Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion granting the petition for review of the BIA's decision finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal based on his conviction for delivery of a controlled substance under Oregon Revised Statutes 475.992(1)(a). The panel held that because the Controlled Substances Act does not punish soliciting delivery of controlled substances, section 475.992(1)(a) could not be a categorical match to an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Furthermore, because section 475.992(1)(a) was indivisible, the modified categorical approach does not apply. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Sandoval v. Sessions" on Justia Law

DLS petitioned for review of the ALJ's decision finding DLS liable for numerous violations of sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1324a(b), which requires employers to verify that their employees are legally authorized to work in the United States. The ALJ also ordered DLS to pay civil money penalties. In regard to the ALJ's finding that DLS was liable for section 504 violations, the panel held that one charge was untimely under the applicable statute of limitations, so that violation could not stand. The panel denied the petition for review as to the ALJ's finding of the other 503 violations because DLS was not entitled to good faith defenses, and as to the ALJ's determination of the penalty amount. View "DLS Precision Fab LLC v. ICE" on Justia Law

Ildefonso-Candelario, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. unlawfully, allegedly in 1996. In 2015, he pled guilty in Pennsylvania state court to a misdemeanor count of obstructing the administration of law or other governmental function. Immigration and Customs Enforcement took Ildefonso-Candelario into custody, charging him with being removable as an alien present without admission or parole, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). At his first hearing, Ildefonso-Candelario stated his intention to seek cancellation of removal. Counsel for ICE suggested that Ildefonso-Candelario’s prior conviction might qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude, which would render him statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C). The Immigration Judge issued an initial holding that the offense was “categorically” a crime involving moral turpitude. ICE added a charge of removability for committing a crime involving moral turpitude. The Immigration Judge then ordered Ildefonso-Candelario removed to Mexico. A single member of the BIA upheld the ruling “[f]or the reasons given by the Immigration Judge.” The Third Circuit remanded to the BIA, holding hold that 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 5101 is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. The offense encompasses non-fraudulent as well as fraudulent conduct, such as obstruction by “physical interference or obstacle.” View "Ildefonso-Candelario v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

After the IJ denied petitioner's motion to reopen her removal proceedings as untimely, the BIA dismissed her appeal. The Fifth Circuit denied her petition for review, holding that she has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating she was entitled to equitable tolling. The court explained that it could not consider the BIA's or the IJ's refusal to reopen sua sponte, and the court rejected petitioner's claim that her removal proceeding was a gross miscarriage of justice. View "Gonzalez-Cantu v. Sessions" on Justia Law

After USCIS discovered that an employee had illegally issued nearly 200 certificates of naturalization to individuals who had not satisfied the requirements to become U.S. citizens, the government canceled certificates of naturalization to individuals, including plaintiffs here, without seeking a court order. The State Department then administratively revoked or refused to renew their passports. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims that the government's revocations of their certificates of naturalization and their passports violated the Immigration and Nationality Act and due process because they took place through administrative rather than judicial process; affirmed the dismissal of their claims of ethnicity or national origin discrimination; and reversed insofar as the district court held that any plaintiff was barred by failure to exhaust administrative remedies from challenging under the Administrative Procedure Act the government's failure to afford plaintiffs the review the law requires, and pursuing 8 U.S.C. 1503 claims in the correct venues. Accordingly, the court remanded in part. View "Xia v. Tillerson" on Justia Law

Victoria‐Faustino, a Mexican national who entered the U.S. illegally in 1991, is the father of five U.S. citizens. He returned to Mexico to visit his family in 1999 but re‐entered illegally in January 2000. During a 2000 traffic stop, Victoria‐Faustino provided the police with a false identity; he then served a term of two years’ imprisonment for obstruction of justice.In 2015, he was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol. DHS instituted removal based upon his 2000 conviction, which DHS determined constituted an aggravated felony such that he was subject to expedited removal procedures. Victoria‐Faustino indicated that he wished to contest or to request withholding of removal, based on his fear of persecution and torture upon removal to Mexico. He never challenged DHS’s determination that he was removable based upon his 2000 Illinois conviction. An Asylum Officer determined that while Victoria‐Faustino was credible, he had not established that he was entitled to asylum. The Seventh Circuit remanded. While the statute generally strips courts of jurisdiction to consider an appeal of a Final Administrative Removal Order, they retain jurisdiction to determine whether the underlying conviction upon which it is based is an aggravated felony. Victoria‐Faustino’s 2000 conviction was not properly classified as an aggravated felony. View "Victoria-Faustino v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Attorney General has the discretion to cancel the removal of a non-permanent resident alien if the alien, among other things, has ten years of continuous physical presence in the United States. At issue here was whether, for purposes of the “stop-time” rule, an alien’s period of continuous physical presence ends when the alien is served a notice to appear that does not contain the date and time of the alien’s initial hearing. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) answered this question in the affirmative in Matter of Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644 (B.I.A. 2011). In the instant case, Petitioner conceded removability but sought relief in the form of cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1), arguing that the notice to appear had not stopped the continuous residency clock because it was defective where it did not include the date and time of his hearing. An Immigration Judge ordered Petitioner removed. The BIA affirmed, concluding that the notice to appear was effective under the stop-time rule. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA’s decision in Camarillo was entitled to Chevron deference. Therefore, Petitioner was unable to demonstrate the requisite ten years of physical presence and was thus ineligible for cancellation of removal. View "Pereira v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review of the denial of petitioner's application for asylum and withholding of removal. The court held that substantial evidence in the record supported the IJ's factual conclusion that petitioner's case was solely one of personal conflict among family members. In this case, petitioner and her son had fled Honduras based on threats from her mother-in-law. Therefore, petitioner did not meet her burden of showing persecution "on account of" a protected ground. View "Velasquez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the denial of petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court held that the IJ's credibility finding was rooted in numerous inconsistencies between petitioner's testimony and the record, the implausibility of certain events, and a lack of corroborating evidence. Therefore, substantial evidence supported the denial of asylum. Because withholding of removal and CAT claims were based on the same discredited testimony, these claims also failed. View "Kegeh v. Sessions" on Justia Law

In 2012, Vikash, a U.S. citizen born in Fiji, married Ashlyne, a citizen of Fiji, in Fiji in an arranged marriage. Vikash filed an immigration visa petition on Ashlyne's behalf, which was approved, and submitted an I–864 affidavit of support, under which the sponsor agrees to “[p]rovide the intending immigrant any support necessary to maintain ... an income that is at least 125 percent of the Federal Poverty Guidelines ... that person may sue you for this support.” According to Ashlyne, Vikash abused her and “tricked” Ashlyne into going to Fiji in 2013, where he abandoned her. Her legal permanent resident stamp was torn out of her passport. Ashlyn obtained temporary documents from the U.S. Embassy and returned to the U.S. Vikash sought an annulment. Ashlyne indicated she had applied for government assistance and argued that by signing the I–864 affidavit, Vikash agreed to support her for 10 years. The court awarded temporary support and ordered Ashlyne to make efforts to get the necessary paperwork "to work in this country if she is intending on remaining.” The court later terminated support and denied Ashlyne’s request to enforce the I–864 because Ashlyne was “not using best efforts to find work.” The court of appeal reversed. An immigrant spouse has standing to enforce the I-864 support obligation in state court and has no duty to mitigate damages. View "In re: Marriage of Kumar" on Justia Law