Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

In consolidated appeals, petitioner sought review of DHS's reinstatement of prior orders of removal and challenged the dismissal of related complaints that were filed in federal district court. The Eighth Circuit denied the petition for review in the lead case and affirmed the district court's judgment in the consolidated cases.The court held that the district court properly dismissed petitioner's lawsuits in federal district court, based on lack of jurisdiction, where he sought review of DHS's reinstatement of the removal order and to compel DHS to adjudicate a motion to reopen; the relevant statute stated that a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of the order of removal; the court lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner's arguments concerning the validity of the underlying removal order; substantial evidence supported DHS's decision to reinstate the removal order, because petitioner conceded his identity, the existence of the removal order, and that he unlawfully reentered the United States; and there was no error in the IJ's determination that petitioner failed to show that he was eligible for withholding of removal or relief under the Convention Against Torture. View "Lara-Nieto v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed an amended order granting a petition for review of the IJ's decision affirming an asylum officer's negative reasonable fear determination in expedited removal proceedings.The panel held that non-citizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. 1228 have a statutory right to counsel in reasonable fear proceedings before an immigration judge. In this case, the panel held that petitioner had a statutory right to counsel, the colloquy at the beginning of the hearing before the IJ was inadequate to waive that right, and no showing of prejudice is required. Therefore, the panel held that the IJ violated petitioner's right to counsel in his reasonable fear review proceeding by failing to obtain a valid waiver, and petitioner was entitled to a new hearing before an IJ in which his right to counsel is honored. Accordingly, the panel reversed for further proceedings. View "Zuniga v. Barr" on Justia Law

In 1991, at age three, petitioner Karen Robles-Garcia was admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor authorized to remain in this country for up to seventy-two hours and to travel within twenty-five miles of the Mexican border. She stayed longer and traveled further than permitted. In 2008, DHS served Robles-Garcia with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), the document that the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") issues an immigrant to initiate removal proceedings, charging her with violating her visitor permissions from almost seventeen years earlier. Robles-Garcia admitted the five factual allegations charged in the NTA and conceded she was removable. But she applied for cancellation of removal and adjustment of her status, asserting that her removal would work an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” on her two children, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(D), who were U.S. citizens. Relying on Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), Robles-Garcia argued for the first time that the immigration judge who initially presided over her removal proceedings never acquired jurisdiction over those proceedings because DHS initiated those proceedings by serving Robles-Garcia with a defective Notice to Appear. Because Robles-Garcia had not yet made that argument to the IJ or the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), it was unexhausted and the Tenth Circuit determined it lacked jurisdiction to address it. In addition, Robles-Garcia argued the BIA erred in concluding that she was ineligible to apply for discretionary cancellation of removal. The Tenth Circuit upheld that determination because Robles-Garcia was unable to show that a theft conviction was not a disqualifying crime involving moral turpitude. The Court therefore denied Robles-Garcia’s petition for review challenging the BIA’s determination that she was ineligible for cancellation of removal, and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction to the extent that it asserted the Pereira question. View "Robles-Garcia v. Barr" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of India, appealed from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241. Petitioner has been in ICE custody for 31 months and argued that he was entitled to release under the Supreme Court's ruling in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S. Ct. 2491 (2001). In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution limits detention of lawfully-admitted noncitizens under 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(6) to a period reasonably necessary to bring about the alien's removal and does not permit indefinite detention.The Eleventh Circuit held that section 1231(a)(1)(C) requires that petitioner return the incomplete travel document application in bad faith, i.e., petitioner intentionally withheld the necessary information in order to apply. In this case, the court could not evaluate whether petitioner's removal period had been extended by operation of section 1231(a)(1)(C). Because there was insufficient evidence to evaluate the district court's denial of the petition for habeas relief, the court reversed and remanded. View "Singh v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The BIA must consider the principles of equitable tolling when an untimely appeal is filed and the petitioner raises the issue.The Second Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision refusing to accept petitioner's untimely appeal of an IJ's order of removal from Ghana. The court held that the BIA erred in refusing to consider whether the argument that the appeal deadline, which is nonjurisdictional, is subject to an equitable tolling exception. The court found that the appeal deadline is a claim‐processing rule amenable to equitable tolling and thus remanded to the BIA to develop standards for equitable tolling, determining whether petitioner qualified for such relief. View "Attipoe v. Barr" on Justia Law

Eight-year-old Quinteros and his mother came to the U.S. from El Salvador in 2001. When he was 13, Quinteros joined the gang MS-13. In 2011, Quinteros was indicted for conspiracy to commit assault with a dangerous weapon, 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(6). The planned gang attack never occurred. Quinteros later pled guilty and was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment. In prison, Quinteros left MS-13 to follow Christianity. Other MS-13 members in prison told him that when he was deported “things are going to change. There’s no getting out over there.” Quinteros was charged as removable for having committed an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), (U), and (J). Quinteros checked the form box to contest his deportability but failed to follow up with additional documentation. Quinteros then sought withholding of removal. An asylum officer determined that Quinteros demonstrated a reasonable fear that he would be tortured in El Salvador. Before an IJ, Quinteros testified and presented studies and reports, that discussed the perception and treatment of individuals with tattoos in El Salvador. The Third Circuit vacated the BIA’s rejection of Quinteros’s claims. Quinteros’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(6) is not an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), (U), or (J); conviction under section 1959(a)(6) does not require an overt act and is not a categorical match for conspiracy under the Immigration Act. View "Quinteros v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Aguilar-Calvo pleaded guilty to illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(1). He had been previously convicted of felony drug possession, assault, driving under the influence, and illegal reentry. In its sentencing memorandum, the government addressed18 U.S.C. 3553(a)’s sentencing factors, noting that some people are “impatient for action to protect their perceived economic interests, as promised by our duly enacted immigration policies. Aguilar-Calvo’s sentencing memorandum argued that the district court should not consider such “extraneous, inflammatory, and idiosyncratic views.” The government responded that it did not agree that these concerns are “extraneous,” noting that the guidelines recommend a higher sentence for recidivist illegal reentries and for defendants who have a prior felony conviction. The district court sentenced Aguilar-Calvo to 38 months of imprisonment after a lengthy explanation, citing 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). Aguilar-Calvo objected to “any consideration of the Government’s arguments about the political debate about illegal immigration.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the sentence was procedurally unreasonable. At no point in sentencing Aguilar-Calvo did the district court rely on the government’s inappropriate representations, on unreasonable speculation or on erroneous information. View "United States v. Aguilar-Calvo" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's dismissal of a 2018 indictment charging defendant with illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. The court agreed with the government's contention that the district court erred in sustaining defendant's collateral attack on his underlying 2013 deportation order and dismissing the 2018 illegal-reentry indictment.In this case, the district court found that the IJ and the BIA erroneously classified bail jumping as an aggravated felony and the error led the IJ not to consider defendant's claims for asylum and withholding of removal. The court disagreed with the district court for two reasons: first, the district court diluted the actual prejudice standard; and second, applying the correct actual-prejudice standard, the record foreclosed any notion that defendant likely would have escaped deportation either through asylum or withholding of removal. The court saw nothing in the record indicating that defendant was likely eligible for asylum or withholding of removal. Therefore, even assuming the IJ and BIA erred in classifying defendant's bail jumping conviction as an aggravated felony, defendant still could not show actual prejudice under section 1326(d). View "United States v. Ramirez-Cortinas" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Robert Vivar pled guilty to possession of materials with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. Defendant was placed on probation for three years, and as a condition of probation was to serve one year in county jail. He also received a referral to the Residential Substance Abuse Treatment (RSAT) program. Shortly after his release, defendant was removed from the country as a consequence of his plea. Over a decade later, defendant filed a motion to vacate his conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.7. The trial court denied defendant’s motion. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate his guilty plea because his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and advise defendant of the immigration consequences of his plea and for failing to defend or mitigate the judgment. Defendant also argued that his plea must be vacated because it was legally invalid. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Vivar" on Justia Law

Notwithstanding a district court's release order pursuant to the Bail Reform Act (BRA), the government has the authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to detain a criminal defendant who is an alien in the course of an administrative removal proceeding.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of an indictment against defendant with prejudice. The court held that the district court's bail release order under the BRA did not preclude the government from detaining defendant under the INA as an inadmissible alien subject to removal. The court found defendant's arguments to the contrary unavailing. View "United States v. Lett" on Justia Law