Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of cancellation of removal. The panel held that petitioner's complaints of poor memory, without evidence of an inability to understand the nature and object of the proceedings, were insufficient to show mental incompetency; the standard for mental incompetency as set by the BIA in Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474 (BIA 2011), and endorsed by this court in Calderon-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 878 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2018), and Mejia v. Sessions, 868 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2017), was a stringent one; and, in this case, any memory loss petitioner may have experienced did not prejudice his immigration proceedings because his application, not his poor memory, was the basis for the IJ's denial of cancellation of removal. View "Salgado v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of an order of removal based on petitioner's conviction for possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree in violation of New York Penal Law. The court rejected petitioner's argument that 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(T) did not set forth the elements of the generic federal crime for failure to appear, because the agency's interpretation, which was contrary to petitioner's interpretation, was entitled to deference; petitioner's related mens rea argument was also without merit; a conviction for failure to appear was an aggravated felony; and thus the BIA did not err in finding that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal. View "Perez Henriquez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of an order of removal based on petitioner's conviction for possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree in violation of New York Penal Law. The court rejected petitioner's argument that 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(T) did not set forth the elements of the generic federal crime for failure to appear, because the agency's interpretation, which was contrary to petitioner's interpretation, was entitled to deference; petitioner's related mens rea argument was also without merit; a conviction for failure to appear was an aggravated felony; and thus the BIA did not err in finding that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal. View "Perez Henriquez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied in part and granted in part a petition for review of the BIA's dismissal of an appeal of the IJ's denial of relief. The court held that the BIA erred in requiring petitioner to prove past persecution to establish a claim based on a well-founded fear of future persecution and in recharacterizing petitioner's claimed social group as those who might defy gangs, rather than as female activists or human rights defenders from Honduras who actively protest the Maras. The court affirmed in all other respects, remanding for further proceedings. View "Cabrera v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Yahya entered the U.S. on a six-month tourist visa in either 2000 or 2001 and overstayed. According to Yahya, in 2003, he voluntarily appeared to register in the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System and was placed in removal proceeding (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B)). He accepted an order of voluntary departure but did not depart. He claims he did not want to put his eight-month-old, American-born son on a 24-hour flight to Indonesia. More than 12 years later, Yahya moved to reopen his removal proceedings. Because the 90-day deadline had passed, he cited an exception, raising a claim for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality,” 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), (ii), claiming that he feared that his “moderate” Islamic faith would make him a target for “radical fundamentalist Islamic groups” in Indonesia. The BIA upheld the IJ’s denial of the motion. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. The BIA properly compared objective evidence of religious violence in Indonesia from 2003, the time of Yahya’s original proceedings, to the evidence he presented now. He has evidence of only one attack against moderate Muslims between 2003 and 2016, which is not sufficient to show a material change in country conditions. View "Yahya v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Perez grew up in Honduras. When Perez was 14, a street gang told him to join or “suffer the consequences.” Perez moved. Later that year, the gang confronted Perez again. Perez ran away and dropped out of school. Later, Perez witnessed the murder of a friend whose brother belonged to a rival gang. Perez was beaten and an unidentified person fired shots in the direction of Perez and his friends. Perez reported these events to the police, who did nothing. In 2008 Perez was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident. He returned to Honduras in 2010 for a vacation. He attended a neighborhood festival and was recognized by gang members. Perez ran and cut short his vacation. Three years later, in Indiana, Perez pleaded guilty to engaging in sexual misconduct with a minor. An IJ found Perez removable for having committed an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), and noted that Perez was ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal because his conviction was a “particularly serious crime.” He sought deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. Family members testified about their fear that Perez would be killed if he were removed to Honduras. The BIA affirmed the denial of relief. The Seventh Circuit remanded. The BIA erred by truncating the crucial factual inquiry about Perez’s risk of torture if he is returned to Honduras and by asking the wrong question with respect to internal relocation. View "Perez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's conclusion that petitioner was ineligible for asylum. In Mejia v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 573, 584 (4th Cir. 2017), the court recently held that an alien subject to a reinstated order of removal may not apply for asylum. Mejia's fact pattern was substantially similar to petitioner's where the alien had grounds to apply for asylum prior to her initial removal. The court held that petitioner's arguments were inconsistent with the plain terms of 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(D) and were contrary to Mejia's holding that section 1231(a)(5) attached a categorical prohibition against applying for asylum to aliens subject to reinstated orders of removal. View "Lara-Aguilar v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's determination that petitioner was ineligible for special rule cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA). When petitioner applied for NACARA special rule cancellation, the BIA interpreted the physical presence requirement as running from petitioner's most recent disqualifying conviction, rather than his earliest, and so held him ineligible for NACARA cancellation of removal. The panel held that the BIA's determination of NACARA was reasonable and was therefore entitled to deference. View "Campos-Hernandez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Students granted deferred removal action by the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under its Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy are not eligible for in-state college tuition in Arizona.In 2013, the Arizona Attorney General filed this action seeking a determination that the Maricopa County Community College District Board’s (MCCCD) policy of accepting employment authorization documents (EADs) issued to DACA recipients by the DHS as evidence of residency for students to receive in-state tuition violated Arizona law. The Attorney General also sought an injunction prohibiting MCCCD from allowing DACA recipients to obtain the in-state tuition rates. Two DACA-recipient MCCCD students who receive in-state tuition intervened. The trial court granted summary judgment to MCCCD and the students, concluding that DACA recipients are “lawfully present” for purposes of eligibility for in-state tuition and are therefore eligible for in-state tuition benefits. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that DACA recipients are not “lawfully present” for purposes of 8 U.S.C. 1623(a), which governs in-state tuition benefits, and therefore, DACA recipients are not eligible for in-state tuition. View "State ex rel. Attorney General v. Maricopa County Community College District Board" on Justia Law

Students granted deferred removal action by the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under its Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy are not eligible for in-state college tuition in Arizona.In 2013, the Arizona Attorney General filed this action seeking a determination that the Maricopa County Community College District Board’s (MCCCD) policy of accepting employment authorization documents (EADs) issued to DACA recipients by the DHS as evidence of residency for students to receive in-state tuition violated Arizona law. The Attorney General also sought an injunction prohibiting MCCCD from allowing DACA recipients to obtain the in-state tuition rates. Two DACA-recipient MCCCD students who receive in-state tuition intervened. The trial court granted summary judgment to MCCCD and the students, concluding that DACA recipients are “lawfully present” for purposes of eligibility for in-state tuition and are therefore eligible for in-state tuition benefits. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that DACA recipients are not “lawfully present” for purposes of 8 U.S.C. 1623(a), which governs in-state tuition benefits, and therefore, DACA recipients are not eligible for in-state tuition. View "State ex rel. Attorney General v. Maricopa County Community College District Board" on Justia Law