Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Zhakypbaev, a citizen of Kyrgyzstan, was admitted to the U.S. in 2012 as a nonimmigrant student to attend the Computer Systems Institute. His wife and three daughters were admitted based on his status. He did not attend the Institute after February 4, 2013, and in April 2013, filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. His claims were premised on the events surrounding the ouster of president Bakiev in Kyrgyzstan in April 2010. Zhakypbaev claimed that based on his connections with the Bakiev family and with Bakiev’s political party, he was persecuted and had a well‐founded fear of future persecution in Kyrgyzstan. The Immigration Judge denied relief, holding that Zhakypbaev failed to demonstrate that his persecution was connected to his political opinion or social group and that he had failed to establish a threat of torture. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. The IJ and BIA could properly conclude that Zhakypbaev’s claimed persecution, a beating and questioning, did not result from his political affiliation but from his potential as a witness because of his employment. View "Zhakypbaev v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Zhakypbaev, a citizen of Kyrgyzstan, was admitted to the U.S. in 2012 as a nonimmigrant student to attend the Computer Systems Institute. His wife and three daughters were admitted based on his status. He did not attend the Institute after February 4, 2013, and in April 2013, filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. His claims were premised on the events surrounding the ouster of president Bakiev in Kyrgyzstan in April 2010. Zhakypbaev claimed that based on his connections with the Bakiev family and with Bakiev’s political party, he was persecuted and had a well‐founded fear of future persecution in Kyrgyzstan. The Immigration Judge denied relief, holding that Zhakypbaev failed to demonstrate that his persecution was connected to his political opinion or social group and that he had failed to establish a threat of torture. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. The IJ and BIA could properly conclude that Zhakypbaev’s claimed persecution, a beating and questioning, did not result from his political affiliation but from his potential as a witness because of his employment. View "Zhakypbaev v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Perez-Montes, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. in 1989 as a lawful permanent resident. In 2001 he joined the Army and served two tours in Afghanistan. He received a general discharge under honorable conditions. He did not apply for citizenship. In 2010, he was convicted of a cocaine offense, which led to removal proceedings. Aliens convicted of aggravated felonies remain eligible for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. Perez-Montes contended that he was at risk of being tortured or killed in Mexico because his military training would lead drug gangs to recruit him; that the police would fail to protect him; and that the Mexican government tortures its citizens who return after serving in the U.S. military. An immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals rejected his argument. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting an argument that the Board and the IJ erred by asking, instead, whether he faced a “substantial risk” of torture in Mexico. “More likely than not” is the standard burden in civil litigation and does not impose a statistical or quantitative requirement; “substantial risk” means nothing more than the “more likely than not” standard. It was designed, rather, as a non-quantitative restatement of that standard. View "Perez-Montes v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protections under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner argued that his diagnosis with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder should have been taken into consideration when determining whether inconsistencies in his statements rendered his testimony not credible. The court held that petitioner failed to show that no reasonable fact-finder could make an adverse credibility finding and thus the court must defer to the determinations of the IJ and BIA that his testimony was not credible. View "Singh v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Williams, a citizen of Guyana and a lawful U.S. permanent resident, immigrated to this country in 1970, when he was 13 months old. He has no family in Guyana; his relatives are all U.S. citizens. In 2006, he pleaded guilty to five counts of first-degree forgery under Georgia Code 16-9-1(a). Williams was charged as removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The IJ denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Georgia forgery statute is broader than generic forgery because it criminalizes the use of a fictitious name when signing a document and because the statute does not require a showing of prejudice. The BIA later denied a motion for reconsideration under the Supreme Court’s 2016 "Mathis" decision, arguing that Georgia’s forgery statute is indivisible under Mathis and is overbroad in criminalizing some conduct that does not relate to forgery--false agency endorsements. The Third Circuit denied relief. Employing a “looser categorical approach,” the court considered the “logical connection” between the federal offense the state law and concluded that concerns about the inauthenticity or unauthorized nature of a written instrument establish a logical relationship between common law forgery and false agency endorsement. The intent elements are “directly analogous” and target the “same core criminal conduct.” View "Williams v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's orders of removable and denial of cancellation of removal based on petitioner's felony conviction for battery of a child by throwing, tossing, projecting, or expelling blood, seminal fluid, urine, or feces, in violation of Florida Statute 784.085. The court held that petitioner was removable because his conviction was a crime of child abuse within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i); petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal because his conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i); and the IJ did not deprive petitioner of due process by granting the government's motion to pretermit his application for cancellation of removal. View "Pierre v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Diaz entered the U.S. in 2002. She was apprehended in 2007 and placed in removal proceedings. At a 2012 hearing, Diaz sought asylum and withholding of removal, claiming that she believed the La Familia drug cartel, would seek revenge for her brother’s refusal to work for them. The IJ found that Diaz’s asylum application untimely, assessed her claim under the higher “clear probability of persecution” standard for withholding of removal, and denied relief, noting that the cartel had not harmed or threatened her or anyone in her family other than her brother. The BIA dismissed an appeal. Diaz was allowed to remain in the U.S. She received work authorization and regularly reported to ICE. In 2017, Diaz learned that her father had been kidnapped by the Knights Templar Mexican cartel and that the kidnappers stated that they were looking for Diaz’s brother. They specifically mentioned Diaz and threatened to hurt family members. Diaz moved to reopen and to stay removal, citing “changed country conditions.” ICE apprehended Diaz outside her home and scheduled her removal. The BIA denied her stay of removal. The Sixth Circuit dismissed her petition for review. Diaz was deported. The BIA then declined to reopen. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The BIA failed to credit the facts in Diaz’s declarations, which undermined its conclusion and abused its discretion in summarily rejecting Diaz’s Convention Against Torture argument that she could not safely relocate internally in Mexico. View "Trujillo Diaz v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Sharareh fled Iran in 1986, became a naturalized citizen of Norway, and married a Norwegian citizen. In 1999, using a Norwegian passport, Sharareh entered the U.S. She applied for asylum, stating that she was an Iranian national without disclosing that she was a Norwegian citizen. She falsely stated that she was married to an Iranian citizen who had been tortured. The application was granted. Sharareh traveled to Norway several times in 2001-2002 using her Norwegian passport. Sharareh applied for adjustment of status, omitting reference to Norway. She became a lawful permanent resident. In 2008, she was charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(A). An IJ denied relief under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(H), stating fraud waiver is not available for frauds committed at the time of an adjustment of status. The IJ declined to consider DHS’ argument that Sharareh was barred from all relief because she filed a frivolous asylum application, 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(6). DHS later conceded that an IJ may waive frauds committed in an adjustment of status. The BIA remanded. The IJ denied relief, finding that Sharareh had made a knowing frivolous asylum application. The BIA and Seventh Circuit upheld the denial. The court rejected an argument that the BIA procedurally erred in granting DHS’ motion to remand. DHS’ opposition brief sought affirmance of the decision, while also arguing that the record supported a frivolous asylum application finding. This was the proper way to preserve the issue on appeal. View "Shojaeddini v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's order dismissing petitioner's appeal from the IJ's decision finding petitioner removable and denial of his applications for withholding of removal and for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court held that petitioner waived his challenge to the IJ's application of the "one central reason" nexus standard to petitioner's withholding of removal application; substantial evidence supported the IJ's conclusion that petitioner's worship of Santa Muerte was not one central reason for his persecution by Mexican law enforcement; and substantial evidence supported the denial of petitioner's application for CAT protection. View "Garcia-Moctezuma v. Sessions" on Justia Law

There is no reason to conclusively presume prejudice when an individual was denied the right to counsel during his initial interaction with DHS officers, provided the individual was able to consult with counsel before the removal order is executed. The Ninth Circuit denied petitions for review of DHS's final administrative order of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1228(b). Assuming that a due process violation occurred when petitioner did not have counsel present at the outset of the removal process, the panel held that petitioner must show that he was prejudiced by the violation. In this case, petitioner failed to show that denial of the right to counsel during his initial interaction with DHS officers prejudiced him. In this case, petitioner has never attempted to contest the charges against him, even after having an opportunity to consult with counsel, so he could not contend that his un-counseled admissions cost him the chance to raise plausible grounds for contesting removal. Nor could he claim prejudice by virtue of his un-counseled waiver of the right to request withholding of removal. View "Gomez-Velazco v. Sessions" on Justia Law