Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a challenge by eighteen states and other plaintiffs against the enforcement of Executive Order No. 14,160, which limits the recognition of U.S. citizenship for certain individuals born in the United States. The Executive Order specifies that individuals born to mothers unlawfully present in the U.S. or temporarily present mothers, where the father is not a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident, will not be recognized as U.S. citizens. The plaintiffs argue that this order violates the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1401.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted a preliminary injunction preventing the enforcement of the Executive Order. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, and that the balance of harms and public interest favored the injunction. The court issued a "universal" preliminary injunction, applying nationwide, to prevent the enforcement of the Executive Order.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the government's motion for a stay pending appeal of the preliminary injunction. The court denied the stay, concluding that the government failed to make a "strong showing" that it was likely to succeed on the merits of its appeal, particularly regarding the plaintiffs' standing and the lawfulness of the Executive Order. The court also found that the government did not meet its burden on the other factors required for a stay, including irreparable harm and public interest. The court upheld the nationwide scope of the preliminary injunction, noting that the government did not adequately address the necessity of such broad relief to prevent harm to the plaintiffs. View "State of New Jersey v. Trump" on Justia Law

Amarjeet Singh, a native and citizen of India, sought asylum in the United States, claiming that he faced persecution in India due to his political affiliation with the Mann party, a Sikh nationalist group. Singh testified that he was wrongfully arrested and tortured by Indian police in 2000, and that he was attacked twice by political opponents in 2017. He argued that the Indian government was unable or unwilling to protect him from these private persecutors.An immigration judge (IJ) found Singh removable and denied his application for asylum and withholding of removal, concluding that Singh had not demonstrated past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ noted that Singh had been acquitted of the false charges from 2000 and that the police officers involved had been removed from their positions. The IJ also found that Singh had not reported the 2017 attacks to the police, undermining his claim that the government was unable or unwilling to protect him. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, emphasizing that Singh had not shown that the Indian government was unable or unwilling to protect him.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed Singh's petition for review. The court held that the BIA did not misinterpret the "unable or unwilling" standard for asylum claims based on private persecution. The court found that the BIA had considered both the Indian government's willingness and ability to protect Singh. The court also concluded that substantial evidence supported the BIA's finding that Singh had not demonstrated that the Indian government was unable or unwilling to protect him. The court noted that Singh had been acquitted of the false charges from 2000, that the police officers involved had been removed, and that Singh had not reported the 2017 attacks to the police. The court denied Singh's petition for review. View "Singh v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Diego Penaranda Arevalo, a citizen of Ecuador unlawfully present in the United States, sought cancellation of a removal order under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). An immigration judge denied his application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Penaranda then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review. While this petition was pending, Penaranda filed a motion with the BIA to terminate or remand his removal proceedings, arguing that his removal order was invalid because his original notice to appear did not include the date and time of his initial hearing, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). The BIA denied the motion, reasoning that Penaranda had forfeited any objection based on the time-and-place requirement by failing to raise it in a timely manner.The Second Circuit reviewed both cases together. The court reaffirmed its decision in Banegas Gomez v. Barr that the time-and-place requirement is a non-jurisdictional rule and held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Penaranda forfeited his objection. Therefore, the court denied that petition.In his first petition, Penaranda challenged the immigration judge’s finding that he gave false testimony for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit, which led to the conclusion that he failed to establish good moral character and was therefore ineligible for the requested relief. The Second Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction to review Penaranda’s petition insofar as it contested whether and why he testified falsely, as these are unreviewable questions of fact under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Penaranda also argued that the immigration judge held him to a higher burden of proof than required. The court found that this argument, while a question of law, failed on the merits. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and denied in part Penaranda’s first petition. View "Penaranda Arevalo v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Marvin Laguna Rivera, a Nicaraguan citizen, petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order affirming the Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Laguna Rivera claimed that his political activities against the Nicaraguan government put his life in danger if he returned. The IJ found his testimony about recent threats not credible and determined that past persecution of his family members was too remote to establish a future threat to him. The BIA upheld the IJ's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. Laguna Rivera argued that the court had jurisdiction to review the denial of his asylum petition despite its untimeliness and that the BIA's adverse credibility finding was not supported by substantial evidence. However, the court found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the asylum petition's timeliness due to controlling precedent. The court also determined that substantial evidence supported the BIA's adverse credibility finding and the denial of withholding of removal and CAT relief.The Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's determination that Laguna Rivera's asylum application was untimely. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the BIA's conclusion that Laguna Rivera did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution, as his claims were based on dated incidents and unsubstantiated rumors. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition for review of the asylum claim and denied the petition for review of the withholding of removal and CAT claims. View "Rivera v. United States Attorney General" on Justia Law

Shuqiang Tian, a native and citizen of China, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States. Tian claimed persecution by the Chinese government due to his opposition to the government's forcible demolition policy, which involved demolishing villagers' homes without just compensation. Tian testified that he protested against the demolition, was arrested, beaten, and threatened by the police, and ultimately forced to accept inadequate compensation under duress.An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Tian's claims, concluding that his prosecution for blocking a road and agitating in a government office did not amount to persecution. The IJ found no sufficient nexus between Tian's political opinion and the harm he suffered. The IJ also summarily denied Tian's CAT claim, stating that he had not demonstrated a likelihood of torture upon return to China. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that Tian failed to show past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution based on a protected ground, and that he did not meet the burden for CAT protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the agency's analysis was legally deficient. The court noted that the IJ and BIA failed to consider material evidence and the context of Tian's protests, which indicated that his persecution was linked to his political opinion. The court also found that the agency did not adequately address the possibility that Tian's arrests were pretextual and failed to provide a reasoned basis for denying his CAT claim. Consequently, the Second Circuit granted Tian's petition, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded the case for reconsideration. View "Tian v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Shenisa Mohammed, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 2010. In 2020, she pleaded guilty to arson under Virginia Code § 18.2-77. The Department of Homeland Security charged her as removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), alleging her arson conviction qualified as an aggravated felony. Mohammed sought cancellation of removal, but the immigration judge (IJ) concluded that her arson conviction was an aggravated felony, making her removable and ineligible for discretionary relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, and Mohammed petitioned for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court confirmed its jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal, limited to constitutional claims or questions of law. The court reviewed de novo whether Mohammed’s state conviction for arson qualified as an aggravated felony under the INA.The court applied the categorical approach to determine if the Virginia arson statute matched the federal arson statute under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). The Virginia statute criminalizes maliciously burning or aiding and abetting the burning of certain properties. The federal statute criminalizes maliciously damaging or destroying property used in interstate commerce by fire or explosives. The court found that both statutes prohibit malicious burning, and the federal statute implicitly includes aiding and abetting liability through 18 U.S.C. § 2.The court concluded that the Virginia arson statute is not broader than the federal arson statute, as aiding and abetting is considered an alternative theory of liability under federal law. Therefore, Mohammed’s state arson conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony. The Sixth Circuit denied Mohammed’s petition for review. View "Mohammed v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Lau, a native and citizen of China, was charged with third-degree trademark counterfeiting in New Jersey. While awaiting trial, he left the United States and upon his return, he was paroled for deferred inspection by immigration authorities. Lau was later convicted and sentenced to probation. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against him, asserting he was inadmissible due to his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT).An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Lau inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The IJ concluded that Lau’s conviction constituted a CIMT, did not qualify as a petty offense, and that he was properly classified as an applicant for admission upon his return. The IJ also determined that Lau did not meet the continuous residency requirement for a 212(h) waiver. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing with the findings and dismissing Lau’s appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that DHS improperly classified Lau as an applicant for admission when he returned to the United States while his criminal charge was pending. The court found that a pending charge does not provide clear and convincing evidence of a CIMT necessary for DHS to consider an LPR an applicant for admission. Consequently, the court granted Lau’s petition for review, vacated the final order of removal, and remanded the case to the agency with instructions to terminate removal proceedings against Lau based on his inadmissibility under section 1182(a), without prejudice to any future deportation proceedings. View "Lau v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Breion Woodson was convicted in Wisconsin state court on charges of firearm and drug possession and sentenced to 19 years in prison. During sentencing, the government presented a video from social media showing men with guns and drugs, which the judge used to assess Woodson's character and danger to the community. Woodson argued that he was misidentified in the video, but the judge denied his motion for a new sentencing hearing. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed, stating Woodson failed to prove he was not the man in the video.Woodson then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, introducing booking photos from the time of his sentencing that suggested he was not the man in the video. However, the district court ruled it could not consider the photos since they were not presented in state court and denied his petition, finding the state appellate court's decision reasonable based on the evidence it had.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), habeas relief is unavailable unless the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of facts. The court found that Woodson's claim was not procedurally defaulted and that the actual innocence exception did not apply to his case. The court also ruled that it could not consider the new evidence (booking photos) under AEDPA's strict limitations. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Woodson's habeas petition. View "Woodson v Mlodzik" on Justia Law

Marvin T. Jose Mateo filed a petition in the Hall County Court seeking to establish a minor guardianship for his 18-year-old brother, Tomas J. The petition also requested immigration-related factual findings under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). Tomas had been in Marvin's care since 2019, and they had been living in Grand Island, Nebraska, since January 2022. Tomas was attending high school and planned to join the U.S. Marines after graduation. Marvin testified that Tomas' parents were in Guatemala and did not provide financial support.The county court denied the guardianship petition, noting that Tomas was already 18 years old and that Marvin had a power of attorney from Tomas' parents, which allowed him to care for Tomas without a guardianship. The court did not make the requested factual findings under the UCCJEA. Marvin filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that the court applied the wrong legal standard and failed to consider Tomas' best interests. The court overruled the motion, reiterating that Marvin had been able to care for Tomas without a guardianship and suggesting that the petition was filed primarily to obtain immigration findings.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the UCCJEA did not apply because Tomas was no longer a "child" under the UCCJEA when the petition was filed. The court determined that other Nebraska statutes gave the county court jurisdiction over the minor guardianship proceeding. However, the court found that the appeal became moot once Tomas reached the age of majority, as the relief of appointing a minor guardian was no longer available. The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that none of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied. View "In re Guardianship of Tomas J." on Justia Law

Donglan Xia, a U.S. citizen, filed a Form I-130 Petition for Alien Relative on behalf of her adopted nephew, Tian "Tim" Xia, who was born in China and entered the U.S. on a temporary visitor visa in 2011. Tim's parents relinquished their parental rights, and Xia adopted him in 2012. Xia filed the I-130 petition in 2018 to classify Tim as an immediate relative for preferential immigration status. USCIS denied the petition, stating Xia did not prove Tim's adoption fell outside the Hague Adoption Convention, that Tim did not enter the U.S. for adoption, or that Tim had compelling ties to the U.S. before his adoption.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Xia's appeal, agreeing with USCIS that Xia failed to show Tim's adoption was outside the Hague Adoption Convention and that Tim had not established compelling ties to the U.S. before his adoption. The BIA noted Tim's activities in the U.S. but concluded they did not demonstrate habitual residence. Xia sought judicial review, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government, finding substantial evidence supported the BIA's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and found the BIA's decision lacked sufficient reasoning for meaningful judicial review. The court noted the BIA did not explain which specific facts and circumstances it considered or how they negated Tim's documented connections to the U.S. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings, requiring a more detailed explanation of the BIA's decision regarding Tim's habitual residence and ties to the U.S. View "Xia v. Scott" on Justia Law