Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Hillocks, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago and a lawful U.S. permanent resident, was convicted of using a communication facility to facilitate a felony. The Board of Immigration Appeals applied the modified categorical approach, looked to Hillocks’s plea colloquy, and found that Hillocks used a phone to facilitate the sale of heroin. The Board found that his conviction was therefore both an aggravated felony and related to a controlled substance, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2) and ordered Hillocks removed. The Third Circuit vacated the removal order. The categorical approach does not call for the consideration of the facts of a particular case; the court presumes that the state conviction rested upon the least of the acts criminalized by the statute, and then determines whether that conduct would fall within the federal definition of the crime. The modified approach only applies when the statute of conviction has alternative elements, and “at least one” of the alternative divisible categories would, by its elements, be a match with a generic federal crime. Pennsylvania’s statute does not have enumerated categories that suggest alternate elements, it does not provide different punishments depending on the underlying crime; the underlying felonies serving as a basis for a conviction under the statute are means, not separate elements. View "Hillocks v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

An issue was actually litigated only if it was raised, contested, and submitted for determination in the prior adjudication. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for USCIS and related defendants in an action brought by plaintiff alleging that issue preclusion barred the government from denying his adjustment of status application. In this case, shortly after petitioner was granted asylum, his application for adjustment of status was denied under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(i) for support of a Tier III terrorist organization.The panel held that the issue of terrorism-related inadmissibility was not raised, contested, or submitted for determination at plaintiff's asylum proceeding, and thus it was not actually litigated. Therefore, issue preclusion did not bar the government from disputing the issue in plaintiff's adjustment of status. View "Janjua v. Neufeld" on Justia Law

After the district court dismissed defendant's indictment for illegal reentry following removal because an IJ in the underlying removal lacked jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion in an analogous immigration appeal, Pierre-Paul v. Barr, ---F.3d---, 2019 WL 3229150 (5th Cir. July 18, 2019), that foreclosed defendant's arguments that were adopted by the district court.Determining that the case was not moot, the court held that the district court erred in concluding that the lack of a date and time on petitioner's 2003 notice to appear deprived the IJ of jurisdiction in the 2003 removal proceeding. Under Pierre-Paul's three alternative holdings, the district court's ruling was untenable, and thus the IJ did not lack jurisdiction as a result of the government's failure to include a date and time on the notice to appear. The court also held that the district court should have denied the motion to dismiss the indictment because 8 U.S.C. 1326(d) barred petitioner's collateral attack on the validity of his removal order. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Pedroza-Rocha" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's denial of petitioner's asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) claims. Petitioner alleged past persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution, both individually and as a member of a group, based on his practice of Ahmadiyya Islam.The court held that the IJ ignored specific evidence that petitioner brought to its attention and the BIA ignored the same evidence on appeal. In this case, petitioner cited specific examples that supported his position, including Ahmadis' inability to openly practice their religion, to propagate their religion, to convene for religious gatherings, to perform a pilgrimage, to vote, to build mosques, and to pray in certain manners. View "Ali v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Gonzalez, a citizen of Guatemala, surrendered himself at the U.S. border and requested asylum. Gonzalez alleges that he would be persecuted and tortured because of his status as a former taxi driver if he is removed to Guatemala. An immigration judge denied Gonzalez’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed and the Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. Gonzalez’s Notice to Appear, which omitted the date and time of the hearing, was promptly followed by a Notice of Hearing that provided this information, so both the IJ and the BIA had jurisdiction over Gonzalez’s case. There is no evidence that Gonzalez would be targeted as a former taxi driver, nor any evidence that former taxi drivers are perceived as a distinct group by Guatemalan society or by the gangs. View "Gonzalez-De Leon v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit held that petitioner's conviction under Oregon Revised Statute 163.187(1) for "strangulation" was categorically a crime of violence for purposes of removability under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The panel also held that the BIA abused its discretion in designating petitioner's offense of conviction as a "particularly serious crime."The panel denied the petition for review of the BIA's decision because petitioner failed to carry his burden of showing eligibility for withholding of removal or for protection under the Convention Against Torture; and the BIA's denial of petitioner's application for relief was supported by substantial evidence. View "Flores-Vega v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the determination that petitioner was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because he was convicted in Iowa of committing an aggravated felony. Determining that it had jurisdiction, the court held that DHS was correct when it concluded that petitioner's Iowa forgery conviction qualified as an aggravated felony for purposes of section 1227(a)(2)(iii). The court held that, although DHS erred by issuing a Final Administrative Removal Order before petitioner's deadline to respond expired, petitioner failed to show prejudice. In this case, petitioner's state law crime unarguably qualified as an aggravated felony and there was nothing petitioner could have offered that would change the result. View "Salazar v. Barr" on Justia Law

Moreno-Martinez, a citizen of Honduras, arrived in the U.S. in 1999, returned to Honduras in 2003, and reentered in 2004. In 2007, DHS issued “Notice to Appear” under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), ordering Moreno-Martinez to appear on “a date to be set” at “a time to be set.” Almost two months later, the immigration court sent a notice setting June 26, 2007, as the initial hearing date. Moreno-Martinez applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. An IJ denied those requests but granted voluntary removal. The BIA affirmed. Moreno-Martinez did not seek review of the removal order but left the U.S. in February 2012. He later returned. On August 1, 2018, ICE detained him and DHS filed a Notice of Intent to reinstate its previous removal order. Moreno-Martinez contends that DHS violated due process by not providing him a copy of the reinstatement order or allowing him to make a statement contesting the reinstatement so that he could argue that the removal order was invalid under Pereira v. Sessions, because his notice to appear lacked specific time-and-date information. The Sixth Circuit denied relief, reasoning that it had jurisdiction to review Moreno-Martinez’s due-process challenge because it presents a constitutional issue but that it could not grant the relief that Moreno-Martinez seeks, lacking jurisdiction to reopen the underlying removal order. The petition is an untimely collateral attack on the validity of the removal order, 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1). View "Moreno-Martinez v. Barr" on Justia Law

Petitioners, undocumented aliens from Guatemala, have lived and worked in New York since 2008. They were traveling in a van with eight other men when Pennsylvania State Trooper Macke stopped the van for speeding. Petitioners were asleep in the back of the van. Macke approached the driver, who did not have his license with him. The van’s owner, in the front passenger seat, gave Macke his license and registration. Petitioners allege that instead of returning to his vehicle, Macke opened the side door and said to the passengers, ‘let me see your immigration papers, work permit, visa, passport and ID.’” Petitioners did not have any such documents. The government claims the Petitioners admitted that they were citizens of another country. Macke issued the driver's citations at 8:57 a.m.and ordered them to a nearby rest stop, where Macke positioned his car so that Petitioners’ van could not move. They claim that he interrogated them about their immigration status until ICE agents arrived at approximately 9:30 a.m. The government claimed that all freely stated that they had illegally entered the U.S. In removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), Petitioners moved to suppress evidence of their alienage obtained as a result of the stop, arguing that it had been discovered through a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. They claimed that Macke stopped them because of their Hispanic appearance. The BIA rejected the argument. The Third Circuit remanded, concluding that Petitioners alleged a potentially egregious Fourth Amendment violation that warrants an evidentiary hearing. View "Yoc-Us v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's dismissal of petitioner's appeal of an IJ's order denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court held that the IJ relied on personal beliefs and perceived common knowledge to reach unfounded adverse conclusions regarding petitioner's faith, and the IJ gave no weight to translation issues in the proceeding. Consequently, the IJ's credibility determinations were not supported by cogent reasons for disbelief and the BIA erred in upholding these findings. The panel vacated the removal order and remanded for a new credibility determination. View "Jinfeng Tian v. Barr" on Justia Law