Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review of the the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's determination that petitioner was removable because she was convicted of a drug offense. Petitioner argued that she was not removable because she was convicted for possessing a small amount of marijuana for personal use. The court held that the BIA's interpretation of 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)'s personal-use exception was reasonable. Applying the BIA's circumstances-specific approach, the court held that petitioner's conviction did not fall within the personal-use exception. In this case, substantial evidence supported the BIA's findings that petitioner possessed 54.6 pounds of marijuana—substantially more than the personal-use exception’s 30-gram threshold. View "Cardoso de Flores v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for DHS in an action challenging DHS's authority to expedite construction of border barriers near San Diego and Calexico, California. On January 25, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13,767, directing federal agencies to deploy all lawful means to secure the Nation's southern border. A focal point of the directive was to immediately construct a physical wall.As a threshold matter, the panel held that it had jurisdiction to consider the "predicate legal question" of whether the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) authorizes the contested projects. On the merits, the panel held that IIRIRA section 102(a)'s broad grant of authority, which was not limited by section 102(b), authorized the construction projects. The panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to DHS, holding that the projects were statutorily authorized and therefore not ultra vires. The panel also held that DHS has waived the environmental laws California and environmental groups sought to enforce. Furthermore, the panel lacked jurisdiction to consider any argument challenging the Secretary of DHS's August and September 2017 waivers of applicable environmental laws. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Delhorno, age 42, came to the U.S. with his parents when he was three years old. Living as a lawful permanent resident, he was pulled over for speeding. A drug-detection canine alerted to the presence of drugs. Officers discovered four kilograms of cocaine in a trap compartment. Delhorno pleaded guilty to possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. His hearing was more than a year after the Supreme Court held (Padilla v. Kentucky), that a defense lawyer provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to advise his client that his guilty plea would subject him to automatic deportation. Although the judge was informed of his status, there was no discussion about the immigration consequences of Delhorno’s guilty plea. Delhorno was sentenced to 60 months. Delhorno never filed an appeal or a habeas corpus petition. In 2017, Delhorno completed his prison sentence and was deported to Mexico. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Delhorno's petition for a writ of coram nobis without a hearing. The common-law remedy of coram nobis is available to correct errors in criminal cases, only when the error is of the most fundamental character as to render the conviction invalid, there are sound reasons for the defendant’s failure to seek earlier relief, and the defendant continues to suffer from his conviction although he is out of custody. Delhorno cannot offer “sound reasons” for failing to seek earlier relief through a direct appeal or habeas corpus petition. View "United States v. Delhorno" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of a final order of removal following the dismissal of petitioner's appeal by the BIA. Petitioner was convicted of communication with a minor for immoral purposes in violation of Revised Code of Washington 9.68A.090, and an IJ found that petitioner's conviction constituted a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years of admission to the United States. Therefore, petitioner was removeable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).The panel held that, in assessing the constitutional status of the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude," it was bound by the Supreme Court's decision in Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), which held that the phrase was not unconstitutionally vague. The panel also held that the Supreme Court's more recent decisions in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), and Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), did not reopen inquiry into the constitutionality of the phrase. Furthermore, petitioner's alternate claim that communicating with a minor for immoral purposes was not a crime of moral turpitude was foreclosed by the panel's decision in Morales v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2007). View "Islas-Veloz v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit granted a petition for review of an order of removal, holding that the BIA applied the wrong standard of review. The court held that, whether petitioner established that the government would acquiesce in his torture under 8 C.F.R. 1208.16(c)(2) was a mixed question of law and fact, and the IJ's determination that the evidence did not meet the relevant standard was a legal judgment subject to de novo review by the Board. Accordingly, the court remanded for the Board to review the IJ's determination under the proper standard. View "Cruz-Quintanilla v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted in part a petition for panel rehearing, vacated the prior opinion in this case, and substituted the following opinion. Petitioner sought review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal.The court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA's finding that petitioner was convicted under Fla. Stat. 893.13(1)(a) (possession with intent to deliver), and not section 893.13(6)(a) (simple possession). Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction under Immigration and Nationality Act section 242 to grant petitioner relief on this claim and dismissed the petition for review in part.The court held that DHS was not required to file a cross-appeal to advance its controlled substance argument on appeal to the BIA, and the BIA did not err in considering that argument. The court also held that Flunitrazepam is a controlled substance, and the BIA did not err in denying petitioner's motion for a remand to pursue a section 212(h) waiver. Accordingly, the court denied the petition in part. View "Bula Lopez v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence of 111 days and 3 years of supervised release after he pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful use of identification documents. The court held that the district court's decision to impose supervised release was both consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines and an appropriate exercise of the district court's wide latitude in determining a sentence. In this case, the conditions of defendant's supervised release specified if he were removed or deported, he could not reenter the United States without permission, but he would not be on active supervision while he was outside the country. View "United States v. Hernandez-Loera" on Justia Law

The temporary, ex parte emergency order presented by plaintiff did not qualify as a predicate state court custody order for the special immigrant juvenile application. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and held that it properly concluded that the USCIS did not impose an ultra vires requirement for permanent custody orders within the SIJ application process. Therefore, the agency did not act arbitrarily, capriciously or contrary to law, or abuse its discretion in determining that plaintiff failed to present a qualifying predicate order in support of his SIJ petition. Finally, the court held that the Full Faith and Credit Act was inapplicable under the facts presented in this case. View "Perez v. Cissna" on Justia Law

In Belarus, Ruderman experience discrimination and violence because of his Jewish heritage. His father, a documentary filmmaker, died while filming a piece on government corruption and had previously been detained and battered by the KGB. Ruderman fled to the U.S. at age 19, in 2001, under the Lautenberg Amendment, which lowers barriers to immigration for certain former Soviet nationals, 8 U.S.C. 1157. Shortly after arriving he was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and sentenced to court supervision. He found work and got married. In 2008, Ruderman struck and killed a pedestrian while driving drunk. He pleaded guilty to homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle and was sentenced to five years in prison. Following his release, he worked until the government denied his adjustment‐of‐status application, causing his work permit to expire. The government then began removal proceedings. The IJ concluded that Ruderman was statutorily inadmissible because of his two convictions and denied Ruderman’s applications for a waiver of inadmissibility, adjustment of status under the Lautenberg Amendment, cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The BIA dismissed Ruderman’s appeal. The Seventh Circuit remanded the question of whether Ruderman is statutorily inadmissible. It is unclear why the BIA concluded that Ruderman waived his argument that the inadmissibility statute applies only when two or more convictions each result in a sentence to confinement. View "Ruderman v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

A notice to appear that does not specify the time and date of an alien's initial removal hearing vests an immigration judge with jurisdiction over the removal proceedings, so long as a notice of hearing specifying this information is later sent to the alien in a timely manner. The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner relief from removal. In this case, because the charging document satisfied the regulatory requirements, the panel held that the IJ had jurisdiction over the removal proceedings. The panel also noted that petitioner had actual notice of the hearings through multiple follow-up notices that provided the date and time of each hearing. View "Karingithi v. Whitaker" on Justia Law