.The panel also held that the BIA reasonably concluded that petitioner's two section 646.9(a) counts of conviction did not arise out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. In this case, Count 1 of the state felony complaint involved petitioner willfully and maliciously following and harassing one person between June 1, 2015 and April 26, 2017. Count 2 involved the same conduct by petitioner against a different person between March 1, 2017 and April 26, 2017. Accordingly, petitioner is removable as charged under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). View "Orellana v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision upholding the IJ's order of removal and denial of petitioner's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner argues that he should be granted relief from removal because he faces religious persecution if removed to China.The court identified no error in the denial of petitioner's claims where the agency's adverse credibility finding was supported by substantial evidence consisting of numerous testimonial inconsistencies and petitioner's evasive demeanor. Furthermore, the court rejected petitioner's argument that he satisfactorily explained the inconsistencies, because the explanations would not compel a reasonable factfinder to excuse the inconsistencies or credit petitioner's testimony. View "Likai Gao v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review to reopen petitioner's removal proceedings for the second time. After petitioner failed to appear for his removal proceeding, the IJ ordered him removed in absentia. The court agreed with the BIA that petitioner failed to establish the materially changed country conditions necessary to succeed on a successive motion to reopen.In this case, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that petitioner has not shown that there has been a material change, as opposed to a continuation, of overall violent conditions experienced by lower caste members in India since the date of his removal order; the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that incremental worsening of an existing condition does not constitute a changed country condition for the purpose of reopening a removal order; and petitioner's assertion that the IJ and the BIA did not consider his evidence because they did not specifically cite certain articles he submitted cannot overcome the presumption of regularity. View "Deep v. Barr" on Justia Law

In 2008, Melara, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the U.S. illegally and was removed after being apprehended. In 2016, Melara’s wife and children immigrated legally to the U.S. and became lawful permanent residents. Melara then experienced threats and violence from the MS-13 gang. In 2017, Melara illegally reentered the U.S. The government apprehended him and reinstated his 2008 removal order. An asylum officer found that he had established a reasonable possibility of future torture. An IJ found that Melara was not entitled to relief. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Sixth Circuit remanded Melara’s withholding-only case and dismissed his other petitions for review. The BIA reinstated Melara’s appeal.Melara has remained in detention since December 2017. In June 2019, Melara filed a habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2241, seeking either release from detention or a bond hearing before a neutral decision-maker. The district court dismissed Melara’s petition, holding that 8 U.S.C. 1226 does not apply to his detention and under 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)'s indefinite-detention standard, his due process claims fail because his removal is reasonably foreseeable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Section 1231(a) provides the authority for detaining aliens in withholding-only proceedings. Because Melara’s removal is reasonably foreseeable, his continued detention does not violate due process under the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas v. Davis. View "Martinez v. LaRose" on Justia Law

Blanco, a citizen of Honduras, is a member of Honduras’s Liberty and Refoundation anti-corruption political party that opposes the current Honduran president. After participating in six political marches, he was abducted by the Honduran police and beaten, on and off, for 12 hours. He was released but received death threats over the next several months until he fled to the U.S. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the denial of all relief.The Third Circuit vacated. The BIA misapplied precedent by requiring Blanco to show severe physical harm in order to establish past persecution; by requiring the death threats to be imminent; and by considering the beating and death threats separately. On remand, the BIA must consider the other elements of asylum eligibility: whether the persecution was on account of a statutorily protected ground and whether it was committed by the government or forces the government was unable or unwilling to control. As for the CAT claim, before requiring corroborating evidence, an IJ must identify the facts for which ‘it is reasonable to expect corroboration, ask whether the applicant has corroborated them, and if not, consider whether the applicant has adequately explained his failure to do so. View "Blanco v. Attorney General of the United States" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision to deny his application for deferral of removal under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that Petitioner was not eligible for deferral of removal under the CAT.Petitioner, who was born in Venezuela, was convicted of heroin trafficking in the United States. Petitioner was subsequently served with a notice informing him that he was removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. Petitioner requested withholding of removal under CAT protection, stating that if he returned to Venezuela he feared retaliation by drug traffickers, as well as persecution, torture, and death because of his earlier membership in a Venezuelan opposition political party. An immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's application, and the BIA dismissed Petitioner's appeal. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the record did not compel the conclusion that Petitioner demonstrated eligibility for deferral of removal under the CAT. View "Sanabria Morales v. Barr" on Justia Law