Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Radiowala entered the United States on a visitor’s visa in 1998, with his wife and two children, fleeing a noted Indian gangster. Following a 2017 vehicle stop, he was charged as removable because he was present in the U.S. without having been admitted or paroled. Radiowala sought cancellation of removal (8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)), asylum (8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(A)), and protection under the Convention Against Torture. He testified that he started out supporting a family of four on $300 a week and eventually developed a lucrative business. He is the sole provider for his mother in India, his wife and two children who emigrated with him, and two more children, both U.S. citizens. His fourth child is in high school. The Immigration Judge denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Radiowala sought judicial review, citing his relatively non-existent criminal history and his role as the sole provider for his family. The Third Circuit denied his petition. The principal avenue for relief, cancellation of removal, is a ground on which the Board’s decision is largely unreviewable. Radiowala became ineligible for asylum more than 19 years ago and the proposed social groups of which he is a part are not legally cognizable. Substantial evidence supports the determination that he is unlikely to be tortured if returned to India. View "Radiowala v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over a petition for review of the IJ's determination that petitioner was removable, because petitioner had exhausted his administrative remedies.The court also held that petitioner's prior Virginia offense of participating in a criminal street gang was not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. Therefore, petitioner's prior conviction could not be a basis for removing him. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the order of removal, and remanded with instructions. View "Rodriguez Cabrera v. Barr" on Justia Law

Petitioner testified at her asylum hearing that she believed that E.G., the father of her son, is a member of the Mexican cartel, La Familia Michoacana. Petitioner ended her relationship with E.G. in July 2012, fearing that opposing cartel members might harm her or her children. She moved to her mother’s house, two hours away, while pregnant with E.G.’s child. Petitioner saw little of E.G. until June 2013, when he started occasionally driving by her home and the restaurant where she worked. When she declined to return to him, E.G. threatened to take her sons away—“the bad way” if necessary. Petitioner moved but continued to see E.G. driving by her apartment late at night. Local police told her there was nothing they could do. She fled to the U.S. with her children. Petitioner has not spoken to E.G. since June 2013 but E.G. sent his relatives to her mother’s house to ask about her whereabouts. Petitioner argued that she was entitled to asylum because she fears persecution as the mother of a cartel member’s child and as a Mexican woman who cannot leave her relationship. The IJ and BIA denied relief. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Petitioner’s testimony did not establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution and an inability to relocate in Mexico to avoid persecution. Petitioner did not establish membership in either social group she identified. She did leave her relationship; her belief that E.G. was a cartel member was speculative. View "N. Y. C. C. v. Barr" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and cancellation of removal. Petitioner also claimed that the IJ violated his due process rights.The Fifth Circuit denied the petition in part, holding that petitioner's notice to appear, which lacked the time and date of his proceeding, was not defective. Assuming arguendo that the notice to appear was defective, the IJ cured the defect by subsequently sending a notice of hearing that included the time and date of the hearing. Furthermore, assuming arguendo that the notice to appear was defective and the defect could not be cured, 8 C.F.R. 1003.14 was not jurisdictional. Rather, section 1003.14 was a claim-processing rule and petitioner failed to raise the issue in a timely manner. The court dismissed the petition in part, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and cancellation of removal. View "Pierre-Paul v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit granted in part and denied in part Petitioner's petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming an immigration judge's (IJ) denial of Petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that substantial evidence did not support the BIA's decision to deny Petitioner's applications for asylum and withholding of removal.Petitioner, a citizen of Nepal, contested deportation, claiming a fear of persecution for his political beliefs if he repatriated. The IJ denied Petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit held (1) the Government did not meet its burden to rebut the presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution, and therefore, Petitioner was statutorily eligible to seek asylum; (2) because the BIA and IJ did not weigh the total corpus of evidence offered in support of the withholding claim, this evidence should be assessed in the first instance by the agency on remand; and (3) substantial evidence supported the BIA's denial of Petitioner's application for protection under CAT. View "Dahal v. Barr" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's order denying his untimely motion to reopen his removal proceedings. Petitioner alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his removal proceedings. The BIA agreed that petitioner's prior counsel performed deficiently, but denied the motion to reopen after concluding that he failed to show prejudice.The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review with respect to petitioner's claims for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and relief under former 8 U.S.C. 212(c). The panel held that the BIA analyzed petitioner's new prejudice evidence under standards more stringent than were proper. Although the more-likely-than-not standard governs the merits of a CAT claim, in the context of a motion to reopen for ineffective assistance, the petitioner need not show that he would win or lose on any claims. Rather, the question with respect to prejudice is whether counsel's deficient performance may have affected the outcome of the proceedings, which means that the petitioner need only show plausible grounds for relief. The panel denied the petition for review with respect to all other claims and held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in rejecting petitioner's claims. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Flores v. Barr" on Justia Law

The en banc court granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of cancellation of removal. The BIA held that petitioner failed to demonstrate that her prior conviction was not for a disqualifying federal offense and therefore had not met her burden of showing that she was eligible for cancellation of removal.The en banc court held that, in the context of eligibility for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b), a petitioner's state-law conviction does not bar relief where the record is ambiguous as to whether the conviction constitutes a disqualifying predicate offense. The en banc court held that the statute under which petitioner was convicted was overbroad at the time of her conviction. The en banc court overruled its decision in Young v. Holder, 697 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), that, under Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013), an ambiguous record of conviction does not demonstrate that a petitioner was convicted of a disqualifying federal offense. Accordingly, the panel reversed and remanded. View "Marinelarena v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment. The court held that the premise of defendant's argument -- – that the purported filing defect in his case deprived the immigration court of authority to enter a removal order, so that he may collaterally challenge that order in subsequent criminal proceedings -- was incorrect. Rather, there was no defect, because the applicable regulations did not require that the information identified by defendant, a date and time for a subsequent removal hearing, be included in the "notice to appear" that was filed with an immigration court to initiate the proceedings. View "United States v. Cortez" on Justia Law

Five Peruvian shepherds who worked in the Western United States pursuant to H-2A agricultural visas brought antitrust claims, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated classes of shepherds, against several sheep ranchers (the “Rancher Defendants”), two associations (the “Association Defendants”), and Dennis Richins (referred to collectively as the “Defendants”). The Shepherds alleged the Defendants “conspired and agreed to fix wages offered and paid to shepherds at the minimum DOL wage floor.” The Shepherds also brought class action RICO claims against Richins and the Association Defendants. The RICO claims focused on allegedly false assurances made by the Association Defendants to the federal government that H-2A shepherds were being properly reimbursed for various expenses. The district court dismissed as to both claims, finding the complaint did not plausibly allege an agreement to fix wages, and did not allege the existence of enterprises distinct from the persons alleged to have engaged in those enterprises. The trial court denied the Shepherds' request to amend their complaint. On appeal, the Shepherds argued there were valid antitrust and RICO claims, and that the district court abused its discretion in denying their motion to amend their complaint. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court erred in dismissing the RICO claim naming Richins as a defendant. But in all other regards, the district court was affirmed. View "Llacua v. Western Range Association" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision upholding the IJ's conclusion that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal because of a prior conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude.The court held that petitioner's conviction under Nebraska law for making a false statement to a peace officer is a crime involving moral turpitude that renders a petitioner statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. Therefore, the IJ and BIA correctly determined that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal. View "Adame-Hernandez v. Barr" on Justia Law