Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Appellant's motion to make three predicate findings necessary to petition to petition the federal government for special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status after awarding sole physical custody of A.A. to Appellant, holding that a child custody order satisfies the dependency or custody prong for SIJ predicate findings.The district court concluded that Appellant did not satisfy the first two predicate SIJ findings because the court did not "appoint" Appellant to have custody over A.A. and that Appellant did not prove that A.A. was unable to reunify with both parents, rather than with just her father. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a child custody order can satisfy the first predicate SIJ finding requiring a person to be "appointed" to have custody over a juvenile; (2) the second predicate SIJ finding can be made where reunification is not viable with one parent due to abuse, abandonment, neglect, or other similar basis under Nevada law; and (3) because the district court reached the opposite conclusions and failed to determine whether the third predicate was met, the case must be remanded for further adjudication. View "Amaya v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Nunez was indicted for passport fraud, making a false representation of U.S. citizenship, using a false social security number, and producing a state driver’s license not issued for her use. Nunez was detained under the Bail Reform Act (BRA), 18 U.S.C. 3142(d), which permits the 10-day pretrial detention of non-citizens who may pose a flight risk or danger so ICE may take them into custody. ICE lodged a detainer. Twelve days later, a different magistrate arraigned Nunez, denied the government’s motion for pretrial detention, and set conditions for her release. The district court upheld the order. ICE then executed its detainer, taking Nunez into custody for her removal proceedings. While in ICE custody, Nunez unsuccessfully moved to dismiss her indictment or obtain release, arguing that section 3142(d) gives the government “the choice of [either] taking the Defendant into [ICE] custody during the ten-day period and proceeding with removal or continuing with the criminal prosecution in which case the BRA controls.” The court held that 8 U.S.C. 1226(a)(1) allowed ICE to detain Nunez during the pendency of removal proceedings notwithstanding the criminal action; her detention did not conflict with the BRA. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal of the ruling denying the request to dismiss the indictment, which was not a final ruling. The court affirmed the denial of Nunez’s claim that her BRA release order foreclosed her ICE detention. View "United States v. Nunez" on Justia Law

The plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act unambiguously permits an applicant to raise multiple claims in her asylum application, even if the changed circumstance relates only to one proffered basis for asylum. The Second Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's denial of petitioner's application for asylum. The court held that petitioner demonstrated the existence of changed circumstances permitting her late filing, and the IJ and BIA were obligated to consider her entire application. Accordingly, the court remanded to the BIA for the limited purpose of granting the application for asylum. View "Yan Yang v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying Petitioner's motion to reopen his removal proceedings, holding that Petitioner showed at least a reasonable chance that he will face future persecution based on his political opinion, and therefore, reversal was warranted.After Petitioner, a Venezuelan native and citizen, overstayed his visa U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement commenced removal proceedings against him. An immigration judge (IJ) found Petitioner ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The BIA and First Circuit affirmed. Seven years later, Petitioner submitted a motion to reopen his removal proceedings, arguing that conditions had materially worsened for political dissidents in Venezuela since the denial of his applications and claiming prima facie eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal relief. The BIA denied the motion, concluding that Petitioner failed to establish a material change in country conditions and rejecting Petitioner's evidence of a well-founded fear of future persecution. The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) the BIA's conclusion that country conditions in Venezuela had not worsened was arbitrary; and (2) the BIA improperly concluded that Petitioner's evidence could not establish prima facie eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal. View "Cabas v. Barr" on Justia Law

E.D., a female immigration detainee at the Berks County Residential Center Immigration Family Center (BCRC), brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against employee Sharkey, alleging that he violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity after the two had sexual relations. Sharkey’s co-workers and BCRC supervisor allegedly were deliberately indifferent to the violation and Berks County allegedly failed to implement policies to prevent the violating conduct. The District Court denied the defendants’ motion for qualified immunity. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that immigration detainees are entitled to the same constitutional protections afforded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as pre-trial detainees and E.D.’s rights were clearly established. There is enough evidence to support an inference that the defendants knew of the risk facing E.D., and that their failure to take additional steps to protect her, acting in their capacity as either a co-worker or supervisor, “could be viewed by a factfinder as the sort of deliberate indifference” to a detainee’s safety that the Constitution forbids. View "E. D. v. Sharkey" on Justia Law

Chen was charged with cultivating marijuana, possession of marijuana for sale, and theft of services. The arraignment form stated, “If you are not a United States citizen, a plea of Guilty or No Contest could result in your deportation, exclusion from admission to this country, or denial of naturalization.” Chen signed the form, attesting she understood it; her court interpreter also signed, certifying it had been translated. Chen pleaded no contest to cultivation of marijuana. On her plea form Chen initialed the statement regarding the immigration consequences. Her interpreter certified it was translated to Chen. At the hearing, through an interpreter, the court asked Chen whether the interpreter read the form, whether Chen understood, and whether she had time to discuss it with her attorney. Chen responded, “Yes.” Years later, Chen moved to vacate her plea and conviction under Penal Code 1473.7 and 1016.5, arguing her attorney failed to properly advise her of the immigration consequences and that she is a Permanent Resident and the primary caretaker for her parents. She asserted that she had no knowledge of her brother's marijuana grow operation but that her attorney told her she would go to jail unless she took a plea bargain. The district attorney cited evidence of Chen’s involvement in the marijuana operation. Chen’s attorney testified that he talked to Chen about her immigration status. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of relief. View "People v. Chen" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment in an action seeking a declaratory judgment that DHS had improperly denied plaintiff's application to adjust his status to that of a legal permanent resident. Although the court had jurisdiction in this case, it held that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In this case, plaintiff overstayed his nonimmigrant visitor visa, accruing time as an alien in unlawful status. Therefore, that period made him ineligible for an adjustment of status. The court entered judgment that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice. View "Melendez v. McAleenan" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of DHS's reinstatement of a prior order for petitioner's removal and the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of his applications for withholding of removal and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the reinstatement of the prior removal order because the issue was not exhausted; petitioner failed to show prejudice and could not succeed on his claim that DHS violated his due process rights by continuing to interrogate him without his attorney present; and petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his claims for withholding of removal and protection under the CAT. In this case, petitioner failed to make a showing that the Guatemalan government would be unable or unwilling to protect him from a loan shark, and petitioner failed to make any meaningful argument to the BIA regarding his CAT claim. View "Mendez-Gomez v. Barr" on Justia Law

Mother and her four minor children were undocumented immigrants from Angola living in Vermont. Mother is married to the children’s father. At one time, father indicated that he would join the family in North America but he had not. Mother alleged that father had not contacted or supported the family since 2013. She also testified that there was no place for the children in Angola. In February 2018, mother sought relief under 15 V.S.A. 291, seeking award of sole legal and physical parental-rights-and-responsibilities (PRR) based on father’s abandonment of the family. Mother also asked the court to make special findings that would allow the children to apply for “special immigrant juvenile” (SIJ) status with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Father was served by publication in Angola. The trial court concluded that it was in the children’s best interests that mother have sole PRR, both legal and physical. It did not order any parent-child contact with father. The court denied mother’s request for SIJ findings, concluding it lacked authority to make SIJ findings because they were not necessary to its parental-rights-and-responsibilities (PRR) decision. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that given the primacy of a child’s best interests in cases like this and the court’s broad discretion in determining those interests, the trial court did have the authority to make such findings. “It should make such findings when it is in a child’s best interests to do so and where such findings are supported by the evidence.” The Supreme Court therefore reversed and remanded the trial court’s decision to allow it to engage in this analysis. Because one of the juveniles would turn eighteen on July 13, 2019, the Supreme Court issued the mandate immediately and directed the court to issue its findings forthwith. View "Kitoko v. Salomao" on Justia Law

Rehaif entered the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa to attend university but was dismissed for poor grades. He subsequently shot firearms at a firing range and was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. 922(g), which makes it unlawful for certain persons, including aliens illegally in the country, to possess firearms, and section 924(a)(2), which provides that anyone who “knowingly violates” the first provision can be imprisoned for up to 10 years. The jury was instructed that the government was not required to prove that Rehalf knew that he was unlawfully in the country. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed his conviction. The Supreme Court reversed. In a prosecution under sections 922(g) and 924(a)(2), the government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm. The Court noted a longstanding presumption that Congress intends to require a defendant to possess a culpable mental state regarding each statutory element that criminalizes otherwise innocent conduct. The statutory text supports the application of presumption requiring "scienter." The term “knowingly” is normally read as applying to all the subsequently listed elements of the crime and clearly applies to section 922(g)’s second element, possession. There is no basis for interpreting “knowingly” as applying to the second element but not the first (status). Possessing a gun can be an innocent act; it is the defendant’s status that makes a difference. Without knowledge of that status, a defendant may lack the intent needed to make his behavior wrongful. Rehaif’s status as an alien “illegally or unlawfully in the United States” is a “collateral” question of law and a mistake regarding that status negates an element of the offense. View "Rehaif v. United States" on Justia Law