Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Calderon-Rosas, a Mexican national, entered the U.S. in 2001. He and his wife lack lawful immigration status. Their three children are U.S. citizens. Calderon-Rosas was a successful contractor for 11 years. In 2018, Calderon-Rosas was charged with DUI. Those charges were later dismissed. The government initiated removal proceedings. Calderon-Rosas hired attorney Grannan, who would soon be disbarred for “multiple violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct in seven separate client matters” in a “troubling pattern of neglect.” Calderon-Rosas sought asylum (8 U.S.C. 1158) and cancellation of removal (section 1229b(b). Although Calderon-Rosas spent over $7000 on Grannan’s services, Grannan never visited him, never discussed his case by phone, and never explained to Calderon-Rosas the requirements for the relief he sought. Grannan failed to meaningfully pursue Calderon-Rosas’s asylum application and did not obtain adequate medical records of Calderon-Rosas’s children to support Calderon-Rosas’s cancellation of removal application.The IJ denied relief, finding the asylum application abandoned and that the children's suffering would not amount to “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to qualify Calderon-Rosas for cancellation. With new counsel before the BIA, Calderon-Rosa argued ineffective assistance and submitted new evidence, including medical records for his three children, which demonstrated multiple medical conditions. The BIA dismissed Calderon-Rosas’s appeal. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, first holding that it had jurisdiction although Calderon-Rosas, sought only discretionary relief. Calderon-Rosas plainly presented a meritorious ineffective-assistance claim. View "Calderon-Rosas v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The First Circuit held that the requirements for establishing membership in a particular social group in support of a request for asylum or withholding of removal do not categorically preclude applicants from successfully relying on any group defined in material part as women "unable to leave" a domestic relationship.Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Petitioner alleged that her former domestic partner and the father of her son abused her in the past, will abuse her in the future, and will remain unfettered by Dominican law enforcement authorities. The immigration judge ruled against Petitioner in part on claimed inadequacy of the tendered social groups. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the BIA's holding that Petitioner's claim necessarily failed because the groups to which she claimed to belong were necessarily deficient was arbitrary and unexamined. View "De Pena-Paniagua v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's applications for asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). While not diminishing petitioner's tragic experience of being threatened at gunpoint while helplessly watching her son be beaten and abducted, the court held that the record does not compel a finding that such an experience constitutes persecution. In this case, petitioner was never physically harmed and the kidnappers' threat was non-specific and lacking in immediacy.The court rejected petitioner's argument that the harm suffered by her son constitutes direct persecution of her; petitioner failed to present any evidence to suggest that this alleged persecution of her son was on account of his family relationship, rather than an extortionate demand; petitioner failed to meet the rigorous burden of showing a well-founded fear of future persecution; and thus substantial evidence supported the BIA's denials of petitioner's requests for asylum and withholding of removal. Finally, the court held that substantial evidence in the record likewise supports the BIA's denial of petitioner's request for relief under the CAT. View "Cano v. Barr" on Justia Law

Over 12 years, Barton a lawful permanent resident, was convicted of state crimes, including a firearms offense, drug offenses, and aggravated assault offenses. An Immigration Judge found him removable under 8 U.S.C. 1229a, based on his firearms and drug offenses. Barton applied for cancellation of removal, for which a lawful permanent resident must have “resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status.” The "stop-time rule" provides that a continuous period of residence “shall be deemed to end” when the lawful permanent resident commits “an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) . . . that renders the alien inadmissible." Because Barton’s aggravated assaults were committed within his first seven years of admission and were covered by section 1182(a)(2), the Immigration Judge concluded that Barton was not eligible for cancellation of removal. The BIA and the Eleventh Circuit agreed.The Supreme Court affirmed. For purposes of cancellation-of-removal eligibility, a section 1182(a)(2) offense committed during the initial seven years of residence does not need to be one of the offenses of removal. The cancellation-of-removal statute functions like a traditional recidivist sentencing statute, making a noncitizen’s prior crimes relevant to eligibility for cancellation of removal. Whether the offense that precludes cancellation of removal was charged or could have been charged as one of the offenses of removal is irrelevant.Barton’s aggravated assault offenses were crimes involving moral turpitude and therefore “referred to in section 1182(a)(2).” He committed the offenses during his initial seven years of residence and was later convicted of the offenses, thereby rendering him “inadmissible.” Barton was, therefore, ineligible for cancellation of removal. View "Barton v. Barr" on Justia Law

On April 3, 2020, 20 immigration detainees filed a habeas petition (28 U.S.C. 2241), seeking immediate release, claiming that due to underlying health conditions, their continued detention during the COVID-19 pandemic puts them at imminent risk of death or serious injury. The district court found that the petitioners face irreparable harm and are likely to succeed on the merits, that the government would “face very little potential harm” from their immediate release, and that “the public interest strongly encourages Petitioners’ release.” Without waiting for a response from the government, the court granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) requiring the release. The government moved for reconsideration, submitting a declaration describing conditions at the facilities, with details of the petitioners’ criminal histories. The court denied reconsideration, stating that the government had failed to demonstrate a change in controlling law, provide previously unavailable evidence, or show a clear error of law or the need to prevent manifest injustice. The court extended the release period until the COVID-19 state of emergency is lifted but attached conditions to the petitioners’ release. The government reports that 19 petitioners were released; none have been re-detained.The Third Circuit granted an immediate appeal, stating that the order cannot evade prompt appellate review simply by virtue of the label “TRO.” A purportedly non-appealable TRO that goes beyond preservation of the status quo and mandates affirmative relief may be immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1). View "Hope v. Warden Pike County Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

After overhearing the 2017 murder of his two next-door neighbors and facing repeated threats from local MS-13 gang members for his perceived role in assisting law enforcement, Guzman, then 18 years old, left his home in El Salvador and entered the United States seeking relief under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Immigration Judge denied his application; the BIA dismissed his appeal.The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that persons who publicly provide assistance to law enforcement against major Salvadoran gangs constitute a cognizable particular social group for purposes of asylum and withholding of removal under the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(A), but Guzman failed to meet his burden to show that imputed anti-gang political opinion was a central reason for the treatment he received. The BIA erred in denying Guzman relief under the CAT by “brushing aside” facts and reasonable inferences in assessing whether Guzman is likely to face torture upon removal. View "Guzman-Orellana v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress his responses to an ICE agent's two questions at the Treasurer's Office, because he was not in custody at the time of questioning.Although defendant was in custody at the ICE facility, the court held that an agent's questions were not custodial interrogation because the agent could not have known his questions were likely to elicit incriminating information regarding the two criminal charges that were eventually brought against defendant. The court noted that the Attorney General's regulations carefully distinguish between the warrantless arrest of an alien for a criminal violation of the immigration laws, and what is called the "administrative arrest" of an alien who is reasonably believed to be illegally present in the United States. The court agreed with the district court that the agent's questioning was a request for routine information necessary for basic identification purposes that is not interrogation under Miranda, even if the information turns out to be incriminating. View "United States v. Sanchez-Velasco" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's order denying petitioner's asylum application and ordering his removal to Guatemala.The court held that petitioner established that the past persecution he suffered at the hands of the Guatemalan military was on account of a statutorily protected ground: his imputed political opinion. The court held that the evidence compelled the conclusion that petitioner has established the requisite nexus between his undisputed past persecution and imputed political opinion. In this case, petitioner credibly testified that he refused to engage in inhuman conduct as a conscripted teenager in the Guatemalan military (G-2 intelligence unit), including murdering an infant, and that he threatened to expose the G-2's human rights abuses. Consequently, he was confined to a hole in the ground for ten months. Furthermore, he credibly testified that while he was in the hole, G-2 soldiers mocked him with his own words—telling him to call human rights groups to defend him. View "Lopez Ordonez v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision affirming a prior-marriage-fraud finding, and held that the BIA violated due process by relying on undisclosed evidence that petitioners, husband and wife, did not have an opportunity to rebut. In this case, there is no dispute over whether petitioners' current marriage is bona fide. Rather, the government insists that there is substantial and probative evidence that wife's first marriage to an American citizen was a sham. Therefore, the government used this determination of prior marriage fraud to deny husband's I-130 petition that he filed on wife's behalf.The panel held that, in making its initial determination of marriage fraud, the BIA violated due process by applying too low a standard of proof. On remand, the panel instructed the agency to establish marriage fraud by at least a preponderance of the evidence before it can deny any subsequent immigration petition based on such a finding. View "Zerezghi v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed an order amending its prior opinion and an amended opinion denying petitioner's petition for review.The panel joined the Fifth and Seventh Circuit in concluding that 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5) bars reopening a removal order that has been reinstated following an alien’s unlawful reentry into the United States. In this case, petitioner's 2008 removal order had been reinstated and thus the BIA properly concluded that section 1231(a)(5) deprived it of jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's motion to reopen. Accordingly, the panel denied the petition for review. View "Padilla Cuenca v. Barr" on Justia Law