Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's application for cancellation of removal. The panel held that petitioner was ineligible for relief because he was convicted of "Assault of a Child in the Third Degree – Criminal Negligence and Substantial Pain – With Sexual Motivation." The court held that petitioner's conviction was a categorical match for sexual abuse of a minor, which was an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A). The panel reasoned that it was unnecessary to decide whether to look at state law or the line of Supreme Court precedent beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), to determine what elements were part of the offense that petitioner had been convicted of, because the sexual motivation allegation constituted an element under either approach. View "Quintero-Cisneros v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's order reversing an IJ's decision to grant petitioner withholding of removal. The court held that petitioner's proposed social group consisting of "former taxi drivers from Quezaltepeque who have witnessed a gang murder" did not constitute a cognizable particular social group. The court reasoned that the proposed social group would not be perceived, considered or recognized by Salvadoran society to be a distinct social group. In this case, petitioner failed to show that he would experience future persecution on account of a protected ground and therefore he was not entitled to withholding of removal. View "Miranda v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Washtech, a union representing workers throughout the country in the STEM labor market, challenged DHS's regulations allowing nonimmigrant aliens temporarily admitted to the country as students to remain in the country for up to three years after finishing a STEM degree to pursue work related to their degree. The DC Circuit held that Washtech had standing to bring challenges to the 2016 Rule under the doctrine of competitor standing; affirmed the dismissal of Washtech's challenge to the 1992 Rule as time-barred; reversed the dismissal of Washtech's challenge in Count II (challenging DHS's statutory authority) because the district court abused its discretion in dismissing a plausible claim of relief based on Washtech's inadequate opposition to DHS's motion to dismiss; remanded as to Count II; and affirmed the district court's dismissal of Counts III (alleging procedural deficiencies) and IV (alleging rule was arbitrary and capricious) under Federal Rule of Civil procedure 12(b)(6) because neither stated a plausible claim for relief. View "Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. DHS" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied petitions for review of two decisions of the BIA dismissing petitioner's appeal from the IJ's grant of voluntary departure with an alternate order of removal, and denying reconsideration. The court held that, in these circumstances, petitioner's belated appeal to the BIA was untimely because it was filed after termination of the voluntary departure period, whether or not it was timely filed under the BIA's procedural regulations. The court reasoned that any error by the BIA in not taking up this futile appeal of the alternative removal order on the merits was harmless. View "Camick v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit joined its sister circuits and held that differentiating between two classes of legal permanent residents—those who seek a waiver from within the United States and those who seek a waiver at the border—in the 8 U.S.C. 1182(h) waiver process does not violate equal protection. Petitioner, a native and citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, sought review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal based on his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude and constituting an aggravated felony. In this opinion, the court held that the agency's interpretation of the waiver provision did not violate the Equal Protection Clause by arbitrarily distinguishing between aliens who seek a waiver of inadmissibility while within the United States from those entering the United States at its borders. View "Seepersad v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Meridor arrived in the U.S. about 25 years ago as a political refugee from Haiti and applied for political asylum. He withdrew his application after it lingered for many years. In 2013, DHS notified Meridor that he was subject to removal as a foreign national without a valid visa or passport, and because he had convictions for a crime of moral turpitude and controlled-substance offenses. Meridor applied for asylum and for withholding of removal. An IJ agreed that Meridor was removable and denied his requests for asylum and withholding of removal. Meridor moved for reconsideration, but before the IJ ruled, Meridor applied to USCIS for a U visa (available to certain crime victims). The IJ terminated his removal proceedings, and, acting as the Attorney General’s delegate, stated that she had jurisdiction over the waiver application. Before the IJ could issue a written opinion, USCIS denied Meridor’s applications for a U visa and waiver of inadmissibility. Three weeks later, the IJ granted the waiver, citing “extraordinary circumstances.” The BIA reversed the IJ’s decision, holding that only DHS can grant waivers of inadmissibility for U visa applications and that Meridor did not merit such a waiver. The Eleventh Circuit vacated. The plain language of 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(3)(A) gives IJs authority to grant waivers of inadmissibility and the BIA committed legal error in reaching its alternative holding on the merits. View "Meridor v. United States Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's application of asylum and withholding of removal. The panel held that substantial evidence supported the determination that petitioner's testimony, even if credible, was not persuasive and did not sufficiently demonstrate eligibility for refugee status; the IJ and BIA determinations that petitioner needed corroborating evidence were supported by the record; petitioner did not provide any meaningful corroborating evidence and that failure supported the denial of his applications; and petitioner had sufficient notice that corroborating evidence was required. View "Jie Shi Liu v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Macias, a six-year-old citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1976. In 1990, he was convicted of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated battery, and burglary. While in prison, he was convicted of possession of a weapon by a felon. An IJ ordered Macias removed, prohibiting Macias from returning to the U.S. for five years unless he obtained permission from the Attorney General, In 1995, Macias reentered, purportedly to care for his young son. He claims that border officers waved him into the U.S. without questioning him or asking to see travel documents. For 21 years, he made no attempt to bring his immigration status into legal compliance In 2016, Macias was arrested for aggravated DUI. DHS served him with a Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior Order of Removal. His counsel argued that Macias’s reentry was “procedurally irregular” but lawful because Macias presented himself for inspection and did not attempt to deceive anyone. An ICE deportation officer reinstated the removal order. Prosecutorial discretion was denied due to the serious nature of Macias’s past crimes, his admitted membership in the Latin Kings, and his recent arrest. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. The statute providing for reinstatement for aliens who have reentered “illegally” after previously having been removed is not ambiguous. A person who reenters without the consent of the Attorney General during the required period reenters illegally, violating 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A). View "Mendoza v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to deny Petitioner’s application for deferral of removal based on the protection to which he claimed he was entitled under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT).Petitioner, a native of Jamaica and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was charged with removability for being convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Petitioner contended that, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 1208.17, he was eligible for deferral of removal under CAT based on the fact that a gang leader in Jamaica with ties to the Jamaican police had threatened to kill him for being an informant. An immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s claim for deferral of removal. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Petitioner failed to show that he was entitled to deferral of removal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 1208.17(a). View "Morris v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Bonilla, a citizen of El Salvador, first attempted to enter the U.S. illegally in 2010 and was removed but returned. In 2017, Bonilla was arrested and found to be the subject of a removal order. He expressed a fear of persecution or torture if returned to El Salvador. Bonilla first three meetings with an asylum officer ended because Bonilla wanted his attorney present. At the fourth meeting, with his attorney present via telephone, Bonilla stated that he had been extorted by a gang in El Salvador because they thought he received money from his family in the U.S. and had light skin color. They never physically harmed or threatened him and he did not report these incidents to the police. The asylum officer issued a negative reasonable fear determination. Bonilla then appeared before an IJ. Bonilla later declared that he did not request that his attorney be present because he believed his attorney was listening on the phone; his counsel submitted a letter notifying the IJ of counsel’s error in not appearing. The IJ upheld the determination. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. Bonilla has not shown that the regulations explicitly invested him with a right to counsel at the IJ’s review hearing and Bonilla was not denied the opportunity to obtain the counsel of his choice; his attorney simply failed him. Bonilla has not shown that he suffered prejudice by the absence of his counsel. View "Bonilla v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law