Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Mike Govender Hatchet, a Sierra Leone citizen who sought to adjust his immigration status to that of a lawful permanent resident in the United States. Hatchet applied for discretionary relief multiple times, but the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied each application, citing facts that rendered Hatchet ineligible for discretionary relief. Hatchet challenged the agency's actions in federal district court, arguing that the agency relied on facts clearly at odds with the record.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The district court dismissed Hatchet's case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, agreeing with the defendants' argument that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Patel demonstrated that Hatchet's claims were not subject to judicial review due to a jurisdiction-stripping statute.The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the factual findings of USCIS, and because Hatchet's arguments were entirely fact-bound, the court agreed that the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court's decision was based on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Patel, which held that federal courts are without jurisdiction to review both discretionary and non-discretionary judgments related to the granting of relief, including factual findings. View "Hatchet v. Andrade" on Justia Law

Miguel Angel Garcia Carrera, a nonpermanent resident and citizen of Mexico, sought to cancel his removal from the United States. Garcia Carrera argued that his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his U.S. citizen daughter. The Department of Homeland Security had placed him in removal proceedings after he entered the U.S. without inspection. Garcia Carrera had been in the U.S. since 2005, with a brief return to Mexico in 2005. His removal proceedings began in 2012 following an arrest for driving while intoxicated.The Immigration Judge (IJ) initially denied Garcia Carrera's application for cancellation of removal, concluding that he had not demonstrated the requisite hardship to his daughter. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision, agreeing that Garcia Carrera failed to establish the necessary hardship as his daughter, who would remain in the U.S. with her mother, had no serious physical or mental disabilities. Garcia Carrera, proceeding without counsel, appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.The Second Circuit, following the Supreme Court's decision in Wilkinson v. Garland, confirmed that it had jurisdiction to review Garcia Carrera's claim. The court considered both the IJ's and the BIA's decisions and found no error in the agency's conclusion that Garcia Carrera failed to demonstrate the requisite hardship. The court noted that the IJ correctly stated the applicable legal standards and addressed the hardships that Garcia Carrera claimed his daughter would suffer. The court also found no indication that the IJ failed to consider other relevant evidence. Therefore, the court denied Garcia Carrera's petition for review. View "Garcia Carrera v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves Sergio Manrique Gutierrez, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, who was convicted of carjacking under California law. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld an Immigration Judge's (IJ) decision that Gutierrez was removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony crime of violence and for having been convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude.The BIA held that Gutierrez's conviction for carjacking under California law is a categorical crime of violence. The BIA did not address the second ground for removal, concluding that Gutierrez waived his challenge to the moral turpitude removal charge. Gutierrez separately petitioned for review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen his appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that California carjacking under Cal. Penal Code § 215(a) is not a categorical crime of violence. The court also concluded that the BIA erroneously determined that Gutierrez waived his challenge to the moral turpitude removal charge. The court remanded the case to the BIA to decide, in the first instance, whether Gutierrez is removable for having been convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude. The court dismissed Gutierrez’s petition for review of the IJ’s sua sponte reopening of his case to consider a change in the law. The court denied Gutierrez’s petition as to his remaining claims concerning the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, the discretionary denial of his application for waiver of admissibility, the denial of protection under the Convention Against Torture, and the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen his case to consider new evidence that he was incompetent and to consider his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "GUTIERREZ v. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The case involves a family from Guatemala who entered the United States without valid entry documents and were served with Notices to Appear, charging them with removability under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The father, Roni Cruz Galicia, filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, with his wife and child as derivative beneficiaries. Cruz claimed that they were members of a particular social group ("PSG") defined as "climate refugees," having fled Guatemala due to severe environmental conditions and the government's inadequate response.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Cruz's testimony credible but rejected his asylum claim. The IJ determined that Cruz did not experience sufficient harm in Guatemala to constitute past persecution, the asserted PSG of "climate refugees" was not legally cognizable, and Cruz's fear of poor conditions in his home country did not constitute a well-founded fear of future persecution. Cruz appealed the IJ's asylum ruling to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which summarily affirmed the IJ's decision.In the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Cruz argued that his asserted PSG of "climate refugees" was legally cognizable and that he had experienced past persecution and had a well-founded fear of future persecution due to his membership in the PSG. The court found no error in the determination that Cruz failed to show that his asserted PSG is legally cognizable. The court also rejected Cruz's argument that the BIA erred by affirming the denial of his asylum claim summarily and without a written opinion. The court denied the petition. View "Cruz Galicia v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves Gilberto Azael Leon Perez, a Mexican national and legal permanent resident of the United States, who was convicted of attempted lewdness with a child under the age of 14, in violation of Nevada law. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security charged Perez as removable based on his conviction, which they argued constituted an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). An immigration judge agreed, finding that the conviction was for an attempted aggravated felony that rendered Perez removable from the United States. Perez appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed the appeal, thus affirming the immigration judge's removal order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was tasked with reviewing the case. The court had to decide whether their precedent, which sets out the generic definition of sexual abuse of a minor, was clearly irreconcilable with a Supreme Court decision, Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions. The court held that it was not. The court also held that the BIA did not err in concluding that Perez’s conviction categorically constituted an attempted “sexual abuse of a minor” aggravated felony that renders him removable. Therefore, the court denied Perez's petition for review. View "PEREZ V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Purushothaman Rajaram, a naturalized U.S. citizen, alleged that Meta Platforms, Inc., refused to hire him because it preferred to hire noncitizens holding H1B visas, to whom it could pay lower wages. Rajaram claimed that this constituted employment discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits discrimination in hiring against U.S. citizens based on their citizenship.The district court dismissed Rajaram's complaint, ruling that section 1981 does not prohibit discrimination based on U.S. citizenship. Rajaram appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court's interpretation of section 1981. The appellate court held that the statutory text of section 1981 prohibits employers from discriminating against U.S. citizens. The court reasoned that an employer that discriminates against U.S. citizens gives one class of people—noncitizens—a greater right to make contracts than U.S. citizens. This interpretation, the court held, is consistent with the plain language of the statute, which guarantees that all persons shall have the same right to make and enforce contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Rajaram's employment discrimination action and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court concluded that section 1981 does prohibit discrimination in hiring against U.S. citizens on the basis of their citizenship. View "RAJARAM V. META PLATFORMS, INC." on Justia Law

The case involves Gerson Eduardo Alfaro Manzano, a native and citizen of El Salvador, who fled to the United States after being persecuted for his Jehovah's Witness faith. In El Salvador, Alfaro Manzano preached to the youth of his hometown to dissuade them from joining gangs. This led to him being attacked, threatened, and nearly killed by gang members. He sought asylum in the United States, arguing that his faith would be a central reason for his persecution in El Salvador.The immigration judge (IJ) granted Alfaro Manzano withholding of removal but denied asylum, finding that his religion would be "a reason" for his persecution but not "one central reason" sufficient for asylum eligibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, concluding that the gang's desire to increase its wealth and power was the primary reason for targeting Alfaro Manzano, while religion provided only an incidental or subordinate reason.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the record compelled the conclusion that Alfaro Manzano's faith would be "one central reason" for his persecution. The court clarified that a motive can be a central reason if it, standing alone, would lead the persecutors to harm the individual. The court found that even in the absence of the gang's desire to extort him, Alfaro Manzano's religion, standing alone, would lead the persecutors to harm him. The court remanded the case for the Attorney General to exercise his discretion in determining whether to grant Alfaro Manzano asylum. View "MANZANO V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of plaintiffs who were selected in the diversity visa lottery for fiscal years 2020 and 2021. The plaintiffs argued that the Department of State unlawfully suspended, deprioritized, and delayed the processing of their visa applications during the COVID-19 pandemic. They contended that these actions prevented them from receiving visas before the fiscal-year-end deadlines.The district courts agreed with the plaintiffs and ordered the Department of State to continue processing applications and issuing visas after the statutory deadlines had passed. The Department of State appealed these decisions, arguing that the courts lacked the authority to order such relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the district courts lacked the authority to order the Department of State to continue processing applications and issuing visas after the statutory deadlines. The court reasoned that the statutory deadline for issuing visas was clear and unambiguous, and neither history nor context provided any basis for departing from it. The court further noted that the plaintiffs did not have a substantive entitlement to the visas, and decisions regarding the prioritization and processing of visa applications implicated weighty concerns of foreign policy and national security. The court reversed the remedial orders of the district courts and remanded the cases with instructions to enter judgment for the government. View "Goodluck v. Biden" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Ravi Teja, an Indian citizen, who paid thousands of dollars to enroll at the "University of Farmington," expecting to take classes. Unbeknownst to him, the University was a fictitious entity created by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as part of an undercover operation to target fraud involving student visas. When the operation came to light, the government neither provided the education Ravi had paid for nor refunded his money. Ravi filed a lawsuit against the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims, alleging a breach of contract and an accompanying breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed Ravi's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, without addressing other issues. The court reasoned that its jurisdiction under the Tucker Act does not extend to contracts entered into by the government when acting as a sovereign unless those contracts unmistakably subject the government to damages in the event of breach. The court concluded that the government was acting in its sovereign capacity as it entered into the alleged contract in furtherance of an undercover law-enforcement operation, and that the alleged contract did not unmistakably subject the government to damages in the event of breach.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Claims Court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Appeals Court concluded that the Claims Court had jurisdiction pursuant to the Tucker Act over the agreement alleged by Ravi. The court disagreed with the Claims Court's interpretation of the Tucker Act, stating that the contract in question did not concern what was promised to happen or not to happen in a different proceeding in another adjudicatory forum, and thus did not fall into the narrow exception carved out by precedent. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, noting that other grounds not reached by the Claims Court but raised by the government as alternative bases to affirm warranted further exploration. View "RAVI v. US " on Justia Law

Juan Santiago Lopez, a Mexican citizen, sought to overturn an immigration judge's denial of his request for cancellation of removal. Lopez had been in the United States for nearly 20 years, working for the same company and raising four children with his wife. However, he had also accumulated three convictions for driving while intoxicated. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him after his third conviction. Lopez conceded his removability but applied for cancellation of removal relief, arguing that his family circumstances, particularly the burden his removal would place on his wife, warranted cancellation.The immigration judge denied Lopez's request for cancellation of removal but granted his request for voluntary departure. The judge acknowledged Lopez's positive equities, such as his long-term residence, employment, and family ties in the U.S., but found that his history of drunk driving and disregard for U.S. laws outweighed these factors. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge's decision.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Lopez challenged the immigration judge's discretionary decision and argued that the missing date and time information in his Notice to Appear required termination of removal proceedings. The court dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Wilkinson v. Garland, which clarified that courts lack jurisdiction to review substantive challenges to an immigration judge's discretionary decision denying cancellation of removal. The court also rejected Lopez's argument about the Notice to Appear, noting that objections to such violations can be forfeited if not raised in a timely manner. View "Lopez v. Garland" on Justia Law