Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

A mother filed for sole custody of her two daughters, alleging the father, who resides in Guatemala, had abused, neglected, and abandoned the children. The Delaware County Court of Common Pleas granted her sole custody but denied her request for Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) findings, which are necessary for the children to seek SIJ status with federal immigration authorities. The court found insufficient evidence of abuse, neglect, or abandonment under Pennsylvania law and questioned whether it was in the children's best interest to issue an SIJ order.The mother appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which affirmed the lower court's decision. The Superior Court held that SIJ determinations could only be made in dependency proceedings, not in custody proceedings where one parent is awarded sole custody.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and reversed the Superior Court's decision. The Court clarified that under federal SIJ law, a child involved in custody proceedings resulting in sole custody being awarded to a parent in the United States can seek SIJ determinations in that context. The Court held that the Superior Court erred in limiting SIJ determinations to dependency proceedings and that the record supported the children's entitlement to predicate SIJ determinations.The Supreme Court directed the custody court to enter orders consistent with its opinion, including findings that reunification with the father is not viable due to abandonment and neglect, and that it is not in the children's best interest to return to Guatemala. The case was remanded to the custody court for entry of these orders. View "Velasquez v. Miranda" on Justia Law

Oswaldo Favio Dominguez Ojeda, a native and citizen of Peru, faced reinstatement of a prior removal order by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2023. He expressed fear of returning to Peru, citing multiple incidents of harm and threats from members of the political group Peru Libre. An asylum officer conducted a reasonable fear screening interview but determined that Dominguez Ojeda did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture. Dominguez Ojeda sought review of this negative determination.The matter was referred to an Immigration Judge (IJ) for a reasonable fear review hearing. During this hearing, Dominguez Ojeda attempted to introduce new evidence, including claims of being raped by Peru Libre members and country conditions reports. The IJ refused to consider this new evidence, mistakenly believing that he lacked the discretion to review evidence not initially presented to the asylum officer. The IJ cited the case Alvarado-Herrera v. Garland, which allows an IJ to exercise discretion in considering new evidence, but still concluded that he could not review the new evidence. Consequently, the IJ upheld the asylum officer's negative reasonable fear determination.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the IJ committed legal error by failing to exercise discretion regarding the consideration of new evidence. The court clarified that while an IJ is not required to consider new evidence at a reasonable fear hearing, the IJ must exercise discretion in deciding whether to accept or reject such evidence. The Ninth Circuit granted Dominguez Ojeda’s petition for review and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the IJ to properly exercise discretion in considering the new evidence. View "OJEDA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

A man who has lived in the United States for thirty years, married to a U.S. citizen and father to U.S. citizens, has been attempting to adjust his immigration status for seventeen years. His third application was denied in 2021 due to the use of an incorrect birthdate, which was deemed to constitute fraud. The man sought review in district court, which dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. He then appealed this decision.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the case, stating that decisions regarding the adjustment of status and waivers of inadmissibility are within the discretion of USCIS and are not subject to judicial review. The court cited 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) and § 1182(i)(2), which preclude judicial review of such discretionary decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) precludes judicial review of denials of applications for adjustment of status and waivers of inadmissibility, regardless of whether the judgment is made in removal proceedings. The court referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Patel v. Garland, which interpreted the statute to broadly preclude judicial review of any judgment regarding the granting of relief under § 1255. The court acknowledged the potential for governmental errors but concluded that the statutory language clearly barred judicial review in this context. View "Momin v. Jaddou" on Justia Law

Hussein Ahmed Mouns, a native of Ethiopia and citizen of Yemen, has been in the United States since 1996. He applied for asylum and withholding of removal in 1997, which were denied by an immigration judge in 1999 and affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in 2002. Mouns filed motions to reopen his proceedings in 2003 and 2004 to pursue asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), which were denied by the BIA in 2003 and 2005. In 2020, Mouns filed a third motion to reopen based on changed country conditions in Yemen, citing the ongoing civil war and potential persecution due to his religion and imputed political opinion.The BIA denied Mouns’s 2020 motion to reopen, applying the stringent standard from In re Coelho, which requires the movant to show that the new evidence would likely change the result of the case. Mouns requested reconsideration, arguing that the BIA should have used the less burdensome "reasonable likelihood" standard from In re L-O-G-. The BIA denied reconsideration, reaffirming the use of the Coelho standard without addressing the L-O-G- standard.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision. The court found that the BIA abused its discretion by not following its own precedents, which limit the Coelho standard to cases with special, adverse considerations. The court noted that the BIA did not identify any such considerations in Mouns’s case and should have applied the "reasonable likelihood" standard. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit granted Mouns’s petition for review, vacated the BIA’s decision denying reconsideration, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mouns v. Garland" on Justia Law

Gary Lall, born in Trinidad and Tobago, applied for a Certificate of Citizenship in 1990 through his adoptive parents, who were naturalized U.S. citizens. The government erroneously approved his application after he turned eighteen, issuing a certificate stating he "became a citizen." However, Lall had not met the statutory requirements for citizenship. The error was discovered shortly after issuance, but the government waited twenty-one years to cancel the certificate. Lall, incarcerated at the time, filed a declaratory judgment action seeking recognition of his citizenship.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed Lall's declaratory judgment action, finding he never obtained citizenship. Concurrently, the government initiated removal proceedings, and an Immigration Judge (IJ) ordered Lall's removal, rejecting his claim to citizenship. Lall appealed both the District Court's dismissal and the IJ's removal order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Lall never satisfied the statutory requirements for citizenship under the relevant sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as they existed in 1991. The court emphasized that a Certificate of Citizenship is only prima facie evidence of citizenship and does not confer citizenship if statutory requirements are unmet. The court also ruled that equitable estoppel could not be used to confer citizenship, as courts lack the power to grant citizenship contrary to statutory requirements. Consequently, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal of Lall's declaratory judgment action and denied his petition for review of the IJ's removal order. View "Lall v. USICE" on Justia Law

Eucineia Soares da Silva Pazine, a Brazilian national, sought asylum in the United States, claiming she faced persecution from her husband, Lucas Luiz Pazine, and his associates. She testified that her husband was abusive, both physically and emotionally, and that after she left him and returned to Brazil with their children, she continued to receive threats from his cousin Dulce and his lawyers. These threats included surveillance and attempts to coerce her into giving up custody of her children and her property.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found her testimony credible but denied her asylum claim, stating that the abuse she suffered in the United States did not qualify as persecution under asylum law, which requires harm to occur in the applicant's home country. The IJ also concluded that the threats from Dulce and the lawyers were motivated by a personal dispute over custody and property, not by her membership in a particular social group (PSG) such as "Brazilian Women." Consequently, the IJ denied her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's decision, agreeing that there was no nexus between the harm she feared and a protected ground under asylum law. The BIA found no clear error in the IJ's determination that the threats were related to a personal dispute rather than her membership in a PSG. The BIA also declined to address her new "pattern or practice" theory of persecution, as it was not raised before the IJ.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and denied the petition for review. The court found that substantial evidence supported the agency's no-nexus finding, concluding that the threats from Dulce and the lawyers were primarily motivated by personal disputes over custody and property, not by her gender or membership in a PSG. The court also noted that the BIA correctly applied the "one central reason" standard in its analysis. View "Pazine v. Garland" on Justia Law

Zohaib Zia, a citizen of Pakistan, entered the United States as a conditional permanent resident based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen, Anum Haq. After their marriage ended in divorce, Zia sought a waiver to remove the conditions on his residency, claiming the marriage was entered into in good faith. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied his petition, finding the marriage was not in good faith, and terminated his conditional status. The Department of Homeland Security then issued a notice to appear, charging him as removable. Zia renewed his petition before an Immigration Judge (IJ), who also denied it, citing an adverse credibility finding and insufficient evidence of a good faith marriage.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing with the adverse credibility determination and finding the remaining evidence insufficient to prove a good faith marriage. Zia appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the BIA erred in its findings and that his due process rights were violated due to an incomplete hearing transcript.The Ninth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the adverse credibility finding, as such factual determinations are unreviewable under Patel v. Garland. The court also found that while it had limited jurisdiction to review the good faith marriage determination as a mixed question of fact and law, the BIA's decision was not in error. The court concluded that Zia's testimony was of little weight due to the adverse credibility finding, and the remaining evidence did not compel a reversal. Additionally, the court rejected Zia's due process claim, finding no prejudice from the incomplete transcript. The petition for review was dismissed in part and denied in part. View "ZIA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Victor Meza-Carmona, born in Mexico to a U.S. citizen mother, Victoria, claimed U.S. citizenship based on his mother's status. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1952), Victoria could transmit citizenship to him only if she had been physically present in the U.S. for a continuous period of one year before his birth. Victoria was born in Los Angeles and baptized in El Paso, Texas, but later moved to Mexico. The case hinges on whether Victoria met the continuous physical presence requirement.The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Meza-Carmona in 2012. An immigration judge ordered his removal, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal. Meza-Carmona then petitioned for review. The Ninth Circuit transferred the case to the District of Arizona to resolve factual disputes about his citizenship claim. The district court found that Meza-Carmona failed to prove his mother's continuous physical presence in the U.S. for one year before his birth.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's findings. The court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) requires a person claiming citizenship to show that their mother stayed in the U.S. for one year without leaving. The Ninth Circuit found that the district court did not clearly err in determining that Meza-Carmona failed to establish his mother's continuous presence. The evidence allowed for either inference—that Victoria stayed continuously in the U.S. or that she did not. Given the record, the district court's conclusion was not clear error. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit denied Meza-Carmona's petition for review. View "MEZA-CARMONA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Collins Enyong Aben, a native and citizen of Cameroon, entered the United States without valid entry documents and was placed in removal proceedings. He sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming persecution due to his political opinion and membership in several particular social groups. Aben testified that he was targeted by the Cameroonian military for treating separatist fighters as a nurse, leading to multiple arrests, beatings, and death threats.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all relief, citing the Third-Country Transit Bar and doubting Aben's credibility due to inconsistencies in his testimony. The IJ also found that Aben failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, and that his harm was not politically motivated but due to his occupation as a nurse. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Aben's appeal, assuming his credibility but agreeing with the IJ that he did not establish past persecution or a nexus to a protected ground. The BIA also found that Aben failed to corroborate his claims and that changed country conditions in Cameroon undermined his fear of future persecution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court found that the BIA failed to address key evidence, including credible death threats and the imputation of a political opinion to Aben. The court held that the BIA's determinations regarding past persecution, nexus, and corroboration were not supported by substantial evidence. The court vacated the BIA's decision on Aben's asylum and withholding of removal claims and remanded for further proceedings. However, the court denied the petition for review regarding Aben's CAT claim, finding that he had forfeited any challenge to the BIA's determination on that issue. View "Aben v. Garland" on Justia Law

Edson Pires Rosa, a citizen of Cape Verde, entered the U.S. on a visitor visa in 2015, which expired later that year. His mother, a lawful permanent resident, filed a petition for him, which was approved, but his subsequent application for adjustment of status was denied. In 2019, Rosa was accused of participating in a sexual assault, leading to a police report and a pending criminal charge. Despite his denial of the allegations, he was placed in removal proceedings for overstaying his visa. Rosa applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and voluntary departure.The Immigration Judge (IJ) initially denied Rosa's asylum and withholding of removal applications but granted voluntary departure. Rosa appealed the denial of asylum and withholding of removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which remanded the case to consider his adjustment of status application after his mother became a U.S. citizen. On remand, a new IJ denied his adjustment of status and voluntary departure requests, citing the pending criminal charge as a significant negative factor. Rosa appealed to the BIA, which upheld the IJ's decision, finding no error in the reliance on the police report and pending charge.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA erred in deeming Rosa's challenge to the voluntary departure denial as waived and vacated the BIA's decision on both adjustment of status and voluntary departure. The court remanded the case to the BIA to reconsider these issues, particularly whether the police report and pending charge alone could justify the denial of discretionary relief without corroborating evidence, as required by precedent. View "Rosa v. Garland" on Justia Law