Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Madar was born in communist-ruled Czechoslovakia in 1964, entered the U.S. in 1991, and overstayed. He has litigated his legal status in the decades since his arrival. Madar sought a declaration that he is a U.S. citizen because his late father, Jozef, was a citizen, and his father’s citizenship transmitted to him. Madar’s paternal grandmother, Cikovsky, was born in 1906 in Ohio. As a teenager, she left the U.S. to settle in Czechoslovakia. She married there and gave birth to Jozef in 1940. Jozef never lived in the U.S., married a non-U.S. citizen in Czechoslovakia and had children there. Jozef knew of his mother’s American birth, but did not know that this might entitle him to citizenship. In his son’s immigration proceedings, Jozef swore in an affidavit that the political circumstances of post-war Czechoslovakia would have made compliance with requirements that foreign-born children of citizens be physically present in the U.S. for some amount of time to retain citizenship, difficult, if not impossible. The Third Circuit affirmed that even if Jozef had retained his citizenship under an equitable theory that excused his noncompliance with statutory physical presence requirements, he did not transmit that citizenship to his son. View "Madar v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit vacated the BIA's final order denying petitioner's motion to reopen removal proceedings. Petitioner claimed that she never received notice of her removal hearing. The court held that the BIA abused its discretion in refusing to reopen petitioner's removal proceedings where petitioner satisfied her obligation to provide a new address to the "Attorney General" by notifying ICE of her change of address. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Fuentes-Pena v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision holding petitioner inadmissible because he falsely represented himself as a citizen when applying for a Georgia driver's license. Petitioner argued that he simply checked the wrong box, and that citizenship did not affect the application. The court held that it did not have jurisdiction to review petitioner's claim because it was a factual matter regarding whether he checked the wrong box and thus lacked the requisite subjective intent to trigger the statute. The court also held that it did not have to defer to the Board's interpretation of Matter of Richmond, 26 I. & N. Dec. 779, 786–87 (BIA 2016), finding a materiality element in 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I). Rather, the statute did not require that citizenship be material to the purpose or benefit sought. View "Patel v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower courts denying Appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief on the basis that his attorney provided deficient performance that prejudiced him, holding that counsel rendered ineffective assistance to Appellant by failing to properly advise him about the immigration consequences of a misdemeanor guilty plea.Appellant pleaded guilty to stealing less than twenty dollars of merchandise from Walmart without realizing that his guilty plea made him a deportable felon under federal immigration law. Appellant sought post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The lower courts denied relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellant’s attorney rendered constitutionally deficient performance as a matter of law by independently marking “N/A” next to the citizenship advisement on the standard advisement of rights from before inquiring into Appellant’s citizenship status; and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced Appellant. View "Bobadilla v. State" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court held that substantial evidence in the administrative record supported the BIA's finding that petitioner and his son failed to prove past persecution.The court held that petitioner failed to establish an objective nexus between fear of future persecution and a protected ground. Although petitioner claimed a well-founded fear on account of his Mam ethnicity, the BIA found insufficient proof that the harm his family suffered during the guerilla conflict was due to their ethnicity, no evidence that private persons who claimed the family's land after they fled to Mexico acted on account of their ethnicity, and no evidence of a pattern or practice against Mam people in Guatemala. Furthermore, claims of fear of future persecution by the Zetas was not related to a protected ground. View "Martin v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal. The court held that petitioner's conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. 1956(h) is an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(D). The court also held that the IJ's reliance on the forfeiture order was appropriate, and the IJ did not commit clear error in finding that the government established that petitioner laundered more than $10,000 by clear and convincing evidence. View "Barikyan v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's grant of DHS's motion to pretermit petitioner's cancellation of removal application. At issue was whether petitioner's Nebraska criminal attempt conviction qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude. Petitioner's plea arose from his use of a fraudulent social security card to obtain employment.The court held that the criminal impersonation statute underlying petitioner's attempt conviction was a divisible statute. The court applied the modified categorical approach, but was unable to determine which subsection under which petitioner was convicted. The court explained that petitioner had the burden of establishing his eligibility for cancellation of removal, and because he failed to meet his burden, the court upheld the Board's determination that he has not shown such eligibility. View "Pereida v. Barr" on Justia Law

Petitioner Abdulla Gutale was an immigrant who pleaded guilty to the crime of sex abuse in the third degree. He alleged in a petition for post-conviction relief that his trial counsel had failed to inform him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea to a class A misdemeanor and, through that omission, led petitioner to believe that there would be no immigration consequences. Based on that alleged failure, petitioner asserted that his trial counsel was constitutionally inadequate and ineffective under the state and federal constitutions. His petition was filed outside the two-year limitations period, but petitioner alleged that his petition fell within an escape clause because he could not reasonably have known of his grounds for post-conviction relief within the limitations period because neither trial counsel nor the sentencing court gave him any indication that his plea could carry immigration consequences, even when petitioner stated, on the record, that he was pleading guilty in part because he wished to travel and become a United States citizen. Petitioner alleged that he learned of counsel’s inadequacy only when he was placed in deportation proceedings, after the statute of limitations had run. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as time-barred under ORS 138.510(3). The Court of Appeals affirmed, based on the principle that “persons are assumed to know laws that are publicly available and relevant to them,” including relevant immigration law. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the post-conviction court and the Court of Appeals: "Our conclusion that the subject of the reasonable- ness inquiry in ORS 138.510(3) is an unrepresented petitioner, rather than counsel, is significant. Although counsel may be responsible for knowing that there may be immigration consequences to a criminal conviction, we do not presume that to be the case for an individual petitioner, unless there is a factual basis for concluding that the petitioner knew that there may be immigration consequences to his or her conviction." View "Gutale v. Oregon" on Justia Law

The Oregon Supreme Court allowed review of two cases this case, and Gutale v. Oregon, 395 P3d 942 (2017), requiring it to interpret the meaning and scope of the "escape clause" found in ORS 138.510(3). In both cases, petitioners alleged that their trial counsels were constitutionally ineffective and inadequate under the state and federal constitutions, based on the failure of those attorneys to provide petitioners with information regarding the immigration consequences of their guilty pleas. And petitioners in both cases alleged that their claims fell within the escape clause because they learned of their counsel’s inadequacy only when they were put in deportation proceedings after the statute of limitations had run. Both petitioners argued that they should not have been presumed to know the law any sooner than that. In this case (but not in Gutale), petitioner Ricardo Perez-Rodriquez was told at the time of his plea that there might be immigration consequences to his conviction, even though he was not told that there certainly would be immigration consequences. Furthermore, in this case (but not in Gutale), petitioner alleged that his mental illness and intellectual disability prevented him from knowing that he had a claim for post-conviction relief within the two-year limitations period. The state moved to dismiss, arguing that the laws underlying petitioner’s claim were reasonably available to him. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as time-barred under ORS 138.510(3). The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. Finding no error in this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and the post-conviction court. View "Perez-Rodriguez v. Oregon" on Justia Law

Santos-Santos, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1999. In 2000, he and his wife attempted to enter Canada but were denied admission and directed back to Port Huron, where they were questioned. Both admitted to entering the U.S. illegally. The Immigration and Naturalization Service personally served Santos-Santos with a notice to appear (NTA), charging him with inadmissibility and ordering him to appear for a hearing in Detroit. The NTA listed his Chicago address and indicated that the hearing date and time were “to be determined.” On May 24, the Detroit immigration court mailed a Notice of Hearing for October 20, to the Chicago address. Santos-Santos failed to appear and was ordered removed in absentia. The order was mailed to the same address. Santos-Santos claims he did not receive that order. In 2018, Santos-Santos moved to reopen the in absentia order, stating he did not receive any notices after the NTA. The BIA upheld the denial of the motion, finding no evidence that the mailings were returned to the immigration court; Santos-Santos did not argue that the notice was addressed incorrectly or that he was having mail delivery problems or report any efforts to determine the status of his proceedings during 17 years before his motion. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. Santos-Santos failed to rebut the presumption of delivery. View "Santos-Santos v. Barr" on Justia Law