Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Organizations that represent migrant farm-workers claimed that the U.S. Border Patrol allows agents at its Sandusky Bay, Ohio station to target persons of Hispanic appearance for questioning. The district court found that the Plaintiffs had not proved their claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Border Patrol trains its agents to follow the official policy, to avoid racial profiling and the plaintiffs did not prove the existence of a ratification-based policy of racial targeting at Sandusky Bay. The plaintiffs’ analysis of statistical information to show that agents from Sandusky Bay were targeting persons of Hispanic appearance was unreliable. View "Muniz-Muniz v. United States Border Patrol" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's decision finding her ineligible for cancellation of removal based on her failure to meet her burden of proof of showing that her conviction for conspiring to sell and transport a controlled substance, in violation of California Penal Code 182(a)(1), was not for a disqualifying controlled substance. The Ninth Circuit held that the conspiracy statute under which petitioner was convicted was overbroad but divisible, petitioner failed to carry her burden of proof to demonstrate that her conviction did not involve a federally controlled substance, and she had failed to exhaust the argument that expungement of her conviction erased its immigration consequences. Accordingly, the panel denied the petition in part and dismissed in part. View "Marinelarena v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Mendoza was born in Honduras in 1989. Mendoza’s father (Martinez) was politically active in the Liberal Party. He routinely spoke out against the National Party. In 2000, a National Party activist assassinated Martinez and wounded Martinez’s wife. In 2002, Mendoza’s uncle was assassinated by a National Party activist. Mendoza was president of the local Liberal Party’s youth division, gave speeches supporting the Party, and worked for the Party during the 2013 national election. He received a message that threatened him with the same fate as his father. Mendoza reported this incident. He was denied a visa to enter the U.S., crossed the border without inspection, and was returned to Honduras. When he was detained after his second entry Mendoza requested asylum or withholding of removal because he feared for his life if returned to Honduras. He was placed into a “withholding only” proceeding. An IJ ordered his removal. The Third Circuit reversed, noting evidence of the politically motivated death threats, inaction on Mendoza’s complaints, a perpetrator and judge who shared a political affiliation in opposition to that of Mendoza, and evidence of a politically corrupt system that failed to reign in politically motivated violence. The Honduran government was unwilling or unable to protect Mendoza; he could not safely return. View "Mendoza-Ordonez v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit granted the petition for review challenging the denial of petitioner's application for a waiver and order of removal. The court held that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ's admission of the ex-husband's affidavit and the USCIS report without granting petitioner's request for a subpoena or otherwise providing petitioner the opportunity to cross-examine the ex-husband. The court also held that this error was prejudicial and rendered petitioner's removal hearing fundamentally unfair. Furthermore, the BIA abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion for remand under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), based on her now-husband's pending visa petition on her behalf, which would give petitioner the opportunity to adjust status independent of the conditional status she received by way of her marriage to her ex-husband. In this case, petitioner faced no accusations of fraud or willful misrepresentations, the IJ declined to make an adverse credibility finding, and the IJ explicitly acknowledged that petitioner had not been charged with entering into a marriage by fraud, or for paying for a marriage. View "Patel v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The failure to satisfy the warning requirements of 8 C.F.R. 240.25 does not preclude a finding of a voluntary departure under threat of deportation sufficient to break the ten-year period of continuous presence required to be eligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b). The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of a petition for review of the BIA's dismissal of petitioner's appeal from the IJ's denial of his application for cancellation of removal of a nonpermanent resident alien under section 1229b(b). The court held that petitioner voluntarily departed the country under a threat of deportation, thus breaking his continuous presence here. View "Rodriguez-Labato v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision, holding that petitioner's California conviction for second degree murder on an aiding and abetting theory qualified as an aggravated felony. The panel explained that the Supreme Court, in 2007, reviewed California's law on aiding and abetting, which like that of many jurisdictions looks to the natural and probable consequences of an act the defendant intended. Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 191–93 (2007). The Supreme Court concluded that absent a showing that the law has been applied in some "special" way, a conviction in California for aiding and abetting a removable offense was also a removable offense. The panel held that California law has not materially changed since Duenas-Alvarez was decided and was not applied in any "special" way in petitioner's case. View "Sales Jr. v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit upheld the finding of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that Petitioner was eligible for removal because third-degree larceny under Connecticut law is an aggravated felony. Removal proceedings were commenced against Petitioner on the basis that his conviction was for a “theft offense” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43) (G) and was therefore an “aggravated felony” that rendered him eligible for removal. The BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. The First Circuit upheld the BIA’s decision, holding that Petitioner’s Connecticut conviction is a conviction for a “theft offense” because the range of conduct sufficient to sustain a conviction for third-degree larceny under Connecticut law is not broader than that which constitutes a “theft offense” under the Immigration and Nationality Act. View "De Lima v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's order finding him both removable and inadmissible on the basis of his North Carolina deferred prosecution agreement for soliciting a child by computer to commit a sex act. The Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that the BIA properly found petitioner removable and inadmissible for being convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. In this case, petitioner's deferred prosecution agreement was a "conviction" under the Immigration and Nationality Act; the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" was not void for vagueness in the removability and admissibility contexts; and, even if petitioner's crime was not considered "violent or dangerous," his application would still be denied. View "Boggala v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of petitioner's application for asylum after an IJ granted her application for withholding of removal. The court held that the interplay between 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5) and 1158 was unambiguous: Congress intended that aliens subject to reinstated orders of removal be precluded from applying for asylum. Furthermore, barring illegal reentrants from applying for asylum did not violate international law. The court also held that, because the petition was not timely filed as to the underlying order of removal, the court lacked jurisdiction to address petitioner's objections to the June 2015 hearing. View "Calla Mejia v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's decision concluding that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal because his conviction for petit theft in Idaho was a crime involving moral turpitude. The panel held that the record of conviction was inadequate to determine whether petitioner was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude because the record did not identify any particular statute of conviction and Idaho's petit theft statute was overbroad under the categorical approach. Under the modified categorical approach, the record contained insufficient information to determine whether petitioner was convicted under one of the Idaho petit theft provisions meeting the generic federal offense. The panel also held that the BIA erred by deciding at Chevron step one that an "offense under" 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) did not include the within-five-years element. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Lozano-Arredondo v. Sessions" on Justia Law