Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Mondragon-Gonzalez was admitted to the U.S. in 2008 on an immigrant visa. In 2015, he pled guilty under Pennsylvania law, which provides: A person commits an offense if he is intentionally in contact with a minor" for specified purposes. He admitted to sending a girl pictures of his penis and was sentenced to a prison term of eight to 23 months. DHS commenced deportation proceedings. An Immigration Judge found that Mondragon-Gonzalez’s conviction fell within 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), which provides that “[a]ny alien who at any time after admission is convicted of . . . a crime of child abuse . . . is deportable.” The BIA dismissed his appeal, comparing the elements of the state conviction and its interpretation of a “crime of child abuse” in Matter of Velazquez-Herrera. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. Given Congress’ intent to make crimes that harm children deportable offenses, the BIA’s interpretation is not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. The Pennsylvania law requires intentional contact with a minor for the purpose of engaging in sexual abuse of children; it meets the generic definitional requirement in section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), that the act constitute maltreatment of a child such that there was a sufficiently high risk of harm to a child’s physical or mental well-being. View "Mondragon-Gonzalez v. Attorney General of the United States" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit dismissed the petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's motion to reopen. The court held that whether petitioner diligently pursued her rights to warrant equitable tolling was a question of fact and the jurisdictional bar of 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C) applied. Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition. View "Penalva v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review from the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of her appeal from the denial of her application for asylum and withholding of removal of herself and, derivatively, her two minor children, holding that Petitioner’s challenge to the denial of her claims failed.At her removal proceedings before the immigration judge (IJ), Petitioner testified and submitted a declaration in support of her applications for asylum and withholding of removal, claiming that she suffered past persecution in Honduras on account of her membership in her family and that she had a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her familial ties. The IJ denied Petitioner’s applications and ordered Petitioner and her minor children removed. The BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. The First Circuit agreed with the IJ and the BIA, holding that Petitioner’s challenge to the denial of her asylum claim failed, and so, for identical reasons, did her challenge to the denial of her withholding of removal claim also fail. View "Sosa-Perez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review from the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of her appeal from the denial of her application for asylum and withholding of removal of herself and, derivatively, her two minor children, holding that Petitioner’s challenge to the denial of her claims failed.At her removal proceedings before the immigration judge (IJ), Petitioner testified and submitted a declaration in support of her applications for asylum and withholding of removal, claiming that she suffered past persecution in Honduras on account of her membership in her family and that she had a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her familial ties. The IJ denied Petitioner’s applications and ordered Petitioner and her minor children removed. The BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. The First Circuit agreed with the IJ and the BIA, holding that Petitioner’s challenge to the denial of her asylum claim failed, and so, for identical reasons, did her challenge to the denial of her withholding of removal claim also fail. View "Sosa-Perez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied petitions for review of a precedential decision of the BIA finding petitioner ineligible for asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act based on the ground that she provided "material support" to a terrorist organization, notwithstanding that she acted under duress. The court held that Chevron deference was warranted in this case and joined several other circuits in holding that the material support bar does not except aliens who acted under duress. The court rejected petitioner's claim that aliens who are rendered ineligible for relief from removal by the material support bar have a due process right to some means of obtaining an exemption based on duress, other than the currently‐available procedure for obtaining a discretionary waiver from the Department of State or the Department of Homeland Security. View "Hernandez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied petitions for review of a precedential decision of the BIA finding petitioner ineligible for asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act based on the ground that she provided "material support" to a terrorist organization, notwithstanding that she acted under duress. The court held that Chevron deference was warranted in this case and joined several other circuits in holding that the material support bar does not except aliens who acted under duress. The court rejected petitioner's claim that aliens who are rendered ineligible for relief from removal by the material support bar have a due process right to some means of obtaining an exemption based on duress, other than the currently‐available procedure for obtaining a discretionary waiver from the Department of State or the Department of Homeland Security. View "Hernandez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

This case appeal presented a post-conviction relief (PCR) matter in which Petitioner Gregg Taylor, a Jamaican citizen, pled guilty to a drug offense. Petitioner resided in South Carolina for years with his wife and two children, all three of whom were United States citizens. In plea negotiations, Petitioner's primary concern was whether he would be subject to deportation. Plea counsel viewed Petitioner's grave concern with the prospect of deportation as a "collateral" issue, yet provided general assurances to Petitioner that he would not be deported. As a result, Petitioner pled guilty. The drug offense resulted in Petitioner's deportation, and this PCR application followed. The PCR court denied relief. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and reversed: "By focusing on Petitioner's decision-making, it is uncontested that he 'would have rejected any plea leading to deportation.' Because Petitioner's counsel provided deficient representation, we may not avoid a finding of prejudice on the basis of the likelihood of a guilty verdict . . . we are constrained to 'conclude [Petitioner] has demonstrated a 'reasonable probability that, but for [his] counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" View "Taylor v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

This case appeal presented a post-conviction relief (PCR) matter in which Petitioner Gregg Taylor, a Jamaican citizen, pled guilty to a drug offense. Petitioner resided in South Carolina for years with his wife and two children, all three of whom were United States citizens. In plea negotiations, Petitioner's primary concern was whether he would be subject to deportation. Plea counsel viewed Petitioner's grave concern with the prospect of deportation as a "collateral" issue, yet provided general assurances to Petitioner that he would not be deported. As a result, Petitioner pled guilty. The drug offense resulted in Petitioner's deportation, and this PCR application followed. The PCR court denied relief. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and reversed: "By focusing on Petitioner's decision-making, it is uncontested that he 'would have rejected any plea leading to deportation.' Because Petitioner's counsel provided deficient representation, we may not avoid a finding of prejudice on the basis of the likelihood of a guilty verdict . . . we are constrained to 'conclude [Petitioner] has demonstrated a 'reasonable probability that, but for [his] counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" View "Taylor v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

After a 2004 conviction, Rodriguez, a Mexican citizen and a lawful U.S. permanent resident, was detained under 8 U.S.C. 1226 while the government sought his removal. In 2007, Rodriguez sought habeas relief, claiming that he was entitled to a bond hearing to determine whether his continued detention was justified, alleging that 8 U.S.C. 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c) do not authorize “prolonged” detention without an individualized bond hearing at which the government proves by clear and convincing evidence that detention remains justified. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the entry of an injunction. The Supreme Court reversed; the sections do not give detained aliens the right to periodic bond hearings. “Read most naturally,” sections 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) mandate detention of applicants for admission until immigration officers have finished considering the asylum application or until removal proceedings have concluded, without imposing a time limit or reference to bond hearings. There is a specific provision authorizing temporary parole “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,” implying that there are no other circumstances under which section 1225(b) detainees may be released. Section 1226(c)’s language allows aliens to be released “only if ” the Attorney General decides that certain conditions are met. Nothing in the section supports the imposition of periodic bond hearings nor does it hint that the length of detention before the bond hearing must be considered in determining whether an alien should be released. On remand, the Ninth Circuit should consider the merits of Rodriguez’s constitutional arguments in the first instance. View "Jennings v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Doe sought lawful permanent residence in the U.S. under the EB-5 visa program, which requires applicants to invest in a new U.S. commercial enterprise, 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(5)(A). Doe invested $500,000 in Elgin Assisted Living EB-5 Fund, to build and operate a memory care facility. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services denied Doe’s petition because the facility had not been built since it was proposed in 2011. Doe filed suit. The court granted the government summary judgment. Doe is represented by the three-attorney Kameli Law Group. Floss, an associate, is Doe’s counsel of record. Kameli is the firm’s principal. While briefing was underway, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed suit, accusing Kameli of defrauding 226 immigrants who invested over $88 million. Kameli allegedly misappropriated the memory care center's funds. The Seventh Circuit disqualified the firm from Doe’s appeal. The Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit representation if “there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest.” Neither of Kameli's conflicts can be waived by informed client consent. It “strains credulity to think that Kameli would be diligent.” Kameli would not advise Doe to allege fraud and seek reconsideration of the USCIS decision. Kameli also has divided obligations to his investor-clients, which create an unacceptably high risk of materially limiting Doe’s representation by Floss. View "Doe v. Nielsen" on Justia Law