Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of asylum and related relief. The panel held that an asylum officer's credibility conclusion could not support an adverse credibility finding. In this case, the agency legally erred by relying on the asylum officer's assessment of petitioner's credibility.The panel also held that, where, as here, petitioner's testimony was consistent with, but more detailed than, her asylum application, petitioner's testimony is not per se lacking in credibility. Therefore, the finding that petitioner was less credible merely because her statement did not note the specific date the abortion occurred or the names of the family planning director and hospital staff was unreasonable. The panel also held that petitioner's testimony about the asylum interview did not support the adverse credibility finding; the IJ's speculation that petitioner was in fact still living in Indiana was not a sufficient basis for an adverse credibility finding; the BIA impermissibly engaged in factfinding; and petitioner was entitled to notice and an opportunity to produce corroborating evidence or explain why it was unavailable. View "Lizhi Qiu v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioners' request for humanitarian asylum. Petitioners, seeking asylum for themselves and their children, contend that the district court erred in requiring that they show past persecution on account of a protected ground as a prerequisite for obtaining humanitarian asylum.The court held that petitioner's argument was foreclosed by this court's existing precedent in Kanagu v. Holder, 781 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2015), which held that the petitioner's failure to prove persecution on a protected ground made him ineligible for humanitarian asylum. Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners' requested relief. View "Mejia-Lopez v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied the petition filed by Petitioner, a native and citizen of China, seeking review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying as untimely Petitioner's motion to reopen her earlier removal proceedings, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion.Petitioner sought to reopen her earlier removal proceedings alleging that changed country conditions in China regarding religious persecution would impact her given her recent conversion to Christianity. The BIA denied the motion to reopen, finding that it was time-barred and that the evidence did not support an exception to the time limits. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Petitioner's motion to reopen removal proceedings was time-barred. View "Lin v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied petitions for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application of withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that petitioner failed to establish a clear probability that he would suffer persecution in Mexico on account of his membership in the de la Rosa family. Therefore, the court found that the IJ and the BIA did not err in denying petitioner's application for withholding of removal.Because the IJ and the BIA did not err in finding that petitioner failed to show a likelihood of persecution on account of membership in a particular social group, the court need not address the argument that the IJ and the BIA erred in finding that petitioner failed to establish that the Mexican government is unable or unwilling to protect him. View "De La Rosa Garcia v. Barr" on Justia Law

Various states, municipalities, and organizations filed suit seeking a preliminary injunction against the implementation of DHS's Final Rule, which redefined the term "public charge" to require consideration of not only cash benefits, but also certain non-cash benefits. Under the Final Rule, an alien is a public charge if they receive one or more public benefits, including cash and non-cash benefits such as Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Section 8 housing assistance, Section 8 project-based rental assistance, Medicaid (with certain exceptions), and Section 9 public housing.The Ninth Circuit granted a stay of two preliminary injunctions granted by two different district courts, holding that DHS has shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits because the Final Rule was neither contrary to law nor arbitrary and capricious; DHS will suffer irreparable harm because the preliminary injunctions will force it to grant status to those not legally entitled to it; and the balance of the equities and public interest favor a stay. View "City and County of San Francisco v. USCIS" on Justia Law

The revocation of citizenship on the ground that the grant of citizenship was "illegally procured or . . . procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation," 8 U.S.C. 1451(a), does not constitute a "penalty" for purposes of the five year statute of limitations generally applicable to civil fines, penalties, and forfeitures, under 28 U.S.C. 2462.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government, holding that the purpose of denaturalization is to remedy a past fraud by taking back a benefit to which an alien is not entitled. Therefore, the panel held that section 2462 did not provide petitioner a statute of limitations defense, because denaturalization was not a penalty for purposes of section 2462. View "United States v. Phattey" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the denial of petitioner and her son's requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). As a preliminary matter, the court held that the notices petitioner and her son received satisfied the relevant regulations and the IJ had jurisdiction over her case.The court held that the evidence did not compel a finding in petitioner's favor on either her asylum or withholding of removal requests. Assuming validity of her membership in a particular social group and her political belief in the rule of law, the court held that substantial evidence supported the IJ's finding that petitioner failed to show a connection between them and any persecution she has faced or will face. Furthermore, substantial evidence supported the IJ's denial of protection under the CAT, because petitioner failed to show that it was more likely than not that she would be tortured if she returned to Honduras, and failed to point to evidence establishing that Honduran authorities would acquiesce to the torture of her and her son. View "Martinez-Lopez v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's final order reversing the IJ's grant of petitioner's application for asylum and denial of withholding of removal. The court agreed with the BIA that petitioner failed to establish membership in a particular social group. In light of Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), petitioner's proposed social group of "women in Mexico who are unable to leave their domestic relationships" was not a cognizable particular social group under the Immigration and Nationality Act. View "Amezcua-Preciado v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's determination that petitioner was removable and ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court held that petitioner's conviction under New York Penal Law 110.00, 130.45 for attempted oral or anal sexual conduct with a person under the age of fifteen constitutes sexual abuse of a minor, and was therefore an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The court explained that petitioner's conviction under the New York statute did not encompass more conduct than the generic definition and could not realistically result in an individual's conviction for conduct made with a less than knowing mens rea. View "Acevedo v. Barr" on Justia Law

Defendant Sara Salcido was in the business of providing immigration services — typically, obtaining visas for her clients that would allow them to stay in the United States legally. Defendant failed to comply with the consumer protection requirements outlined in the Immigration Consultant Act, and was ultimately convicted on one count of misdemeanor unlawfully engaging in the business of an immigration consultant. The State argued, however, that each time defendant took money from a client in exchange for providing immigration services, she was committing theft by false pretenses, because she was not a legally qualified immigration consultant under state law. The trial court agreed; thus, it also convicted her on six counts of grand theft, and two counts of petty theft. It dismissed two additional counts of grand theft as time-barred. Defendant was placed on probation for five years. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal held federal law did not preempt the application of the Act to defendant. In the unpublished portion, the Court held one of defendant’s probation conditions had to be stricken. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed as modified. View "California v. Salcido" on Justia Law