Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Eva Daley, a Guatemalan national, entered the United States as a child without inspection. As an adult, she was convicted of second-degree murder in California, but that conviction was later vacated and replaced with a conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. After serving nearly fifteen years in prison, Daley was detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) upon her release and transferred to a facility in Colorado. She applied for asylum and related relief, but after over a year in detention without a bond hearing, she filed a habeas corpus petition challenging her continued detention.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted Daley’s habeas petition, ordering the government to provide her with an individualized bond hearing. Following the court’s order, an immigration judge held a bond hearing and released Daley on bond after 450 days in ICE custody. Daley then moved for attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), and the district court awarded her $18,553.92 in fees. The government appealed the fee award, arguing that the EAJA does not authorize fees in habeas actions challenging immigration detention.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s fee award de novo, focusing solely on statutory interpretation of the EAJA. The Tenth Circuit held that habeas actions challenging immigration detention are “civil actions” within the meaning of the EAJA, based on common law history, judicial precedent, and statutory text. The court concluded that the EAJA unambiguously authorizes attorneys’ fees in such cases and affirmed the district court’s award of fees to Daley. View "Daley v. Choate" on Justia Law

A woman from Honduras, along with her daughter, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States. She described a history of abuse by male relatives and partners in Honduras, culminating in severe stalking and threats from a man named Matute, who attempted to abduct her and threatened her and her daughter’s lives. After repeated failures by local police to respond to her pleas for help, she fled Honduras with her daughter, leaving her son with her grandparents. She later learned that Matute continued to harass her family after her departure.After entering the United States, an asylum officer found she had a credible fear of persecution or torture. The Department of Homeland Security charged her and her daughter with inadmissibility. At her merits hearing before an immigration judge, she presented testimony and country-conditions evidence about violence against women in Honduras. The immigration judge found her not credible, gave little weight to her expert evidence, and denied all relief, concluding that her proposed social groups were not cognizable and that there was no nexus between her persecution and a protected ground. The judge also found she had not established a likelihood of torture with government acquiescence and could have relocated within Honduras.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the immigration judge’s decision, focusing on the lack of nexus between her harm and a protected ground, and finding no clear error in the denial of CAT relief. The BIA concluded that the harm she suffered was due to a private dispute rather than persecution on account of a protected ground.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded the case. The court held that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to meaningfully consider the country-conditions evidence relevant to her claims, as required by precedent. View "Alfaro-Zelaya v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Three U.S. citizens each sponsored a close family member for an immigrant visa to the United States. After their petitions were approved by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the family members applied for visas at the U.S. Consulate General in Guangzhou, China. Following interviews, the consular officers denied the visa applications, citing fraud or misrepresentation as the basis for inadmissibility. The U.S. citizen sponsors challenged these denials in federal court, alleging that the decisions were not facially legitimate or bona fide, were issued in bad faith, and that the notices were untimely.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the claims. It found that one plaintiff’s claim was brought in an improper venue and dismissed it without prejudice. The remaining claims were dismissed with prejudice under the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, which generally bars judicial review of consular visa decisions. The district court concluded that, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Department of State v. Muñoz, U.S. citizens do not have a constitutional right to reunite with parents or siblings through visa sponsorship, and thus no constitutional right was burdened by the denials. The court also found the allegations of bad faith insufficient and rejected the timeliness argument as a repackaged merits challenge.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability precludes judicial review of the visa denials because the plaintiffs did not have a constitutional right implicated by the denials. The court also agreed that the plaintiffs’ alternative arguments lacked merit and that the consular officers’ decisions were insulated from judicial review. View "Chen v. Rubio" on Justia Law

A Mexican citizen, whose legal permanent resident status in the United States had been revoked, was previously removed from the country multiple times following a criminal conviction. In August 2023, he entered the United States from Mexico by bus, intentionally seeking arrest in order to challenge his prior deportation and potentially regain legal status. Upon arrival at the port of entry in El Paso, he bypassed a pedestrian turnstile, was quickly apprehended by Customs and Border Protection officers, and admitted his intent to be arrested. He was indicted for illegal re-entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas conducted a jury trial. The defendant did not dispute the factual basis of his entry but argued that he was not “free from official restraint” and therefore had not “entered” the United States in the legal sense. He requested a jury instruction defining “official restraint,” which the district court denied, reasoning that the concept was not an additional element of the offense and that the pattern jury instructions sufficed. The jury found him guilty of illegal re-entry, and the court entered judgment for attempted illegal re-entry, sentencing him to 18 months’ imprisonment and supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in refusing the requested instruction. The Fifth Circuit held that while “freedom from official restraint” is part of the definition of entry for § 1326(a), the pattern jury instruction given was a correct statement of law and adequately covered the issues. The court found that the defendant was able to present his defense theory to the jury, and thus, the absence of the requested instruction did not constitute reversible error. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction but remanded for correction of a clerical error in the judgment. View "United States v. Hernandez-Adame" on Justia Law

A citizen of Ecuador who had been living unlawfully in the United States since 1997 was placed in removal proceedings after multiple convictions, including for driving under the influence. He conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal, arguing that his deportation would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his three U.S.-citizen children. At the time of his application, all three children were minors. During a hearing before an immigration judge, he and his eldest daughter testified about the potential hardship his removal would cause. The judge ultimately denied his application, finding he lacked good moral character and had not shown the required level of hardship to his children.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the immigration judge’s decision, specifically agreeing that the petitioner had not demonstrated the necessary hardship to his children. The petitioner did not seek judicial review of this decision. Later, he filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings, submitting new evidence—a psychological evaluation of his eldest daughter, who was then almost 20 years old—arguing that this showed she would suffer the requisite hardship. Nearly two years later, the BIA denied the motion, concluding that the new evidence would not change the outcome because the daughter had turned 21 while the motion was pending and thus no longer qualified as a “child” under the relevant statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen. The court held that, under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), a qualifying “child” must be under 21 at the time the application for cancellation of removal is adjudicated, not at the time of filing or when evidence is presented. The court also found that the petitioner was not barred from raising this issue on appeal, as the BIA had raised it sua sponte. The petition for review was denied. View "Yupangui-Yunga v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Iowa enacted a law making it a state crime for certain noncitizens who had previously been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed from the United States to enter or be found in Iowa. The law also required state judges to order such individuals to return to the country from which they entered and prohibited state courts from pausing prosecutions based on pending or possible federal immigration status determinations. Two noncitizens residing in Iowa, both of whom had previously been subject to federal removal orders but later lawfully reentered the United States, along with a membership-based immigrant advocacy organization, challenged the law, arguing it was preempted by federal immigration law.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa found that the plaintiffs had standing and granted a preliminary injunction, concluding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Iowa law was preempted by federal law under both conflict and field preemption doctrines. The district court also found that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if the law went into effect and that the balance of equities and public interest favored an injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion, reviewing legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction, holding that the plaintiffs had standing and were likely to succeed on the merits because every application of the Iowa law would conflict with federal immigration law by interfering with the discretion Congress grants to federal officials. The court also found that the other factors for a preliminary injunction were met. The Eighth Circuit remanded for the district court to determine the appropriate scope of the injunction in light of recent Supreme Court guidance. View "IA Migrant Movement for Justice v. Bird" on Justia Law

A lawful permanent resident of the United States, who is a Canadian citizen, pleaded guilty in 2003 to one count of health care fraud after participating in a scheme involving fraudulent prescriptions and false Medicaid/Medi-Cal billing. The conviction, which involved a loss exceeding $10,000, rendered him removable from the United States. He claimed that his attorneys gave him incorrect or incomplete advice regarding the immigration consequences of his plea. Despite being informed by both the sentencing judge in 2003 and a U.S. immigration official in 2007 that his conviction could lead to removal, he did not seek to vacate his conviction until many years later.After removal proceedings began in 2008, the defendant waited until 2016 to file his first petition for a writ of coram nobis in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the petition due to unreasonable delay, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that denial in 2020, finding the delay between 2014 and 2016 unjustified. The first petition focused on the conduct of the attorney who represented him at sentencing.In 2021, the defendant filed a second coram nobis petition in the same district court, this time alleging ineffective assistance by three different attorneys, including the one who handled his first petition. The district court denied the second petition, finding it barred by laches due to prejudicial delay, as key witnesses had died and evidence had been lost. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the government was prejudiced by the delay and that the defendant failed to show reasonable diligence in seeking relief, given that he was on notice of the immigration consequences years earlier. View "USA V. KROYTOR" on Justia Law

A Guatemalan national entered the United States without authorization after fleeing gang violence in his home country. He sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, but an immigration judge denied these requests and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the removal order. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Niz-Chavez v. Garland, which clarified the requirements for a valid “notice to appear,” the petitioner moved to reopen his removal proceedings to seek voluntary departure, a form of relief that would allow him to leave the United States without a formal removal order. To qualify, he needed to show, among other things, that he had the means to depart the country, typically by possessing a valid passport.The Board of Immigration Appeals denied his motion to reopen, finding that his affidavit—stating only that he was in the process of renewing his Guatemalan passport—was too conclusory and unsupported by documentary evidence. The Board concluded that he had not sufficiently demonstrated that he would be able to depart the United States if granted voluntary departure.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the Board’s denial. The court held that the Board applied the correct legal standard, requiring only a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief at the motion-to-reopen stage, not conclusive proof. The court found that the Board did not err in determining that the petitioner’s unsupported and conclusory statement about his passport application failed to meet even this threshold. The Sixth Circuit therefore denied the petition for review, upholding the Board’s decision. View "Pastor-Hernandez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Nigerian citizen sought relief from removal in the United States, claiming he faced persecution in Nigeria due to his ethnicity and membership in a separatist political organization. He described several violent incidents involving Nigerian police, including arrests, assaults, and threats to his life. After leaving Nigeria, he entered the United States on a visitor visa and subsequently married a U.S. citizen, later applying for adjustment of status based on that marriage. However, both he and his spouse admitted to immigration authorities that the marriage was fraudulent and entered into for immigration purposes, with the petitioner paying his spouse for the arrangement.The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services denied his adjustment application and a subsequent petition under the Violence Against Women Act, finding insufficient evidence of a bona fide marriage. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, charging him with overstaying his visa and committing marriage fraud. During removal proceedings before an Immigration Judge, the petitioner denied the marriage was fraudulent and claimed his prior admission was coerced. The Immigration Judge found him not credible, primarily due to the marriage fraud and his inconsistent statements, and denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the adverse credibility finding and denial of relief, remanding only for further analysis of his fear of future persecution, which was again rejected after additional evidence was submitted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and denied the petition for review. The court held that substantial evidence supported the adverse credibility determination based on the petitioner’s deliberate deception of immigration authorities, even though the fraud was not directly related to his persecution claim. The court clarified that such intentional deception can, by itself, support an adverse credibility finding under the totality of the circumstances, and the record did not compel a contrary conclusion. The denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and the motion to remand was affirmed. View "ANI V. BONDI" on Justia Law

A woman from Honduras and her two minor sons fled their home country after the murder of her partner, Arturo Robles, by a man named Jonis, who was associated with a gang. Following the murder, Jonis threatened the woman and her children, specifically targeting those related to Arturo. The woman reported these threats to the police, but they failed to act, which she attributed to their ties with gangs. Fearing for their safety, she and her children entered the United States unlawfully in 2014 and sought asylum, arguing that their persecution was due to their membership in Arturo’s nuclear family.After removal proceedings began, an Immigration Judge (IJ) granted asylum in 2014, finding the woman and her brother credible and concluding that her family relationship was a central reason for the threats. The government appealed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded for further factfinding. In 2019, after additional hearings and evidence, the IJ again granted asylum, finding that the threats were motivated by the family relationship, that the woman could not safely relocate within Honduras, and that the government was unable or unwilling to protect her. The government appealed again, and in 2023, a three-judge BIA panel vacated the IJ’s decision, holding that the IJ’s factual findings were clearly erroneous.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s 2023 order. The court held that the BIA misapplied the clear-error standard required by regulation when reviewing the IJ’s factual findings. The Tenth Circuit found that the IJ’s findings on nexus, internal relocation, and government protection were permissible and not clearly erroneous. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded with instructions to reinstate the IJ’s grant of asylum. View "Ramos v. Bondi" on Justia Law