Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, sought review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal from an IJ's order of removal and denial of his application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Second Circuit denied the petition insofar as petitioner challenged his conviction-based removal on the ground that, in determining whether his federal narcotics conviction rendered him removable, the agency was required to apply a "time‐of‐decision" rule and to compare his statute of conviction to the version of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq., in effect during his removal proceedings. The court granted the petition to the extent that petitioner urged that the agency committed legal error in denying his application for deferral of removal under the CAT. View "Doe v. Sessions" on Justia Law

In addition to federal officers, the "egregious violation" exclusionary rule also applied in civil deportation proceedings to state and local officers. The Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's rejection of petitioner's motion to suppress statements he made to state officers and ICE and ordering his voluntary departure. The court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the Maryland Transportation Authority Police (MdTAP) officers did not use coercion, threats, or force towards plaintiff. In this case, at most, an MdTAP officer's questioning of petitioner was aggressive, but the officers showed no indication of threatening or violent behavior such that petitioner lacked the option to not answer any questions regarding his immigration status. View "Sanchez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted a petition for panel rehearing and withdrew its prior opinion, substituting the following opinion.Petitioner appealed the BIA's decision that he was eligible for deportation pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for possessing a controlled substance in violation of Oklahoma law. This circuit has held that the realistic probability test applies whenever the categorical approach is employed. See United States v. Castillo-Rivera, 853 F.3d 218 (5th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, No. 17-5054, 2017 WL 2855255 (Dec. 4, 2017). The court held that, given that the state statute is facially broader than its federal analog, Castillo-Rivera suggests that petitioner could prevail only if the realistic probability test was satisfied. However, petitioner failed to address the question in his brief on appeal, and thus waived the only argument available to him in the wake of Castillo-Rivera. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Rodriguez Vazquez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit granted the petition for review of an order of removal after the BIA determined that the crime petitioner pleaded guilty to, sexual solicitation of a minor in Maryland, was a crime involving moral turpitude. The court explained that, under Maryland law, sexual solicitation of a minor does not require that the perpetrator know the victim’s age. Under BIA precedent, a sexual offense against a child categorically involved moral turpitude only if the perpetrator knew or should have known that the victim was a minor. In this case, the court held that the BIA failed to explain its change in position and remanded to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Jimenez-Cedillo v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Lewin, a citizen of Jamaica, was admitted to the U.S. in 1987 as a legal permanent resident. In 2000, Lewin was convicted of receiving stolen property in the third degree, N.J. Stat. 2C:20-7(a), and was sentenced to five years of probation. Seven years later, following a finding that he violated the terms of his probation, Lewin was resentenced to four years of imprisonment. Another seven years later, Lewin was charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)(iii). An Immigration Judge concluded that Lewin is removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony under section 1101(a)(43)(G), based on his 2000 conviction for receipt of stolen property and later resentencing and that the conviction barred him from relief in the form of cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Third Circuit denied Lewin’s petition for review, applying the categorical approach element-by-element analysis to determine whether Lewin’s New Jersey receiving stolen property conviction “fit” the generic definition of receiving stolen property under section 1101(a)(43)(G). On its face, the New Jersey statute’s language, “knowing that [the property] has been stolen, or believing that it is probably stolen,” refers to a specific defendant’s knowledge or belief, and that element must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Lewin v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Abraham Gonzalez-Alarcon filed a habeas petition alleging specific facts which, if proven, would have demonstrated he was a United States citizen. He sought release from custody from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) following ICE’s reinstatement of a prior order of removal on that basis. Dismissing Gonzalez-Alarcon’s petition, the district court concluded that he was required to exhaust administrative remedies, jurisdiction was barred by the REAL ID Act, and the petition for review process was an adequate substitute for habeas such that the REAL ID Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions do not offend the Suspension Clause. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the exhaustion provision at issue did not govern facially valid citizenship claims; that subsection applies only to aliens. And because district courts had jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit held a court must first consider whether a petitioner was in fact an alien before requiring exhaustion. Furthermore, the Court held the REAL ID Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions raised serious Suspension Clause concerns in one limited context: with respect to a United States citizen subject to a reinstated order of removal for whom the deadline to seek judicial review has passed, the REAL ID Act appeared to bar federal court review. “These restrictions would effectively strip citizenship from those who do not clear various procedural hurdles. Citizenship cannot be relinquished through mere neglect. . . . and ‘[t]he very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected.’” Under the Suspension Clause, the Tenth Circuit held Gonzalez-Alarcon had to be granted some path to advance his facially valid claim of citizenship in federal court. Before permitting Gonzalez-Alarcon to proceed under the Great Writ, however, he should first attempt to obtain review of his citizenship claim through the REAL ID Act. View "Gonzalez-Alarcon v. Macias" on Justia Law

Petitioner Paulo Afamasaga was a native and citizen of Samoa who entered the United States on a nonimmigrant tourist visa and remained beyond the date authorized. After he pleaded guilty to making a false statement when applying for an American passport, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against him. Petitioner applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b, but the immigration judge (IJ) deemed him ineligible on the ground that violating Section 1542 was a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) agreed and dismissed his appeal. “Exercising jurisdiction to review questions of law decided in BIA removal orders (see Flores-Molina v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2017)), the Tenth Circuit upheld the BIA’s determination that petitioner was not eligible for cancellation of removal. View "Afamasaga v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review from the denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s application, ruling that his claimed social group was not a protected ground under the Immigration and Nationality Act and that Petitioner had not established a nexus between his alleged persecution, or fear of future persecution, and any protected ground. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ’s decision, concluding that Petitioner did not establish that any persecution he had suffered or feared was on account of a protected ground. The First Circuit agreed, holding that there was substantial evidence before the IJ and BIA that Petitioner failed to meet his burden to establish a nexus between his alleged persecution and a statutorily protected ground. View "Lopez-Lopez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review from the denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s application, ruling that his claimed social group was not a protected ground under the Immigration and Nationality Act and that Petitioner had not established a nexus between his alleged persecution, or fear of future persecution, and any protected ground. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ’s decision, concluding that Petitioner did not establish that any persecution he had suffered or feared was on account of a protected ground. The First Circuit agreed, holding that there was substantial evidence before the IJ and BIA that Petitioner failed to meet his burden to establish a nexus between his alleged persecution and a statutorily protected ground. View "Lopez-Lopez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Defendant Ortiz-Lazaro pled guilty to illegal reentry after deportation in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1326(a)(1) and (b)(1), and he admitted that he violated the supervised release terms of his prior illegal reentry charge. He appealed his above-guidelines sentence for the supervised release violation as procedurally and substantively unreasonable. In looking at the detailed explanation the district court gave for its deviation from the guidelines, the Tenth Circuit concluded the sentence was reasonable and that the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Ortiz-Lazaro" on Justia Law