Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit sidestepped the government’s challenge to its jurisdiction in this immigration case and held that, even if it did have jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s appeal challenging the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (BIA) denial of his motion to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen Petitioner’s case and grant his request for cancellation of removal, it must still deny the petition. Specifically, the court held (1) Petitioner’s translation-based due process claim failed because Petitioner did not show that “a more proficient or more accurate interpretation would likely have made a dispositive difference in the outcome of the proceedinng” and because the claim found next to no support in the record; and (2) Petitioner failed to state a colorable due process claim as to his second allegation of error. View "Ramirez Matias v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions on one count of identity theft and two counts of making a false information for using another person’s Social Security number to obtain restaurant employment, holding that Defendant’s prosecution based on his use of a Social Security number belonging to another person for employment was expressly preempted by the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 8 U.S.C. 1324a(b)(5). In reversing Defendant's convictions, the court relied on State v. Garcia, __ P.3d __ (this day decided), which held that state prosecutions such as the one in this case are expressly preempted by IRCA. View "State v. Morales" on Justia Law

R-S-C illegally reentered the United States after having been removed and her prior removal order was reinstated, thus under the Attorney General’s interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), she could not apply for asylum. She challenged the Attorney General’s regulations as inconsistent with the INA’s asylum guarantee. The Tenth Circuit concluded Congress had not clearly expressed whether aliens governed by the reinstatement provision could apply for asylum. However, the Attorney General’s regulations were consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the statutory scheme, so they are entitled to administrative deference. Accordingly, the Court denied the petition for review. View "R-S-C v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Mateo, a 21-year-old citizen of the Dominican Republic, was admitted to the U.S. in 2010 as a lawful permanent resident. In 2013, he pleaded guilty to the felony charge of criminal conspiracy for an underlying offense Robbery of a Motor Vehicle. A “person commits a felony of the first degree if he steals or takes a motor vehicle from another person in the presence of that person or any other person in lawful possession of the motor vehicle.” Mateo was charged as removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A). DHS stated that his conviction constituted an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and was a “crime of violence” as defined in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), which incorporates 18 U.S.C. 16, which defines “crime of violence” as (a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. The Third Circuit vacated Mateo’s removal order, holding that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States (2015), section 16(b), as incorporated, is unconstitutionally vague. View "Mateo v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The Board of Immigration Appeals found that Uddin, a citizen of Bangladesh, was ineligible for withholding of removal because he was a member of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP). The Board found that the BNP qualified as a Tier III terrorist organization under the “terrorism bar,” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III). The Third Circuit denied relief with respect to the Board’s ruling dismissing Uddin’s Convention Against Torture claim but remanded his withholding of removal claim. The Board pointed to terrorist acts by BNP members but it did not find that BNP leadership authorized any of the terrorist acts committed by party members. The court joined the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit and the Board in many of its own opinions by holding that unless the agency finds that party leaders authorized terrorist acts committed by its members, an entity such as the BNP cannot be deemed a Tier III terrorist organization. View "Uddin v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought to adjust his immigration status to that of a lawful permanent resident, but in order to do so, he needed to prove that at least one of the two visa petitions he filed prior to 2001 was approvable when filed, even though both were ultimately denied. USCIS rejected plaintiff's application to adjust his status because the petitions were denied on their merits and because there was no allegation that the petitions were denied on the basis of circumstances that changed between the time when they were filed and the time when they were adjudicated. The panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to USCIS, holding that the district court correctly concluded that USCIS was permitted to treat prior merits-based denials of plaintiff's visa petitions as dispositive proof that the petitions were not approvable when filed. View "Hsiao v. Hazuda" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for cancellation of removal. The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that because petitioner was sentenced to a "term of imprisonment of at least one year," the BIA did not err in determining that his aggravated-assault conviction was an aggravated felony that made him ineligible for cancellation of removal. View "Calvillo Garcia v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the IJ's decision denying his motion to suppress evidence of his alienage and ordering his removal. The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review, holding that the Coast Guard officers committed an egregious Fourth Amendment violation and violated an immigration regulation because they seized him based on his Latino ethnicity alone; the IJ erred in failing to suppress the Form I-213, but the panel did not reach the question of the Family Unity Benefits and Employment Authorization applications; and because petitioner has shown that the Government violated its own regulation that was designed to benefit petitioner, and that petitioner was prejudiced by the violation, his removal proceedings must be terminated. View "Sanchez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Pursuant to In re M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 480 (B.I.A. 2011), if an applicant shows indicia of incompetency, the IJ has an independent duty to determine whether the applicant is competent. In this case, petitioner sought review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal from the IJ's denial of his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The Ninth Circuit granted the petition, holding that the IJ erred by failing to determine whether procedural safeguards were required after petitioner showed signs of mental incompetency. Furthermore, the BIA abused its discretion by failing to explain why it allowed the IJ to disregard In re M-A-M-'s rigorous procedural requirements. The panel remanded to the BIA with instructions to remand to the IJ for a new hearing consistent with In re M-A-M-. View "Mejia v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Misternovo and his sons (Petitioners) are citizens of Guatemala who first entered the U.S. in 1990, 1998, and 2004, respectively. In 1999, Misternovo filed an application for suspension of deportation or special rule cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) that listed his sons as derivatives. USCIS denied the NACARA application. In 2008, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). The Immigration Judge ruled that Petitioners were removable as charged. Later, in January 2012, Misternovo’s NACARA application received a full merits hearing. An Immigration Judge denied that application, holding that Misternovo had failed to establish that he had timely registered for benefits pursuant to the American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh settlement agreement; an appeal was dismissed by the BIA. More than two years later, Petitioners filed a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions in Guatemala. The BIA denied the motion. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. The time bar contained in 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(c) applies to motions to reopen based on a request for withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture. View "Bamaca-Cifuentes v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law