Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The conviction in this case stemmed from an incident that occurred in the summer of 2010. Defendant, who was attending the University of Vermont (UVM) at that time, met with complainant, another UVM student, to go to a Burlington beach. Complainant later reported that defendant had compelled her to engage in nonconsensual oral sex. In 2012, defendant was convicted of felony sexual assault and sentenced to eight years to life in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing his sentence violated the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because his immigration status interacted with the to-serve sentence to make him unable to get sex-offender treatment, which meant that he would not be eligible for release under the Department of Corrections’ internal procedures. Without reaching the constitutional question, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed and remanded for resentencing, directing the trial court to consider the consequences that defendant’s immigration status had on his sentence. At the sentencing hearing, the court approved nine of the special conditions suggested in the PSI, but amended the proposed language of several. There was not, however, a disclosure of any other conditions that might be imposed on defendant. The probation order, which issued after the hearing, included not only the special conditions discussed on the record and imposed at the sentencing hearing, but also nineteen additional “standard” conditions. Defendant challenged the probation conditions before the Supreme Court, arguing many of the conditions were not orally pronounced during the sentencing hearing and were not sufficiently connected to his crime or rehabilitation. He also argued the sex-offender condition prohibiting defendant from purchasing, possessing, or using pornography or erotica and from going to “adult bookstores, sex shops, topless bars, etc.” was unrelated to his offense and unconstitutionally vague. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded defendant failed to properly preserve his objections to the standard conditions and reviewed them for plain error. Based on the particular provisions and the State’s concessions, the Court struck some conditions, remanded some conditions, and affirmed the remaining. The Supreme Court struck the challenged special condition as unsupported by the record. View "Vermont v. Lumumba" on Justia Law

The conviction in this case stemmed from an incident that occurred in the summer of 2010. Defendant, who was attending the University of Vermont (UVM) at that time, met with complainant, another UVM student, to go to a Burlington beach. Complainant later reported that defendant had compelled her to engage in nonconsensual oral sex. In 2012, defendant was convicted of felony sexual assault and sentenced to eight years to life in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing his sentence violated the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because his immigration status interacted with the to-serve sentence to make him unable to get sex-offender treatment, which meant that he would not be eligible for release under the Department of Corrections’ internal procedures. Without reaching the constitutional question, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed and remanded for resentencing, directing the trial court to consider the consequences that defendant’s immigration status had on his sentence. At the sentencing hearing, the court approved nine of the special conditions suggested in the PSI, but amended the proposed language of several. There was not, however, a disclosure of any other conditions that might be imposed on defendant. The probation order, which issued after the hearing, included not only the special conditions discussed on the record and imposed at the sentencing hearing, but also nineteen additional “standard” conditions. Defendant challenged the probation conditions before the Supreme Court, arguing many of the conditions were not orally pronounced during the sentencing hearing and were not sufficiently connected to his crime or rehabilitation. He also argued the sex-offender condition prohibiting defendant from purchasing, possessing, or using pornography or erotica and from going to “adult bookstores, sex shops, topless bars, etc.” was unrelated to his offense and unconstitutionally vague. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded defendant failed to properly preserve his objections to the standard conditions and reviewed them for plain error. Based on the particular provisions and the State’s concessions, the Court struck some conditions, remanded some conditions, and affirmed the remaining. The Supreme Court struck the challenged special condition as unsupported by the record. View "Vermont v. Lumumba" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's finding that petitioner was statutorily ineligible for withholding of removal because he was convicted of a "particularly serious crime," and holding that an applicant's "mental health as a factor in a criminal act falls within the province of the criminal courts and is not a factor to be considered in a particularly serious crime analysis." See Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 339 (BIA 2014). The panel held that Matter of G-G-S- was not entitled to Chevron deference where its blanket rule against considering mental health was contrary to Congress's clearly expressed intent that the particularly serious crime determination, in cases where a conviction falls outside the only statutorily enumerated per se category of particularly serious crimes, required a case-by-case analysis. Furthermore, the BIA's interpretation was not reasonable in that the BIA's two rationales for its broad rule – 1) that the Agency could not reassess a criminal court's findings, and 2) that mental health was never relevant to the particularly serious crime determination – were unpersuasive and were inconsistent with the law of this Circuit and the BIA's own decisions. View "Gomez-Sanchez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's decision to deny the I-751 petition, to terminate petitioner's permanent resident status, and to have her removed under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(D)(i). The court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that petitioner failed to establish that her marriage was bona fide and not entered into primarily to secure an immigration benefit. In this case, there was substantial direct evidence of the couple's intent at the time of marriage for petitioner to come to the country to enter into a sham marriage for immigration purposes. View "Sagoe v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied the petitions for review of the BIA's order denying petitioner's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner, on behalf of herself and her son, claimed that her husband and a male neighbor have persecuted her on account of her membership in a particular social group as a Guatemalan woman, and will persecute her again if she returns to Guatemala. The court held that petitioner failed to establish that she suffered past persecution and that she did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution. The court explained that persecution was an extreme concept and minor beatings from her husband did not amount to persecution. Furthermore, the harassment and threats from her neighbor also did not cross the threshold to constitute persecution. Finally, petitioner has not demonstrated an entitlement to relief under the Convention Against Torture, because the record did not show more likely than not that she would be subjected to torture in Guatemala. View "Lopez-Coronado De Lopez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied the petitions for review of the BIA's order denying petitioner's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner, on behalf of herself and her son, claimed that her husband and a male neighbor have persecuted her on account of her membership in a particular social group as a Guatemalan woman, and will persecute her again if she returns to Guatemala. The court held that petitioner failed to establish that she suffered past persecution and that she did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution. The court explained that persecution was an extreme concept and minor beatings from her husband did not amount to persecution. Furthermore, the harassment and threats from her neighbor also did not cross the threshold to constitute persecution. Finally, petitioner has not demonstrated an entitlement to relief under the Convention Against Torture, because the record did not show more likely than not that she would be subjected to torture in Guatemala. View "Lopez-Coronado De Lopez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal based on his five criminal convictions for drug offenses under Florida Statute 893.13. The court held that the BIA did not err in concluding that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal because his Florida conviction for sale of cocaine, in violation of Fla. Stat. 893.13(1)(a)(1), constituted "illicit trafficking" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B). View "Choizilme v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal based on his five criminal convictions for drug offenses under Florida Statute 893.13. The court held that the BIA did not err in concluding that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal because his Florida conviction for sale of cocaine, in violation of Fla. Stat. 893.13(1)(a)(1), constituted "illicit trafficking" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B). View "Choizilme v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review as to his challenge to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) determination that his motion to reopen was untimely and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as to Petitioner’s challenge to the BIA’s decision to not exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen.The BIA found that Petitioner had submitted his motion to reopen long after the ninety-day limit and that Petitioner did not show that he fit within an exception to that limit. The BIA also determined that sua sponte reopening was unwarranted. The First Circuit held (1) that the BIA did not abuse its discretion as to the first issue; and (2) the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s challenge as to the second issue. View "Reyes v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied the petition sought by Petitioners, natives and citizens of Guatemala, seeking review of the denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).An immigration judge (IJ) found Petitioners’ asylum applications to be untimely filed and found that Petitioners failed to carry their burden of proof with respect to their withholding of removal and CAT claims. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision. The First Circuit upheld the lower courts, holding (1) this Court lacked jurisdiction to review Petitioners’ claim that they fell within the “extraordinary circumstances” exception to the filing requirement of the asylum application; and (2) substantial evidence in the record supported the IJ and BIA’s finding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that they suffered past persecution or had a well-founded fear of future persecution. View "Olmos-Colaj v. Sessions" on Justia Law