Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Santos, a native of the Dominican Republic, became a lawful permanent U.S. resident in 2006. In 2017, he pleaded guilty to possessing marijuana with intent to deliver. If that crime is the “aggravated felony,” “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance” he is removable, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Santos was taken to the Pike County Correctional Facility, 8 U.S.C. 1226(c). In 2018, an IJ ordered Santos removed. While awaiting the BIA’s decision on remand from the Third Circuit, Santos filed this federal habeas petition, arguing that the Due Process Clause guarantees a bond hearing to an alien detained under section 1226(c) once his detention becomes “unreasonable.” The district court denied relief, finding no evidence that the government had “improperly or unreasonably delayed the regular course of proceedings, or that [it] ha[d] detained him for any purpose other than the resolution of his removal proceedings.” The BIA then held that Santos’s conviction was not an aggravated felony and remanded for a hearing on his application for cancellation of removal. The IJ denied that application, leaving Santos in prison (then more than 30 months). The Third Circuit reversed; his detention has become unreasonable and Santos has a due process right to a bond hearing, at which the government must justify his continued detention by clear and convincing evidence. View "Santos v. Warden Pike County Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings and to deny his motion to remand. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the vast majority of petitioner's arguments concerning his motion to reopen his asylum and withholding of removal claims because they merely constitute a brief in opposition to the BIA's factual findings.In regard to the CAT claim, the court held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that he had not shown facts that would likely change the result in the case on account of a material change in country conditions. In regard to the motion for remand, the court lacked jurisdiction to review petitioner's arguments to the extent they concern his asylum and withholding of removal claims; petitioner's claims that the BIA committed legal error lacked merit; and the court cannot say the BIA abused its discretion in determining that further proceedings on his motion to reopen his CAT claim were not warranted by the newly presented evidence attached to his motion to remand. Finally, the court rejected petitioner's Fifth Amendment due process claim. View "Sharif v. Barr" on Justia Law

In petition No. 18-834, petitioner contends principally that the BIA erred (a) in rejecting his challenge to the IJ's ruling that he failed to carry his burden of showing his procedurally regular admission to the United States, (b) in rejecting his contention that he was denied due process by the IJ's evidentiary rulings minimizing or curtailing evidence to show his procedurally regular admission, and (c) in denying his motion to reopen the proceeding to present newly discovered evidence. In petition No. 19-737, petitioner contends that the BIA erred in rejecting his contention that intervening legal authority requires the conclusion that criminal possession of stolen property was not a crime involving moral turpitude at the time of his conviction.The Second Circuit denied so much of Petition No 18-834 as contends that petitioner was denied due process. The court dismissed the remainder of that petition for lack of jurisdiction. In regard to Petition No. 19-737, the court held that there was no error in the Board's determination that petitioner's conviction for criminal possession of stolen property was a crime involving moral turpitude. Furthermore, the Board did not err by rejecting petitioner's motion to reopen removal proceedings based on petitioner's claim of an intervening change in the law. Therefore, the court denied the petition in No. 19-737. View "Ottey v. Barr" on Justia Law

This appeal involved the relationship between the detention and release provisions of two statutes: the Bail Reform Act (BRA), 18 U.S.C. sections 3141-3156, and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. sections 1101-1537. The district court ordered Jose Luis Barrera-Landa released pending trial subject to the conditions the magistrate judge set in an earlier order. Barrera did not appeal that portion of the district court’s release order. As part of its order granting pretrial release, the district court denied Barrera’s request to enjoin the United States Immigration Customs and Enforcement (ICE) from detaining or deporting him during the pending criminal proceedings. Barrera appealed that portion of the district court’s release order. Barrera raised two new arguments on appeal: (1) 18 U.S.C. 3142(c) authorized a district court to prohibit the United States from deporting a defendant to assure his appearance in court; and (2) the Tenth Circuit should recognize the courts’ inherent supervisory authority to enjoin the United States from arresting or deporting Barrera while the criminal case is pending. Furthermore, Barrera argued the government had to choose to either proceed with immigration enforcement or his criminal prosecution, but could not do both. He asserted that if the government chose to prosecute, it had to must submit to the detention rules that governed criminal prosecutions and ICE could not detain or remove him. The district court denied Barrera’s request to enjoin ICE, explaining that every circuit that has addressed the issue has concluded that ICE may fulfill its statutory duties under the INA to detain an illegal alien regardless of a release determination under the BRA. The Tenth Circuit found Barrera forfeited his first two arguments by failing to raise them at the district court. The Court concluded the BRA and the INA "are capable of co-existing in the circumstances presented here." It therefore affirmed the district court's release order. View "United States v. Barrera-Landa" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of a Department of Homeland Security joint interim final rule which—with limited exceptions—categorically denies asylum to aliens arriving at the border with Mexico unless they have first applied for, and have been denied, asylum in Mexico or another country through which they have traveled.After determining that plaintiffs have Article III standing, the panel held that plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on their claim that the rule is unlawful under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), where it is not in accordance with law and in excess of statutory limitations because it is not consistent with 8 U.S.C. 1158. The panel also held that plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on their claim that the rule is arbitrary and capricious because it runs counter to the evidence before the agency and entirely failed to consider important aspects of the problem. Furthermore, the panel held that plaintiffs have shown that they will suffer irreparable harm, that the balance of equities lies in their favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest. Finally, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering an injunction covering the four states along the border with Mexico. View "East Bay Sanctuary Convenant v. Barr" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's decision denying his applications for adjustment of immigration status and for a waiver of inadmissibility. Regardless of whether or not the Fifth Circuit applied Chevron deference, the disposition of this case would be the same. The court held that petitioner failed to meet the requirements for derivative citizenship because he admitted in the immigration proceedings that he was only conditionally, not permanently, admitted as a refugee. The court rejected petitioner's claims to the contrary and denied the first petition for review.To the extent that petitioner makes a reviewable challenge to the denial of the waiver of inadmissibility, the court held that it lacks merit. In this case, the BIA did not apply a heightened standard to petitioner and his argument that the BIA should have weighed the equities more in his favor does not establish that the BIA applied a heightened standard to his waiver application and thereby acted ultra vires. To the extent the petition presents the issue of whether the BIA should have weighed the equities of his case more favorably to petitioner, the court is without jurisdiction to consider it. Whether or not the BIA considered each of the facts petitioner alleged, the court is without jurisdiction to review its discretionary decision. Accordingly, as to the second petition, the court denied in part and dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction. View "Nastase v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea to one count of reentry after deportation and to dismiss the indictment, holding that the immigration court did not lack jurisdiction.In moving to withdraw his plea and dismiss the indictment, Appellant argued that the removal order underlying his conviction had been rendered null and void. Specifically, Appellant argued that because his notice to appear did not specify the date or time of the removal hearing the immigration court lacked jurisdiction to issue the removal order. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Appellant did not satisfy the prerequisites set forth in 8 U.S.C. 1326(d) for collaterally attacking the removal order. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Goncalves Pontes v. Barr, 938 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2019) controlled, and Appellant's jurisdictional argument failed. View "United States v. Mendoza-Sanchez" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review of the BIA's decision denying asylum and withholding of removal to petitioner. The panel held that substantial evidence supports the BIA's conclusion that petitioner has not met his burden to produce evidence demonstrating that his purported groups are socially distinct: Mexican professionals who refuse to cooperate with drug cartels and agronomists who refuse to help cultivate drugs.In this case, nothing in the record addresses whether Mexican society views either of petitioner's proposed social groups as distinct; no laws or proposed legislation so indicate; nor do any country conditions reports or news articles mention such a group. Rather, the evidence paints a picture of all segments of the Mexican population being adversely affected by the brutality of drug cartels. Furthermore, the expert testimony does not bridge the gap nor does petitioner's testimony make the required showing. View "Diaz-Torres v. Barr" on Justia Law

In 2003, 15-year-old Valadez Bonilla entered the U.S. illegally to be with his father. Months later, police charged him with drunk and disorderly conduct. Immigration authorities took custody of Valadez, then released Valadez into the care of his aunt at her home in Lorain, Ohio. Valadez identified that address as the place at which he would be staying. The same day, immigration authorities personally served Valadez with a notice to appear “on a date to be set at a time to be set.” After Valadez’s release, immigration authorities mailed multiple notices about his upcoming removal hearing to his aunt’s address. When Valadez did not appear at his removal hearing, an IJ ordered him removed in his absence. In 2008, Valadez was removed to Mexico after he was stopped for speeding while driving without a license. Valadez illegally reentered this country many times.In 2019, after the government charged him with illegal reentry, Valadez sought to rescind his earlier removal order, claiming that he had not received notice of his hearing. The BIA found that Valadez failed to prove the lack of notice, relying on his long delay in seeking to rescind the removal order after he learned of it. The Sixth Circuit denied Valadez’s petition for review. The BIA could reasonably conclude that Valadez did receive notice in conformity with all requirements in 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(1) and (2). View "Valadez-Lara v. Barr" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitioned for review of the BIA's final order of removal affirming the IJ's denial of his application for asylum and other forms of relief. Petitioner claimed that he was persecuted and fears future persecution on account of his family ties.The Fourth Circuit dismissed the petition for review in part, holding that petitioner's jurisdictional argument -- that because his initial notice to appear did not include a time or date for a hearing, the immigration court lacked jurisdiction over his removal proceeding -- is squarely foreclosed by the court's recent opinion in United States v. Cortez, 930 F.3d 350, 355 (4th Cir. 2019), which was issued only after the parties' briefing in this case. The court denied the petitioner for review in part, holding that substantial evidence supports the determination of the IJ and BIA that petitioner has not met his burden of showing eligibility for asylum. In this case, the record does not compel the conclusion that family membership was at least one central reason why petitioner was threatened by his brother's attackers. Therefore, petitioner cannot satisfy the nexus requirement and is not eligible for asylum. View "Cedillos-Cedillos v. Barr" on Justia Law