Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Meriyu, now 49 years old, is an Indonesian citizen who is of Chinese descent and of the Buddhist faith. She came to the U.S. in 2000 on a nonimmigrant visa. Meriyu claims she was prompted to leave by her mistreatment, based on her religion and ethnicity, and by violence in Indonesia. In 2002, charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B), Meriyu sought relief from removal based on fear of persecution on account of race and religion. She was ordered removed after she failed to appear at a hearing; 14 years later, she moved to reopen the proceedings. Meriyu is married and has a 12-year-old child. She claims she did not appear because she had sustained injuries to her ankle and foot. The BIA upheld an IJ’s ruling that the motion was untimely and that she could not show a material change in country conditions since the hearing. Her two subsequent motions to reopen were also denied. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. When compared to the 2003 conditions described in the State Department reports, current conditions in Indonesia do not reflect any “new threshold” of human rights abuses. Meriyu’s evidence did not suggest any prospect of persecution if she returned to Indonesia. View "Meriyu v. Barr" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The Fourth Circuit held that the Board erred in finding that the government rebutted the future-threat presumption. The court explained that it was the government's burden to prove either condition that rebuts the presumption, and the record did not support a finding that it did. Therefore, the court vacated the denial of withholding of removal and remanded for the agency to grant relief on this claim.The court affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's CAT application, because the record supported the Board's finding that petitioner did not meet the burden of proof. In this case, a reasonable adjudicator would not be compelled to find that petitioner proved that there is more than a fifty-percent chance that petitioner's former partner would torture her and that Honduran law enforcement would turn a blind eye. View "Ortez-Cruz v. Barr" on Justia Law

Guadalupe entered the U.S. in 1998. In 2003, he married Torres, a U.S. citizen; he was granted conditional permanent resident status. The couple divorced in 2006. Guadalupe applied for the removal of the conditional basis of his permanent resident status. Torres claimed that Guadalupe married her for immigration purposes. USCIS concluded that Guadalupe’s marriage had not been in good faith and terminated Guadalupe’s status. He was placed in removal proceedings. In 2007, DHS sent him a Notice to Appear (NTA) that omitted the date and time for the removal hearing. Four days later, the Immigration Court mailed Guadalupe a Notice of Hearing that contained the date and time. Guadalupe, with counsel, attended the hearing. The IJ denied Guadalupe relief from removal. The BIA affirmed. Guadalupe failed to depart.In 2018, the Supreme Court decided, in "Pereira," that where an NTA does not contain the date or time for the hearing, the noncitizen continues to accrue time toward the 10 years of continuous residence required to apply for cancellation of removal. Guadalupe moved to reopen his case, arguing that he had accrued the 10 years of continuous residency required to apply for cancellation of removal. The BIA denied the motion, reasoning that the Notice of Hearing cured the defective NTA. The Third Circuit vacated the removal order, holding that Pereira abrogated its precedent. DHS may no longer rely on a Notice of Hearing to cure a defective NTA. View "Guadalupe v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The Attorney General was statutorily authorized to impose all three challenged immigration-related conditions on Byrne Criminal Justice Assistance grant applications. The conditions require grant applicants to certify that they will (1) comply with federal law prohibiting any restrictions on the communication of citizenship and alien status information with federal immigration authorities; (2) provide federal authorities, upon request, with the release dates of incarcerated illegal aliens; and (3) afford federal immigration officers access to incarcerated illegal aliens.The Second Circuit held that the Certification Condition (1) is statutorily authorized by 34 U.S.C. 10153(a)(5)(D)'s requirement that applicants comply with "all other applicable Federal laws," and (2) does not violate the Tenth Amendment's anticommandeering principle; the Notice Condition is statutorily authorized by section 10153(a)(4)'s reporting requirement, section 10153(a)(5)(C)'s coordination requirement, and section 10155's rule‐making authority; and the Access Condition is statutorily authorized by section 10153(a)(5)(C)'s coordination requirement, and section 10155's rule‐making authority.The court also held that the Attorney General did not overlook important detrimental effects of the challenged conditions so as to make their imposition arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's award of partial summary judgment to plaintiffs; vacated the district court's mandate ordering defendants to release withheld 2017 Byrne funds, as well as its injunction barring defendants from imposing the three challenged immigration‐related conditions on such grants; and remanded for further proceedings. View "New York v. United States Department of Justice" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision upholding the IJ's denial of petitioner's asylum application. The BIA concluded that petitioner's status as a legal permanent resident (LPR) ended his status as an asylee. Petitioner argued that, at the time of his drug convictions, he was both an LPR and an asylee.The court held that petitioner's voluntary and successful adjustment to LPR status ended his status as an asylee. In this case, upon successfully adjusting to LPR status, petitioner lost asylee status and thus to avoid removal, he needed to reapply for asylum before a second IJ. The court also held that the first IJ's decision lacked preclusive effect because the REAL ID Act changed the law. View "Ali v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial by an immigration judge (IJ) of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that the BIA's decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record.Petitioner applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. Thereafter, Petitioner was placed in removal proceedings. The IJ denied Petitioner's applications and ordered his removal. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision. The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) the denial of Petitioner's asylum application was supported by substantial record evidence; (2) because Petitioner could not succeed on his asylum claim his claim for withholding of removal was properly denied; and (3) Petitioner's claim regarding the denial of CAT protection was waived. View "Gao v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied two petitions for judicial review challenging the orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) first finding that Petitioner was not entitled to asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT protection and then placing the case back on the docket and proceeding from where it left off before the case was administratively closed, holding that the BIA correctly interpreted the word "recalendar."In 2010, the BIA upheld the IJ's decision denying Petitioner's claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. The Petitioner petitioned for judicial review. First Circuit remanded the case to the BIA, and on remand, the government moved to close the proceedings administratively. The BIA granted the motion and administratively closed the case in 2013. The parties then filed a stipulation of dismissal, and the First Circuit dismissed the pending petition for judicial review and entered a judgment of voluntary dismissal. In 2016, the government moved to reinstate the case. The BIA granted the motion and decreed that its original 2010 decision "now takes effect." Petitioner petitioned for judicial review. The First Circuit denied both petitions for judicial review, holding that "recalendar" means to reinstate the case to the active docket in the same posture as it occupied when it was paused for administrative closure. View "Arevalo v. Barr" on Justia Law

Hamid Sow, a citizen of Guinea, sought review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of his motion to remand based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, and motion to reopen based upon new evidence. In December 2016, Sow entered the United States and immediately applied for asylum because he was a homosexual, and the stigma of being a homosexual in a devout Muslim community in his homeland meant danger for himself and his family. Sow only spoke French, and relied on other detainees to relate information to his attorney. Without a translator, Sow's counsel did not fully understand Sow’s concerns: Sow tried to communicate to his counsel that the content of affidavits counsel “did not match up with what happened.” When asked about discrepancies in facts from the affidavits presented, Sow responded he could not explain them because he did not have an opportunity to read them. In his oral decision, the IJ said that he “unfortunately” had to deny Sow’s application based solely on an adverse credibility finding. In coming to this conclusion, the IJ specifically highlighted the inconsistencies in statements made in affidavits. He noted that, if it were true that Sow were a homosexual, then he “clearly should get” asylum. Sow, represented by new counsel, appealed to the BIA. He argued that the IJ erred in failing to assess Sow’s well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA denied Sow’s motion to remand. It held that the IJ did not clearly err in making an adverse credibility determination and the record did not establish that Sow was entitled to relief “independent of his discredited claim of past harm.” It also denied Sow’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, reasoning that counsel “reasonably relied on, and submitted the evidence provided by, the respondent and his friends.” The Eleventh Circuit concluded the BIA abused its discretion in denying Sow’s motion to remand based on ineffective assistance of counsel. It therefore granted Sow’s petition for review, vacated the BIA’s decisions, and remanded to the BIA with instructions to remand to the IJ for reconsideration of Sow’s asylum application. View "Sow v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

E.O.H.C. and his daughter fled Mixco, Guatemala, a city plagued by violence, crossed into the U.S. and presented themselves to Border Patrol officers. The government began removal proceedings, scheduling a hearing in San Diego. Under a new DHS policy, the Migrant Protection Protocols, the government returned the two to Mexico to await their hearing. They were left to fend for themselves in Tijuana. E.O.H.C. told the IJ that he did not fear going back to Guatemala. He later alleged that a Border Protection officer advised him to say this. He was not then represented by counsel. The IJ ordered removal. E.O.H.C. waived the right to appeal, allegedly because he feared being returned to Mexico. They were transferred to a Pennsylvania detention facility, where they argued that E.O.H.C.’s appeal waiver was invalid. The BIA granted an emergency stay of removal. The government flew them to San Diego for return to Mexico. They filed an emergency mandamus petition. The government returned them to Pennsylvania. They challenged the validity and applicability of the Protocols and argued that returning them to Mexico would interfere with their relationship with their lawyer and would violate several treaties. The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.The Third Circuit reversed in part. When a detained alien seeks relief that a court of appeals cannot meaningfully provide on a petition for review of a final order of removal, 8 U.S.C.1252(b)(9) and 1252(a)(4) do not bar consideration by a district court. One claim, involving the right to counsel, arises from the proceedings to remove them to Guatemala and can await a petition for review. The other claims challenge the plan to return the petitioners to Mexico in the meantime. For these claims, review is now or never. View "E.O.H.C. v. Secretary United States Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Grayson does business under the name Gire Roofing. Grayson and Edwin Gire were indicted for visa fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1546 and harboring and employing unauthorized aliens, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). On paper, Gire had no relationship to Grayson as a corporate entity. He was not a stockholder, officer, or an employee. He managed the roofing (Grayson’s sole business), as he had under the Gire Roofing name for more than 20 years. The corporate papers identified Grayson’s president and sole stockholder as Young, Gire’s girlfriend. Gire, his attorney, and the government all represented to the district court that Gire was Grayson’s president. The court permitted Gire to plead guilty on his and Grayson’s behalf. Joint counsel represented both defendants during a trial that resulted in their convictions and a finding that Grayson’s headquarters was forfeitable. Despite obtaining separate counsel before sentencing, neither Grayson nor Young ever complained about Gire’s or prior counsel’s representations. Neither did Grayson object to the indictment, the plea colloquy, or the finding that Grayson had used its headquarters for harboring unauthorized aliens.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although Grayson identified numerous potential errors in the proceedings none are cause for reversal. Grayson has not shown that it was deprived of any right to effective assistance of counsel that it may have had and has not demonstrated that the court plainly erred in accepting the guilty plea. The evidence is sufficient to hold Grayson vicariously liable for Gire’s crimes. View "United States v. Grayson Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law