Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's grant of summary judgment to the United States on Petitioner's claims brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and to the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department (SCSD) on Petitioner's claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act (RHA), 29 U.S.C. 794, and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to Petitioner's FTCA claims.Petitioner filed this action setting forth FTCA claims against the United States based on the treatment to which he was allegedly subjected while he was in immigration custody, as well as claims brought under the RHA and the ADA based on the alleged discrimination against him owing to his disability during his detention. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The First Circuit vacated the judgment in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in granting summary judgment to the United States as it pertained to Petitioner's FTCA claims; but (2) did not err in awarding summary judgment to SCSD on Petitioner's RHA and ADA claims. View "Thiersaint v. Dep't of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioners' petitions seeking judicial review of two decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) - one affirming an immigration judge's (IJ) denial of their application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and the other denying Petitioners' motion to reopen their proceedings, holding that Petitioners were not entitled to relief.Petitioners applied for relief from removal based on China's politics, specifically persecution by Chinese officials seeking to enforce China's Family Planning Policy, which was in effect when Petitioners first entered the United States. The IJ denied Petitioners' application, concluding that they failed to meet their burden of proof. The BIA dismissed Petitioners' appeal. The First Circuit denied Petitioners' petitions for review, holding that there was substantial evidence to support the agency's decisions in this case. View "M.S.C. v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a twenty-three-year-old Guatemalan citizen who fears returning to his home country. Petitioner believed that, due to the large and interconnected network of gang members in the country, nowhere in Guatemala was safe for him. At age seventeen, Petitioner left Guatemala and came to the United States. The Attorney General initiated removal proceedings against him. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. He claimed that he was persecuted on account of his membership in the social group “Guatemalan children who are witnesses of gang crime.” The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied each of his applications. The BIA rejected Petitioner’s applications for asylum and withholding of removal because Petitioner failed to identify a cognizable particular social group. Specifically, the BIA concluded that his proposed group lacked particularity because the term “children” is “vague and amorphous,” and the broader group of “witnesses to gang crime” lacked social distinction. Petitioner appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained Petitioner’s proposed social group fails for lack of social distinction. The court explained that if it grants Petitioner the benefit of the broader definition of “children,” the proposed social group is, in effect, all Guatemalan “witnesses to gang crime.” Petitioner did not introduce evidence establishing that Guatemalan society “in general perceives, considers, or recognizes persons sharing the particular characteristic” of gang crime witnesses as a distinct group. Accordingly, the court explained that because Petitioner failed to establish membership in a cognizable particular social group, the BIA did not err in denying his applications for asylum and withholding of removal. View "Cesar Pacheco-Mota v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

The San Bernardino County District Attorney (the District Attorney) appealed a trial court order granting Karla Coca’s petition under Penal Code section 1473.7 to vacate a misdemeanor conviction. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded Coca failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that “the conviction . . . being challenged is currently causing or has the potential to cause removal or the denial of an application for an immigration benefit, lawful status, or naturalization.” The Court accordingly reversed the order. View "California v. Coca" on Justia Law

On July 6, 2023, the Fourth Circuit granted Petitioner's petition for review, reversed the agency’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal, and remanded with instructions to grant Petitioner's application. The Attorney General filed a petition for panel hearing, claiming that the Immigration and Nationality Act and implementing regulations require that the Attorney General make a discretionary judgment as to whether asylum should be granted, even where a noncitizen has met the statutory requirements.The Fourth Circuit agreed. The power to grant asylum is vested solely in the hands of the Attorney General and, even if a noncitizen is otherwise eligible, the Attorney General is empowered by statute to deny relief. While discretionary denials of asylum are exceedingly rare Petitioner's claim that there are no grounds to deny asylum as a matter of discretion must first be considered by the Attorney General. View "Shaker Ullah v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for panel rehearing, and denied a petition for rehearing en banc, in a case in which the panel: (1) reversed a judgment of the district court granting Petitioner's habeas petition challenging his continued immigration detention after an initial bond hearing; and (2) held that due process does not require a second bond hearing.Judge Paez issued a statement regarding the court's denial. Judge Paez joined by Judges Murguia, Wardlaw, Gould, Berzon, Koh, Sung, Sanchez, H.A. Thomas, Mendoza, and Desai, wrote that the panel opinion conflicts with Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011). View "AROLDO RODRIGUEZ DIAZ V. MERRICK GARLAND, ET AL" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the decision of the immigration judge (IJ) to deny Petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that the IJ's and BIA's decisions were supported by substantial evidence.Petitioner, a member of Ecuador's Quchua indigenous group, went before the IJ seeking to avoid removal through applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. The IJ denied all three forms of relief and ordered Petitioner's removal to Ecuador. The BIA affirmed the IJ's denial of relief on the merits. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Petitioner's application for asylum was appropriately denied, and therefore, withholding of removal was also appropriately denied. View "Caz v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision (1) affirming an Immigration Judge’s denial of his application for cancellation of removal and (2) denying his motion to remand. The BIA rejected Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, declined No. 21-6043 2 to remand for consideration of additional hardship relating to his cancellation application, and declined to remand to await adjudication of his U visa application. Petitioner argued that the BIA (1) applied an incorrect standard when reviewing his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, (2) overlooked and mischaracterized his new hardship evidence, and (3) failed to follow precedent when denying his request for remand while awaiting the adjudication of his U visa application.   The Second Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review, vacated the BIA’s decision and remanded. The court explained that it agrees with Petitioner that the BIA improperly imposed a heightened standard when evaluating whether Petitioner was prejudiced by prior counsel’s deficient performance. The court explained that on remand, the BIA should differentiate between two types of hardship evidence presented by Petitioner in his appeal and motion to remand: (1) hardship evidence that was available to prior counsel and (2) evidence that was not previously available to prior counsel, for which Petitioner must show that the evidence “would likely change the result in the case.” View "Paucar v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 2016, Nerio and her minor daughter sought admission to the U.S. without the required authorization. They applied for asylum and withholding of removal based on Nerio’s fear that her partner’s nephew, Walter, would harm them if they returned. Nerio testified that she and her partner, Yuny, have been together for 10 years. Around a year after they met, Nerio became pregnant. Yuny left Guatemala in 2009, but Nerio continued living with, and later near, Yuny’s family. Walter considered her as his “inferior” based on Nerio’s indigenous heritage, refusing to treat her as family. She further testified that around 2015, Walter began trying to physically harm her. Twice that year, he tried to hit her with his motorcycle. In February 2016, he shot at her with a rifle. Nerio obtained a protective order but did not press criminal charges because of family pressure.The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of relief, finding that substantial evidence supports the immigration judge’s determination that Nerio failed to establish that the Guatemalan government is unable or unwilling to protect her. The IJ reasonably weighed the generalized country conditions report against Nerio’s specific testimony. View "Nerio Perez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Board of Immigration Appeals ruled that Petitioner is removable as an aggravated felon and denied his requests for asylum and withholding of removal. Petitioner petitions for review, arguing that his Massachusetts conviction for armed robbery does not constitute a “theft offense” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(a)(43)(G) and therefore is not an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).   The Eleventh Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition in part and granted in part. The court rejected Petitioner’s argument that armed robbery does not constitute a “theft offense” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(a)(43)(G). However, the court agreed with the parties that a remand to the BIA is nevertheless required. The Attorney General has issued an intervening decision that might impact Petitioner’s request for withholding of removal, and the BIA should have the opportunity to consider the effect of that decision. The court wrote that Petitioner was sentenced to less than five years in prison. His aggravated felony conviction, therefore, does not per se constitute a particularly serious crime with respect to withholding of removal. View "Mucktaru Kemokai v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law