Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

In 1998, Garcia-Martinez pleaded guilty to assault with a deadly weapon under N.J.S. 2C:12-1(b)(2). According to his plea colloquy, Garcia-Martinez’s role was minor: he stuck out his foot to trip the victim. Once the victim was on the ground, Garcia-Martinez’s friends “jumped on [the victim] and started hitting him” and “some of [Garcia-Martinez’s] friends punched [the victim], kicked him and struck him.” Garcia-Martinez stood by during their assault; he soon left the scene. The Board of Immigration Appeals has found in the past that “assault with a deadly weapon” is a generic crime of moral turpitude that makes a noncitizen ineligible for cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). The Board found that there was no realistic probability that the New Jersey law could be applied to conduct outside the scope of the generic crime and concluded that Garcia-Martinez’s conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude. The Seventh Circuit granted a petition for review and remanded. Although the New Jersey statute appears to fit the generic definition of assault with a deadly weapon, only some of the conduct covered by the statute appears to be sufficiently vile, base, immoral, or depraved to deserve the label moral turpitude. The Board speculated about the type of weapon that Garcia-Martinez’s accomplices may have possessed and did not explain why the generic definition of assault with a deadly weapon includes tripping. View "Garcia-Martinez v. Barr" on Justia Law

After plaintiffs were arrested and detained by ICE under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a), pending removal for being in the United States without inspection or admission, they filed suit against ICE and DHS, challenging their transfer or anticipated transfer from ICE's detention facility to an out of state facility. Plaintiffs alleged a violation of their substantive due process right to family unity and procedural due process right to notice and an opportunity to be heard, because such transfers separated them from their children and made it impossible for children to have access to their parents or to visit them.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the government's motion to dismiss and held that plaintiffs did not have a due process right to family unity in the context of immigration detention pending removal. Furthermore, the court did not have the authority to create a new substantive due process right in view of Supreme Court decisions cautioning courts from innovating in this area. Likewise, the court held that, because plaintiffs right to family unity did not exist, their procedural due process claim failed. View "Reyna v. Hott" on Justia Law

Petitioner, who has been held in custody under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) since May 2017 while he litigates the issue of whether he is a removable alien, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief to petitioner, holding that section 1226(a) is not susceptible of more than one construction and that the constitutional avoidance doctrine has no application here. Therefore, the district court erred when it concluded that pre-removal order detention under section 1226(a) is limited to "the period reasonably necessary to receive a removal decision." The court remanded for further consideration of petitioner's constitutional arguments. View "Ali v. Brott" on Justia Law

In 2012, K.H., a Guatemalan citizen, then seven years old, was kidnapped, beaten, and raped by gang members. The Guatemalan police caught K.H.’s persecutors, who were tried, convicted, and sentenced. The government provided K.H. with psychological treatment, temporarily placed her in a child refuge center, helped her with a visa application, and required that K.H. and her grandmother relocate. Shortly thereafter, while her visa application was pending, K.H. fled to the United States, where her mother was living. K.H. was apprehended by immigration authorities at the U.S.-Mexico border in 2014. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the denial of her applications for asylum and humanitarian asylum because she failed to demonstrate that the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control her persecutors and protect her. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination. The court noted the government’s timely intervention and the arrests, prosecution, conviction, and sentencing of K.H.’s persecutors, as well as the steps taken by the to protect K.H. K.H. did not suffer past persecution, so her claim for humanitarian asylum must fail. View "K. H. v. Barr" on Justia Law

Cruz, a native of El Salvador, grew up in a neighborhood dominated by the 18th Street gang. A rival gang, MS-13, sought to recruit Cruz and his friends as “spies” to relay information about 18th Street activities. After they refused, MS-13 threatened and assaulted them. MS-13 members murdered Cruz’s friend. Later that week, one of them told Cruz “if [he] was just as stupid as Brian, then the same thing would happen.” Cruz fled El Salvador and was apprehended near Hidalgo, Texas. In his deportation proceeding, Cruz sought asylum based on his fear of gang violence if he returned home. While his asylum application was pending, MS-13 killed one of Cruz’s friend, while 18th Street killed another. Both gangs extorted protection money from Cruz’s mother. When she missed a payment, 18th Street members broke into her house, beat her, and threatened to rape Cruz’s sister. While the Immigration Judge found Cruz’s testimony credible, she denied Cruz’s asylum application because Cruz failed to establish that he faced this persecution “on account of” a protected ground (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A)). The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. Cruz did not establish a connection between his “well-founded fear of persecution” and his membership in a particular social group. View "Cruz-Guzman v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's order denying petitioner and his family members relief from removal. The court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA's denial of petitioner's application for asylum where, although petitioner had suffered past persecution for his religion and political opinion, DHS rebutted the presumption of future persecution by showing that the circumstances have fundamentally changed. In this case, by showing that harm based on religious views and political activism turned into mere harm based on extortion, DHS sufficiently showed that the circumstances have fundamentally changed and that petitioner and his family no longer have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of petitioner's political opinion. The court rejected petitioner's remaining claims. View "Singh v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's order denying petitioner's motion to administratively close or remand to the IJ, and denying petitioner's motion to reopen and reconsider the first denial. The court held that the BIA's substantial discussion of the statutory and regulatory bases for using a substitute IJ were sufficient.The court held that reopening a case should not be granted unless the alien has met the heavy burden of showing that the new evidence presented would likely change the result in the case. The court held that the BIA applied the correct legal standard in reviewing petitioner's request to submit additional hardship evidence. The court also held that the BIA did not err in denying petitioner's motion to remand in an April order. However, the court remanded for clarification of the BIA's rationale for denying the motion to open in the December order. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Caballero-Martinez v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's dismissal of petitioner's appeal of the denial of his motion to reopen his immigration proceedings. Because petitioner's in absentia proceedings occurred in 1993, the court applied the notice requirements set forth in 8 U.S.C. 1252b.Applying the traditional tools of interpretation to section 1252b(a)(1)(F)(i), the court held that an alien must provide a U.S. address for receiving written notice regarding his deportation proceedings. In this case, petitioner failed to provide an address to the immigration court and thus the BIA did not abuse its discretion in dismissing his appeal. View "Ramos-Portillo v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals explained in this opinion its reasons underlying its December 7, 2018 order, in which the Court issued an order reversing the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the decision of the circuit court denying Petitioner's motion for an order that included all requisite "Special Immigrant Juvenile" (SIJ) status findings, holding that the circuit court applied a far too demanding and rigid standard in this case.In a proceeding before the circuit court, Petitioner sought sole custody of his seventeen-year-old son (Child), an undocumented minor and Guatemalan native. Petitioner further requested that the circuit court issue an order containing factual findings illustrating Child's eligibility for SIJ status, namely that reunification with Child's mother was not viable due to neglect. The circuit court granted Petitioner custody of Child but concluded that Petitioner failed to establish that reunification with the mother was not viable due to neglect. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that returning Child to the custody of the mother, who inadequately cared for and supervised him, could not be a reunification that was viable. View "Romero v. Perez" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's denial of petitioner's motion to reopen removal proceedings. Petitioner alleged that she never received a notice of hearing. The court held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by determining that petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of receipt of effective service. In this case, the BIA reached a final determination based on the totality of the circumstances where various circumstances -- including no non-deliverable return, no prior affirmative applications for relief, and lack of due diligence -- weighed in favor of the presumption of receipt. View "Navarrete-Lopez v. Barr" on Justia Law