Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Doe sought lawful permanent residence in the U.S. under the EB-5 visa program, which requires applicants to invest in a new U.S. commercial enterprise, 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(5)(A). Doe invested $500,000 in Elgin Assisted Living EB-5 Fund, to build and operate a memory care facility. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services denied Doe’s petition because the facility had not been built since it was proposed in 2011. Doe filed suit. The court granted the government summary judgment. Doe is represented by the three-attorney Kameli Law Group. Floss, an associate, is Doe’s counsel of record. Kameli is the firm’s principal. While briefing was underway, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed suit, accusing Kameli of defrauding 226 immigrants who invested over $88 million. Kameli allegedly misappropriated the memory care center's funds. The Seventh Circuit disqualified the firm from Doe’s appeal. The Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit representation if “there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest.” Neither of Kameli's conflicts can be waived by informed client consent. It “strains credulity to think that Kameli would be diligent.” Kameli would not advise Doe to allege fraud and seek reconsideration of the USCIS decision. Kameli also has divided obligations to his investor-clients, which create an unacceptably high risk of materially limiting Doe’s representation by Floss. View "Doe v. Nielsen" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for asylum. The BIA interpreted the corroboration provision of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 303 (2005), as not requiring an IJ to give a petitioner specific notice of the evidence needed to meet his burden of proof, or to grant a continuance before ruling to give a petitioner an opportunity to gather corroborating evidence. The court held that the REAL ID Act was ambiguous on this point, and that the BIA's interpretation of the statute was reasonable and entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In this case, although the IJ determined that petitioner was credible, petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof because of an absence of corroborating evidence. View "Wei Sun v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted a petition for panel rehearing, withdrew the previous published opinion, and substituted this opinion. The court denied the petition for review of the BIA's order affirming petitioner's removal from the United States. The court held that 8 U.S.C. 1432(a) did not discriminate based on gender where, had the situation been reversed, if petitioner's mother had become a lawful permanent resident, was naturalized, and raised him in the United States while his father remained in Jamaica, he still would not have derived citizenship because his parents never legally separated. The court also held that section 1432(a) did not unconstitutionally discriminate based on legitimacy and, in the alternative, assuming without deciding that section 1432(a)(3)'s distinction based on marital choice was a legitimacy based classification, the statute passed constitutional muster. The court agreed with its sister circuits that section 1432(a) was substantially related to protecting parental rights. Finally, section 1432(a) did not unconstitutionally burden petitioner's fundamental right to maintain a family unit. View "Levy v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted a petition for panel rehearing, withdrew the previous published opinion, and substituted this opinion. The court denied the petition for review of the BIA's order affirming petitioner's removal from the United States. The court held that 8 U.S.C. 1432(a) did not discriminate based on gender where, had the situation been reversed, if petitioner's mother had become a lawful permanent resident, was naturalized, and raised him in the United States while his father remained in Jamaica, he still would not have derived citizenship because his parents never legally separated. The court also held that section 1432(a) did not unconstitutionally discriminate based on legitimacy and, in the alternative, assuming without deciding that section 1432(a)(3)'s distinction based on marital choice was a legitimacy based classification, the statute passed constitutional muster. The court agreed with its sister circuits that section 1432(a) was substantially related to protecting parental rights. Finally, section 1432(a) did not unconstitutionally burden petitioner's fundamental right to maintain a family unit. View "Levy v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's application for cancellation of removal and ordering removal. The court held that petitioner's narcotics conviction did not disqualify her from cancellation of removal, because the Florida statute under which she was convicted did not qualify as an aggravated felony where it was indivisible and categorically overbroad. The court remanded for the BIA to reconsider petitioner's application. View "Cintron v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

In 1991, Valerio, a citizen of Costa Rica, entered the U.S. without inspection. She was apprehended and placed in deportation proceedings but failed to appear. Valerio's then-boyfriend purchased her a birth certificate and social security card in the name of Rosa Hernandez, a U.S. citizen who lived in Puerto Rico. From 1995-2007, Valerio used Hernandez's identity to secure employment, open lines of credit, purchase cars and a home, and defraud the government of over $176,000 in housing assistance, food stamps, and other welfare benefits. In 2006, Hernandez learned about the fraud. Valerio was apprehended and was found guilty of aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A and three counts of mail fraud. 18 U.S.C. 1341. After Valerio served her sentence, DHS reopened Valerio’s deportation proceeding but mistakenly stated that she was subject to removal. An IJ denied her applications for asylum and withholding of removal, finding the conviction for aggravated identity theft a "particularly serious crime" under section 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). Following a remand, the BIA concluded that in deportation and removal proceedings alike, its longstanding multi-factor "Frentescu" framework for determining whether a nonaggravated felony qualifies as a "particularly serious crime" remains the same, and again found Valerio ineligible for withholding. The First Circuit agreed. The nature and circumstances of Valerio's crime were fully and properly considered." View "Valerio-Ramirez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit amended an opinion affirming the district court's judgment denying a habeas corpus petition where petitioner sought a custody redetermination as he awaited the outcome of administrative proceedings to determine whether he has a reasonable fear of returning to his native country of El Salvador. The panel held that reinstated removal orders were administratively final for detention purposes, and that the detention of aliens subject to reinstated removal orders was governed by 8 U.S.C. 1231(a), rather than section 1226(a). Therefore, petitioner was not entitled to a bond hearing. View "Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit amended an opinion granting a petition for review of the BIA's denial of asylum and withholding of removal to petitioner, a citizen of China, who sought relief based on his political opinion. The panel explained that there was no dispute that petitioner experienced past persecution at the hands of the local government. The appeal turned instead on whether the persecution he suffered was on account of an imputed or actual political opinion. The panel held that the evidence compelled a finding that petitioner was persecuted by Chinese authorities on account of an imputed or actual political opinion. View "Xinbing Song v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of Proclamation No. 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats. The Proclamation succeeded President Trump's executive orders and indefinitely suspended the entry of some or all immigrants and nonimmigrants from eight countries. Determining that plaintiffs' claims were justiciable, the court held that plaintiffs have met their high burden of demonstrating that the Proclamation's purported purpose was not "bona fide" under Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972). Next, the court examined official statements from President Trump and other executive branch officials, along with the Proclamation itself, and held that the Proclamation failed to demonstrate a primarily secular purpose. Rather, the Proclamation continued to exhibit a primarily religious anti-Muslim objective. Therefore, the court held that plaintiffs have demonstrated that they will likely succeed on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim. Furthermore, the likelihood of irreparable harm, the balance of equities, and the public interest all favored granting injunctive relief. View "International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump" on Justia Law

The First Circuit remanded this immigration case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) due to its insufficient explanation of why the least culpable conduct prohibited under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, 2 is morally reprehensible, and why the statute’s requirement of “malice,” as construed by Massachusetts courts, qualifies the crime as a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT).Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, was charged as removable. Petitioner denied his removability and, in the alternative, requested several forms of relief. Petitioner was previously convicted of the crime of Massachusetts arson. The immigration judge (IJ) concluded that Petitioner’s Massachusetts crime was categorically a CIMT. The IJ also found Petitioner ineligible for relief from removal on the basis that he failed to prove that his conviction was not an aggravated felony. The BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal in an opinion that replicated the IJ’s reasoning. The First Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review, vacated the BIA’s opinion, and remanded for further proceedings for the reasons set forth above. View "Rosa Pena v. Sessions" on Justia Law