Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit dismissed, based on lack of jurisdiction, a petition for review of the BIA's denial of petitioner's motion to terminate asylum-only proceedings and denial of his application for asylum. Petitioner entered the United States in 2000 pursuant to the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), but the INS issued a notice in 2002 concluding that he was removable and had waived his right to contest his removeability as a VWP entrant after he was arrested for credit card fraud. As part of his plea agreement in the credit card prosecution, petitioner agreed to testify against his co-conspirators, in exchange for help resolving his immigration status. Petitioner was issued an I-94 Departure Record, paroling him into the United States for "significant public interest," so he could testify against his co-conspirators. After petitioner's parole had expired, DHS took him into custody pursuant to his 2002 removal order and petitioner then requested asylum.The panel held that the 2002 removal order was executed when petitioner briefly departed the United States in 2004. Because the 2002 order had already been executed when petitioner entered the United States in 2004, he was no longer an applicant under the VWP, but an applicant for admission. Therefore, there was no final removal order over which the court had jurisdiction. View "Nicusor-Remus v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Petitioner and her children petitioned for review of the BIA's order denying their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court held that there was no legal error as to petitioner's petition and that substantial evidence supported the Board's decision that her proposed social group (targeted gang girlfriends or witnesses who report crimes to the police) lacked particularity and was not cognizable. Furthermore, the record did not support a conclusion that a family relationship was a central reason for petitioner's persecution, and she failed to meet her burden of proof on her CAT claim. Therefore, the court denied her petition for review. In regard to the children's petition, the court held that the record showed they presented independent applications, but the Board failed to decide the applications separately from their mother's. Therefore, the court granted their petitions for review and remanded their cases for further consideration. View "Pena De Rivas v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision and held that the Board correctly determined that petitioner was convicted of a conspiracy related to the distribution of a controlled substance; the conviction rendered him inadmissible under the Controlled Substance Provision; and he was subject to removal under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(A). The court also held that section 1229a(c)(3)(B) did not prohibit the Board from considering petitioner's indictment. Finally, the court was without jurisdiction to address a new argument to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence because petitioner did not raise it before oral argument. View "Shaw v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action, based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, brought by children to halt the deportation of their father. The children argued that their father's deportation was arbitrary and violated their rights to familial association under the First and Fifth Amendments, and that his selective removal was because of his Hispanic origin and violated the equal-protection aspect of the Fifth Amendment.The court held that the children's familial-association claim raised a legal question squarely within 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(9), which operated as an unmistakable zipper clause designed to consolidate and channel review of all legal and factual questions that arose from the removal of an alien through the preordained administrative process. Consequently, because the familial-association question reached the courts outside the prescribed administrative process, this court had no jurisdiction to consider it. The court also held that the children's selective-enforcement claim concerned how the Government chose to enforce already-issued removal orders. Therefore, these claims arose from a decision to execute removal orders and 8 U.S.C. 1252(g) generally barred judicial review of such claims. View "Vega Duron v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's decision denying petitioner's application for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court held that DHS failed to produce substantial evidence to show that petitioner, a 21 year old Sikh belonging to the Mann Party, was safely able to relocate within India to avoid further persecution and that it was reasonable for him to do so. Therefore, substantial evidence did not support the IJ's conclusion that DHS rebutted the regulatory presumption and thus the court remanded to the agency to exercise its discretion with regards to petitioner's asylum claim. View "Singh v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed defendant's conviction for unlawful reentry into the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. The panel held that defendant's prior 2008 and 2011 removals were fundamentally unfair and thus could not serve as a predicate removal for purposes of section 1326.The panel held that because the 2008 removal proceeding was in absentia, defendant satisfied the exhaustion and deprivation-of-judicial-review requirements for bringing a collateral attack on the validity of that removal. Furthermore, it was error to remove defendant for a crime of domestic violence under Immigration and Nationality Act 237(a)(2)(E)(i) based on his California battery conviction because circuit precedent established that California battery was not a categorical crime of violence. The panel also held that the due process defects in the 2008 removal proceeding infected the 2011 expedited removal for presenting invalid entry documents. In this case, the 2011 expedited removal order was also fundamentally unfair because it violated the process due to lawful permanent residents. View "United States v. Ochoa-Oregel" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, who were each over the age of 18, had filed Suits Affecting Parent-Child Relationship (SAPCR). In the SAPCR suits, the state courts awarded child support and made certain findings. After plaintiffs received the state court SAPCR orders, they filed Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status petitions with USCIS, which were subsequently denied. Plaintiffs then filed suit in district court seeking declaratory relief regarding the definition of "child" under Texas state law and the proper interpretation and application of the terms "juvenile court" and "dependent," as those terms were defined by federal law. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that the SAPCR orders were not proper ones to support SIJ status.The Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that USCIS properly determined that the state court orders for child support were not the equivalent of the necessary "care and custody" rulings required for SIJ status; the court rejected plaintiffs' claim that the district court relied on reasoning not employed by the agency when upholding the USCIS decision; and USCIS's denials were not arbitrary and capricious. The court denied plaintiffs' motion to supplement and rejected plaintiffs' claim that the district court failed to consider the entire administrative record. View "Budhathoki v. Nielsen" on Justia Law

Wang, a citizen of China, obtained lawful U.S. permanent resident status in 2010 and worked in a financial services firm. In 2011, without authorization, he purchased oil futures contracts using the firm’s trading account and transferred those contracts between firm accounts. In company records, Wang marked these contracts as closed (sold) when they were, in fact, still open. After the firm discovered the transactions, the FBI arrested Wang. The indictment alleged that, upon discovery of a loss of $2.2 million, the firm sold the contracts. Wang pleaded guilty to violating the Commodity Exchange Act by making a false report in connection with a commodities transaction, 7 U.S.C. 6b(a)(1)(B) and 13(a)(2) and was sentenced to three months in prison and ordered to pay $2.2 million in restitution. Wang was ordered removed. The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit granted a petition for review and remanded, first holding that it had authority to consider de novo whether Wang’s conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony because it is “a purely legal question.” Wang is not properly categorized as an aggravated felon under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) because crimes “involv[ing] fraud or deceit” require materiality as an element of proof and Section 6b(a)(1)(B) lacks this element. View "Wang v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Galindo, a lawful permanent U.S. resident, had Kentucky convictions for possession of drug paraphernalia and was charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). The IJ applied the categorical approach, under which an alien’s state conviction renders him removable if it “necessarily establishe[s]” a violation of federal law and the modified categorical approach, which applies if a divisible statute proscribes multiple types of conduct, some of which would constitute a removable offense. If a statute is divisible, a court may consult a limited class of documents to determine which alternative formed the basis of the conviction. The IJ determined that Galindo was not removable under the categorical approach because the Kentucky statute criminalizes paraphernalia for drugs that are not proscribed by federal law and that the modified categorical approach does not apply because the paraphernalia statute is not divisible, then terminated the removal proceedings. The BIA reversed, finding no “realistic probability” that Galindo’s conviction involved those drugs, and purported to enter a removal order. The Seventh Circuit vacated. While courts lack jurisdiction to review the BIA determination that the drug-paraphernalia convictions qualify as controlled-substance offenses and may review only a “final order of removal,” 8 U.S.C. 1252, they may vacate based on clear legal error. In this case, the IJ never made the requisite finding of removability; the Board lacked the authority to issue a removal order. View "Galindo v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Sembhi, a citizen of India, entered the U.S. in 1995 and overstayed his non-immigrant visa. Two years later, after he unsuccessfully sought asylum, Sembhi was charged as removable. Sembhi expected to obtain an I-130 visa based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen but when Sembhi appeared for a hearing in 2001, his counsel reported that his wife had obtained a default divorce. Sembhi’s counsel, Burton, indicated that Sembhi intended to explore vacating the divorce or cancellation of removal as an allegedly battered spouse or voluntary departure. The judge continued the matter. At the continued hearing Burton was present but Sembhi was not. Burton stated that he had not communicated with Sembhi in weeks despite attempts to contact him. Agreeing that Sembhi had received notice, the judge ordered Sembhi removed. More than 10 years later, Sembhi, represented by attorney Carbide, moved to reopen, blaming Burton for his failure to appear--an “exceptional circumstance.” The IJ denied Sembhi’s request. The BIA dismissed an appeal. Sembhi then acknowledged that his attorney had informed him orally of the hearing date but stated that he misunderstood the date. Before he filed this second motion, Sembhi had been married to another U.S. citizen for more than 10 years; his I-130 visa petition had been approved. After five adverse BIA decisions, Sembhi’s petition for review was denied by the Seventh Circuit. His fifth motion was late and numerically barred, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(A); Sembhi is not entitled to equitable tolling of those limitations. View "Sembhi v. Sessions" on Justia Law