Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Moran-Garcia, caught off the California coast in a disguised boat, was indicted for attempting to enter the United States after having been deported, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b), and for attempting to enter other than at a place designated, 8 U.S.C. 1325. The indictment alleged that these offenses occurred “within the Southern District of California.” The evidence established that Moran was apprehended six miles off the coast, within sight of the lights of San Diego. San Diego is within the Southern District of California. Defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence of venue, arguing that the Southern District extended only three miles out to sea. The court denied the motion and ruled that no jury instruction was appropriate because venue was a legal question that it had already decided.The Ninth Circuit vacated, finding that venue was not established. The Southern District of California as defined by Congress comprises the counties of (landlocked) Imperial and San Diego. The territorial sea of the United States extends to 12 nautical miles, but that is not true of the Southern District of California. California law defines the western border of San Diego County as extending “to a point three English miles [into the] Pacific Ocean.” Venue is a question of fact that the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence.” It is a jury question. View "United States v. Moran-Garcia" on Justia Law

In 2001, Shire, a citizen of Somalia, was lawfully admitted to the U.S. as a refugee; in 2004, he obtained lawful permanent resident status. In 2006, Shire pled guilty to two drug offenses and was sentenced to 170 days' imprisonment. In 2008, an IJ ordered him removed under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). In 2018, Shire, still in the U.S., moved to reopen his removal proceedings to apply for asylum, citing changed country conditions.The IJ denied relief, noting that al-Shabaab came into prominence in 2006 and was using the same tactics in 2018 that it had been using in 2008. The IJ also determined that Shire failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of a different outcome, noting that Shire’s conviction for an aggravated felony rendered him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. Shire did not establish entitlement to relief from removal under the Convention Against Torture; the Somali government, while weak, was resisting al-Shabaab and would not acquiesce to the torture of its citizens; the number of deaths from al-Shabaab was low compared to the total population of Somalia; and Shire’s personal circumstances did not subject him to particular notoriety in Somalia. The BIA affirmed. In 2019, Shire was removed to Somalia. The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review, finding those conclusions supported by substantial evidence. View "Shire v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal and affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's motion to reopen his immigration case. The court held that Pierre v. Holder, 738 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2013), foreclosed petitioner's claim that the application of former 8 U.S.C. 1432(a)(3) as written violates his right to equal protection. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's decision in Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017). Pet. Br. at 14, did not invalidate Pierre.As to petitioner's alternative argument that the BIA must consider in the first instance whether his conviction for assault in the second degree under NYPL 120.05(2) is an aggravated felony crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(a), the court held that his argument is precluded by Singh v. Barr, 939 F.3d 457 (2d Cir. 2019) (per curiam). View "Dale v. Barr" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, husband and wife, are citizens of El Salvador. They entered the U.S. without inspection or admission in 1997 and again in 1998. Following a series of earthquakes in El Salvador in 2001, the plaintiffs applied for and received Temporary Protected Status (TPS), 8 U.S.C. 1254a. Over the next several years, the Attorney General periodically extended TPS eligibility for El Salvadoran nationals, which enabled the plaintiffs to remain in the U.S. In 2014, they applied to become lawful permanent residents under section 1255. USCIS denied their applications, explaining that the husband was “statutorily ineligible” for adjustment of status because he had not been admitted into the U.S. The wife’s application depended on the success of his application.The district court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment, holding a grant of TPS met section 1255(a)’s requirement that an alien must be “inspected and admitted or paroled” to be eligible for adjustment of status. The Third Circuit reversed. Congress did not intend a grant of TPS to serve as an admission for those who entered the United States illegally. View "Sanchez v. Secretary United States Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that defendant's denial of plaintiff's application pursuant to the Child State Protection Act (CSPA) for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court set aside defendants' October 2017 decision denying plaintiff's adjustment of status application and directed defendants to reopen and readjudicate the application.The court held that the government is equitably estopped from initiating rescission proceedings to reopen plaintiff's adjustment of status application or placing her in removal proceedings. In this case, the undisputed facts show that USCIS failed to issue a rejection notice, despite controlling regulation and, consequently, plaintiff was not advised of any defect in her application, depriving her of the opportunity to correct the issue. View "Schwebel v. Crandall" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court held that the BIA's adverse credibility determinations is supported by substantial evidence. The court also held that, even assuming petitioner's due process rights were violated when the IJ excluded petitioner's psychologist and country conditions expert, petitioner cannot establish prejudice. View "Santos-Alvarado v. Barr" on Justia Law

ORS 475.992(1)(a), which criminalizes manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance, is divisible as between its "manufacture" and "delivery" terms. The Ninth Circuit held that the BIA properly applied the modified categorical approach and correctly found that petitioner was convicted of manufacture of a controlled substance, which constitutes an aggravated felony. Therefore, petitioner is removable as charged.The panel also held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding petitioner's offense to be a particularly serious crime and that the notice provided to petitioner was sufficient to vest the IJ with jurisdiction. Consequently, petitioner is ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, and withholding under the Convention Against Torture. The panel dismissed in part and denied in part the petition for review. View "Banuelos Dominguez v. Barr" on Justia Law

Skripkov worked as an event planner for the Chelyabinsk (Russia) regional government and served on a commission that oversaw government procurement activities. In 2010, regional leadership directed Skripkov to accept bids from specified suppliers at inflated prices. Skripkov refused and received “[c]onstant threats,” causing him to resign. Skripkov continued to receive threats. Skripkov and his wife moved to a different town. In 2014, Skripkov learned about a bidding competition held by the government of Chelyabinsk, believed that the “staggering” amount at issue was unjustified, and reported to a prominent watchdog organization. Skripkov continued to experience threats; someone threw a rock through his window and a note found in the backyard stated: “[Y]ou d[ug] into our business, we will spoil your life.” In 2018, Skripkov assumed a more public role as an anti-corruption activist, which led to several arrests and physical violence, accompanied by more threats.Skripkov, on vacation in the U.S., received a call from his mother explaining that individuals had come by her house to ask about Skripkov’s adopted son. Skripkov feared that they would take his son. He and his wife sought asylum. The Russian government issued an indictment against Skripkov. An IJ and the BIA denied relief, finding that the officials were motivated solely by their pecuniary interest in furthering a corrupt scheme disrupted by Skripkov. The Seventh Circuit granted Skripkov’s petition for review. The BIA erred in disregarding evidence that Skripkov would be criminally prosecuted for his political opinion if he is returned to Russia. View "Skripkov v. Barr" on Justia Law

Asylum seekers filed suit challenging executive-branch policies adopted to implement the expedited-removal provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Asylum seekers principally argue that the policies raise the bar for demonstrating a credible fear of persecution far above what Congress intended and that the Attorney General and various agencies violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by failing to adequately address important factors bearing on the policies' adoption. The district court found that the policies are inconsistent with the IIRIRA and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), enjoining their enforcement.After addressing jurisdictional issues, the DC Circuit held that the condoned-or-completely-helpless standard is arbitrary and capricious; the new choice-of-law policy is arbitrary and capricious due to USCIS's failure to acknowledge and explain its departure from past practice; when viewed as a whole, the Guidance accurately restates the circularity rule as described in Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 321 (2018); the record in this case does not support the asylum seekers' argument that USCIS and the Attorney General have erected a rule against asylum claims involving allegations of domestic and/or gang violence; and neither 8 U.S.C. 1252(f)(1) nor 1252(e)(1) prohibited the district court from issuing an injunction.Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment with respect to the circularity rule and the statements regarding domestic- and gang-violence claims, vacated the injunction insofar as it pertains to those issues, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Grace v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit granted petitions for review of the BIA's decisions ordering petitioners removed based on their New York firearms convictions. The court principally concluded that the statutes of conviction, sections 265.03 and 265.11 of the New York Penal Law, criminalize conduct involving "antique firearms" that the relevant firearms offense definitions in the Immigration and Nationality Act do not. Therefore, the court held that this categorical mismatch precludes petitioners' removal on the basis of their state convictions. Accordingly, the court vacated the BIA's decisions and remanded with instructions to terminate the removal hearings. View "Jack v. Barr" on Justia Law