Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a citizen of the United Kingdom and a lawful U.S. permanent resident, was convicted of two counts of rape in 2011 under Ohio law. He was charged as removable for being convicted of an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which lists rape as an aggravated felony, but it does not define the term. An IJ found held that Petitioner was removable without eligibility for relief. Petitioner argued in his appeal to the BIA that his Ohio conviction is not an aggravated felony because Ohio’s definition of rape includes digital penetration, whereas the federal law does not. The BIA disagreed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that the Fifth Circuit and the BIA previously considered this question. The BIA reversed course in Petitioner’s case. A conviction for rape in Ohio can be committed by digital penetration, whereas the aggravated felony of rape under the Immigration and Nationality Act cannot; the Ohio conviction does not categorically fit within the federal definition, and Petitioner’s conviction is not an aggravated felony. View "Keeley v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's decision affirming his order of removal and an IJ's denial of waiver of the joint filing requirement to remove the conditions on his permanent resident status on the grounds that his marriage had not been entered in good faith. The Second Circuit held that, although the underlying factual findings were subject to clear error review, whether the evidence satisfied a petitioner's burden to prove entitlement to a good faith marriage waiver was a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review. Therefore, the court remanded in part because the BIA applied only clear error review.Petitioner also sought review of the denial of his motion to reopen and reconsider. The court held that petitioner's argument was abandoned because he failed to assert a meaningful challenge to the BIA's denial of reopening and reconsideration. Therefore, the court denied in part. View "Alom v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

Hernandez-Perez, a Mexican citizen, has lived in the U.S. since 2000. His daughter, L., is a 17-year-old U.S. citizen. Hernandez-Perez has some criminal history, mostly “misdemeanor traffic offenses” but has maintained steady employment despite a handicap. In 2011, Hernandez-Perez was placed in removal proceedings and sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(D), arguing that, if he were removed, L. would face “permanent family separation.” After that application was denied, Hernandez-Perez, alleged his family circumstances changed because he learned that an eight-year-old U.S. citizen, A.W., whose mother is not his wife, might be his son. A.W.’s mother was incarcerated and his grandfather, who had custody, was seriously ill. Hernandez-Perez had a DNA test performed, which confirmed the relationship. He filed a motion to reopen based on hardship to A.W. The BIA denied the motion because Hernandez-Perez had not established that the new evidence was previously unavailable, and the evidence did not establish prima facie eligibility for cancellation of removal. The Sixth Circuit granted a petition for review and remanded, first holding that it had jurisdiction because the motion “raised a new hardship ground not decided in the original decision.” Because the BIA must accept as true Hernandez-Perez’s allegations, there is no reasonable basis to conclude that the genetic evidence could have been obtained in 2015. The BIA erred in determining that the newly submitted evidence was previously available and did not consider all of the facts. View "Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit joined the Second, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits in holding that the decision of whether to certify a claim under 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(c) is committed to agency discretion. Petitioner, a Pakistani national, sought review of the BIA's decision declining to certify, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(c), his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. The panel dismissed the appeal of the failure to certify petitioner's claim and held that it did not have jurisdiction to review the IJ and BIA's decision not to certify. The panel denied petitioner's due process claim challenging the same lack of certification, holding that abuse of discretion challenges to discretionary decisions, even if recast as due process claims, do not constitute colorable constitutional claims. View "Idrees v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an action brought by the State of Texas, seeking a declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. 2201 that SB 4 -- which curbs sanctuary city policies by requiring law enforcement agencies to comply with, honor, and fulfill federal immigration detainer requests -- does not violate the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments and is not preempted by federal law.Although the district court held that Texas lacked Article III standing to seek declaratory judgment, the court held that the district court lacked federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 in light of Franchise Tax Board of the State of California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California, 463 U.S. 1 (1983). In Franchise Tax Board, the Supreme Court held that section 1331's grant of federal question jurisdiction does not encompass suits by the States to declare the validity of their regulation despite possibly conflicting federal law. The court explained that Franchise Tax Board reinforces comity among federal and state courts and mandates that the court dismiss Texas's declaratory relief action. View "Texas v. Travis County" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s appeal of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying her request for deferral of removal under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding holding that the BIA’s factual determinations were supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on the record.Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, sought deferral of removal under the CAT, basing her claim on domestic abuse that she suffered at the hands of her partner of fifteen years. An immigration judge (IJ) found Petitioner to be credible in describing her abuse and granted deferral of removal. The BIA reversed the IJ’s determination, noting that the IJ applied an incorrect legal standard. The BIA then concluded that Petitioner did not meet her burden of establishing that the government had acquiesced in her harm or would be more likely than not to do so if she were to return. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the BIA did not err in finding that Petitioner had not established that the government would acquiesce in her harm upon removal. View "Ruiz-Guerrero v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's order denying their claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court held that even if the IJ committed procedural error by stopping petitioner's counsel from proposing a particular social group, petitioner failed to demonstrate any resulting prejudice. Furthermore, there was no violation of due process where the IJ's conduct in this case did not show a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that precluded fair judgment. Finally, petitioner's claims regarding humanitarian asylum and ineffective assistance of counsel were raised for the first time in the petition and thus the court lacked jurisdiction over the claims. View "Gutierrez Molina v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition seeking judicial review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his application for asylum, holding that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination that Petitioner was not entitled to asylum.Petitioner premised his asylum application on a claim that he had been persecuted in the past, and feared future persecution, by gang members on account of of his political opinion and/or membership in a particular social group. The immigration judge (IJ) rejected Petitioner’s request for asylum. The BIA upheld the IJ’s findings, determining that Petitioner had failed to establish a nexus between the harm that he described and any statutorily protected ground for asylum status. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for judicial review, holding that Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2009), controlled the outcome of this case, requiring that this Court uphold the BIA’s determination. View "Mendez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Liao, a citizen of China, became a lawful U.S. permanent resident in 2005. In 2015, Liao had a physical altercation with his girlfriend, Yu. A neighbor called the police. Yu told responding officers that she was holding her infant son, J.Y., while Liao struck her, but that J.Y. was not “hit or hurt.” She said, however, that during the fight, J.Y. was placed on the bed and fell to the floor. Officers arrested Liao, charging him with three offenses, including endangering the welfare of a child, Pa. Cons. Stat. 4304(a)(1). Liao was convicted and served 106 days of his prison sentence. An IJ ordered Liao’s removal for committing “a crime of domestic violence, a crime of stalking, or a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment,” which rendered him removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). The Third Circuit granted a petition for review and remanded to the BIA, reasoning that the elements of his conviction do not match the elements of the crime of “child abuse” under federal law, which requires a specified risk of harm that rises above conduct that creates only the bare potential for non-serious harm. The Pennsylvania child endangerment statute in effect at the time of Liao’s conviction did not require such a risk. View "Liao v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's determination that petitioner was removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) based on his commission of a crime involving moral turpitude within five years of his admission to the United States. The court explained that it was DHS's burden to affirmatively prove (by clear and convincing evidence) that petitioner last entered in 2000 without inspection, and was therefore not admitted until 2008, because this determined whether his 2012 felony abduction offense fell within the five-year window for removability. The court held that DHS failed to prove that petitioner was admitted in 2008. In this case, the record contained essentially unrebutted evidence showing that petitioner was in Peru from 1999 to 2001, and that he presented himself for inspection and was allowed to enter the United States at Reagan National Airport in 2002 (whether on a visa or otherwise). View "Mauricio-Vasquez v. Whitaker" on Justia Law