Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendant, José Gambino-Ruiz, was convicted and sentenced for illegal re-entry into the U.S. under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Gambino-Ruiz appealed his conviction, arguing that the removal order, which was the basis for his charge, was improper under the Immigration and Nationality Act. He also contested his sentence, claiming that the district judge considered impermissible factors in denying a downward sentencing adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.The Court ruled that Gambino-Ruiz was properly subject to expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) and therefore did not violate his due process rights when he was removed via expedited proceedings in 2013. He was properly convicted of illegal re-entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Furthermore, the Court affirmed his sentence, ruling that Gambino-Ruiz did not demonstrate that his was a rare circumstance where the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility is due after the defendant has proceeded to trial.The facts of the case are as follows: Gambino-Ruiz, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. illegally several times. Each time, he was apprehended by border patrol agents and subsequently deported through expedited removal proceedings. In 2020, he was again found in the U.S. illegally and was charged with illegal re-entry of a removed alien. His motions to dismiss the charges and to suppress his admissions to the border patrol agents were denied, leading to a trial where he was found guilty. At sentencing, Gambino-Ruiz's request for a downward sentencing adjustment for acceptance of responsibility was denied, leading to his appeal. View "USA V. GAMBINO-RUIZ" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied the petition for review filed by Kingsley Owusu, who was seeking asylum and withholding of removal from the United States. Owusu, originally from Ghana, claimed that he had suffered three violent incidents in his home country due to his political affiliations, leading him to fear future persecution. The immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals both found that Owusu had failed to demonstrate that the Ghanaian government was unable or unwilling to address the harm he faced from private actors, that his past incidents did not constitute persecution, that he could not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, and that he could avoid persecution by relocating within Ghana. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that for Owusu to be eligible for asylum or withholding, he must show state action, either by demonstrating that his persecutor is a state actor or that the Ghanaian government was unable to protect him. The court found that Owusu failed to meet this burden, as he presented no compelling evidence that the Ghanaian police would either persecute him or fail to protect him from persecution. As such, the court denied Owusu's petition for review. View "Owusu v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

In a case brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, residents of the Waples Mobile Home Park in Fairfax, Virginia, challenged the Park's policy requiring all adult tenants to provide proof of their legal status in the United States in order to renew their leases. The plaintiffs, noncitizen Latino families, argued that this policy disproportionately ousted Latinos from the Park and therefore violated the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The district court initially granted summary judgment in favor of the Park, reasoning that the policy was necessary to avoid criminal liability under a federal statute prohibiting the harboring of undocumented immigrants.On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court determined that the anti-harboring statute did not plausibly put the Park at risk for prosecution simply for leasing to families with undocumented immigrants. Furthermore, the court found that the Park's policy did not serve a valid interest in any realistic way to avoid liability under the anti-harboring statute. Therefore, the Park did not meet its burden at the second step of the three-step burden-shifting framework established for disparate-impact claims in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. Given these findings, the Court of Appeals did not need to reach the third step to determine whether a less discriminatory alternative was available. As such, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment for the Park and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Reyes v. Waples Mobile Home Park Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

Sergio Mencia-Medina, a native and citizen of Honduras who entered the United States as a child with his mother, petitioned for a review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Mencia-Medina was charged as removable due to his presence in the country without admission, and his request for a form of cancellation of removal available to children who have been battered by lawful permanent resident parents was denied by the BIA. Mencia-Medina's record showed contacts with law enforcement both as a juvenile and as an adult, which the BIA decided outweighed the favorable factors in his record.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied Mencia-Medina's petition for review. The court found that the BIA properly applied the law and exercised its discretion in denying a favorable exercise of discretion to Mencia-Medina. The court ruled that even if an individual meets the statutory criteria for eligibility for cancellation of removal, the Attorney General's decision to grant or deny relief is discretionary. The court also concluded that the BIA did not make an error by citing and applying the factors applicable to cases concerning cancellation of removal for certain permanent residents. The petitioner's argument that the BIA's decision was unreasoned and internally inconsistent was also rejected by the court. View "Mencia-Medina v. Garland" on Justia Law

In this case, a native and citizen of Honduras, Kelmi Velasquez-Castillo, appealed the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) which denied his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. Velasquez-Castillo, who had been categorized as an unaccompanied minor after his second entry to the U.S., argued that his removal would violate the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) and that new evidence regarding his sexual orientation was relevant to his eligibility for asylum. The BIA had upheld the Immigration Judge's decision that Velasquez-Castillo failed to show that the new evidence was not available at the time of the previous hearing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the BIA erred in denying the motion to reopen without resolving the issue of the statutory provisions relating to an unaccompanied minor, and that the BIA failed to consider whether there was new and previously unavailable evidence in support of asylum eligibility. The Court vacated the BIA's decision and remanded the case for the BIA to interpret the TVPRA's relevant provisions in the first instance and to consider whether the new evidence met the requirements for reopening the case. View "Velasquez-Castillo v. Garland" on Justia Law

The court case involves defendants Juan Alberto Ortiz-Orellana and Minor Perez-Chach, who were convicted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering statute (VICAR). Ortiz and Perez were part of a gang known as MS-13 and were separately charged with murders related to their involvement in the gang in Maryland. Ortiz was also convicted of VICAR conspiracy to commit murder, discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and murder resulting from the same crime. Perez, on the other hand, was also convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and an alien in possession of a firearm and ammunition. Both defendants appealed their convictions and sentences.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the government seizure of historical cell site location information (CSLI) without a warrant did not violate the defendants' Fourth Amendment rights due to the good faith exception. The court also upheld the use of summary exhibits and denied the defendants' claim that their sentences were substantially unreasonable. The court agreed with Ortiz that his firearm convictions must be vacated because the underlying offenses for each VICAR count could not qualify as a "crime of violence" after a recent ruling. The court also rejected Ortiz's claim that his RICO and VICAR convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. As a result, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for resentencing on certain counts. View "US v. Ortiz-Orellana" on Justia Law

In this case heard in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Marta Alicia Mejia-Alvarenga, a citizen of El Salvador, sought to challenge the denial of her application for asylum by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Mejia-Alvarenga was detained when trying to cross the Rio Grande into the United States and was subsequently charged with removability due to her lack of valid documentation. She filed an application for statutory withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture, later amending her application to seek asylum, based on threats she received from a man named Rigoberto Nelson and others associated with him.The immigration judge denied Mejia-Alvarenga’s application and ordered her removal to El Salvador. Despite finding Mejia-Alvarenga a credible witness and acknowledging she had suffered previous harm amounting to persecution, the immigration judge ruled she had not been harmed due to political opinion or membership in a particular social group. The judge also concluded that Mejia-Alvarenga did not demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution because she did not show that the government would be unable or unwilling to control a future persecutor.The Court of Appeals denied Mejia-Alvarenga's petition in part and dismissed it in part due to lack of jurisdiction. It ruled that the BIA did not err in concluding that Mejia-Alvarenga failed to establish that the Salvadoran government was unable or unwilling to protect her from private persecutors. The court also rejected Mejia-Alvarenga’s claim that the BIA violated its regulatory obligation to be impartial and her argument that the BIA violated her due process rights by allowing a single BIA member to render its decision. Lastly, the court dismissed Mejia-Alvarenga's claim that the BIA committed an abuse of discretion by not referring her case to a three-member BIA panel, ruling it lacked jurisdiction over this claim. View "Mejia-Alvarenga v. Garland" on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, a foreign service officer and a non-citizen were convicted of conspiring to fraudulently obtain U.S. citizenship for the non-citizen and making false statements in the process. The defendants, Laura Anne Gallagher and Andrey Nikolayevich Kalugin, were married in 2015. They were accused of conspiring to achieve naturalization and proof of citizenship for Kalugin by making false statements and submitting fraudulent documents. The jury found them guilty on all counts. On appeal, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support each defendant’s convictions. However, it found that the jury was allowed to consider a legally inadequate theory on one count and an erroneous evidentiary ruling prevented the defendants from offering certain evidence on the remaining two counts. As a result, the court vacated the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "US v. Gallagher" on Justia Law

In the case reviewed, Mario Gonzalez-Godinez was convicted for attempted illegal entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) after being found near a border fence and admitting to being a Mexican citizen without documentation. After his arrest, a Border Patrol agent read him his Miranda rights as well as his immigration-related administrative rights. Gonzalez waived both sets of rights and then confessed to having been smuggled across the border. Gonzalez argued on appeal that the Miranda warning was inadequate and his conviction should be vacated under the corpus delicti doctrine. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected both arguments.Firstly, the court ruled that the Miranda warning was not inadequate despite also warning Gonzalez that the post-arrest interview may be his only chance to seek asylum. While these two warnings may have posed difficult decisions for Gonzalez, the court found them to be neither contradictory nor confusing. The court held that the government did not need to provide further clarification to the Miranda warning.Secondly, the court held that the corpus delicti doctrine, which requires some evidence to support a confession, did not require vacating Gonzalez's conviction. The court found that sufficient evidence supported Gonzalez’s confession, as he had twice admitted to being a Mexican citizen and his behavior at the border supported his confession. Thus, the court affirmed Gonzalez’s conviction. View "USA V. GONZALEZ-GODINEZ" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) for petitioner Kamaljit Singh, a native and citizen of India. Singh alleged that he had been persecuted in India due to his support for a minority political party, and feared return due to ongoing threats. The immigration judge (“IJ”) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) both denied Singh’s application on credibility grounds, finding inconsistencies in his account. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the BIA's decision, finding that the BIA's adverse credibility finding was supported by substantial evidence. The court also agreed with the BIA's determination that the harm Singh had suffered in India did not rise to the level of past persecution necessary to establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal. In addition, the court held that Singh had waived his claims for future persecution and CAT protection by failing to properly raise them before the BIA. Lastly, the court determined that Singh's due process claims, including a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, had not been properly exhausted before the BIA and therefore could not be reviewed on appeal. As a result, Singh's petition for review was denied. View "Singh v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law