Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a citizen and native of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's decision finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C). The Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that petitioner's 2005 criminal proceedings under Virginia Code 18.2-251 for possession of cocaine constituted a "conviction" as defined within the plain text of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A). In this case, both statutory elements of a conviction were satisfied and thus the BIA did not err in upholding the IJ's decision. View "Payan Jaquez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

California Vehicle Code 2800.2 is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude. Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision concluding that his conviction for fleeing from a police officer under section 2800.2 was categorically a crime involving moral turpitude that made him statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. Given the flaws in the BIA's analysis, the Ninth Circuit accorded minimal deference to the agency's determination that section 2800.2 constitutes a categorical crime involving moral turpitude. The panel held that, under the categorical approach, the conduct criminalized in section 2800.2 does not necessarily create the risk of harm that characterizes crimes of moral turpitude, even though subsection (a) standing alone would appear to contain elements of a dangerous crime. The court explained that, in this case, it did not apply the modified categorical approach because the elements of section 2800.2 were clearly indivisible. View "Ramirez-Contreras v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Sanchez-Lopez pleaded guilty to unauthorized presence in the U.S. after removal, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), and was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment—90 days above the guidelines range. The district court stated that, in an effort to deter future illegal reentry, it was sentencing him to a lengthier term than the sentence he had served the last time he was convicted of the same offense. Sanchez-Lopez had a long history of criminal activity in and removal from the U.S., dating back to his first entry in 1994 and including convictions for DUI, hit-and-run, driving with a suspended license, battery, sexually assaulting an 11-year-old child, and criminal escape. He claimed that his wife’s illness and need for care prompted his latest return. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence. The district court thoughtfully considered Sanchez-Lopez’s personal characteristics, including that he had not committed “serious offenses” since reentering, his reason for returning, and the danger posed to society by his many drunk driving arrests. The court focused on one particular concern in fashioning an appropriate sentence—the need to deter Sanchez-Lopez from continuing to enter the country illegally. That decision was proper; 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(B) specifically instructs courts to consider the need “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.” View "United States v. Sanchez-Lopez" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied petitions for review of the BIA's final order affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for removal. The en banc court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that petitioner was a habitual drunkard; the statutory "habitual drunkard" provision is not unconstitutionally vague under the criminal law standard or any lesser vagueness standard that might apply in a non-criminal context; the statutory "habitual drunkard" provision does not violate equal protection principles because the denial of cancellation of removal to habitual drunkards is rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest in public safety. View "Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican citizen and lawful permanent resident of the U.S., pleaded no contest in a California court under a statute criminalizing “unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator,” defining “minor” as “a person under the age of 18.” He was ordered removed under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(3), as an “alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony,” including “sexual abuse of a minor.” The Supreme Court reversed. Under the categorical approach employed to determine whether an alien’s conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony, the court asks whether the state statute defining the crime of conviction categorically fits within the "generic" federal definition of a corresponding aggravated felony. Petitioner’s state conviction would be an “aggravated felony” only if the least of the acts criminalized by the state statute falls within the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor, regardless of the actual facts of the case. The least of the acts criminalized by the California law would be consensual sexual intercourse between a victim who is almost 18 and a perpetrator who just turned 21. The generic federal definition of “sexual abuse of a minor” requires that the victim be younger than 16 and a significant majority of state criminal codes set the age of consent at 16 for statutory rape offenses predicated exclusively on the age of the participants. View "Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions" on Justia Law

In this immigration case, the First Circuit vacated the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upholding the decision of the Immigration Judge (IJ) denying Petitioner’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). In his petition for review, Petitioner, a native of Guatemala, argued that he presented sufficient evidence to establish both past persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution and that he could not reasonably relocate within Guatemala. The First Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) there was significant evidence in the record supporting a conclusion that relocation would be unreasonable; and (2) given the limited analysis on this issue by the IJ and the BIA, remand was proper for the BIA to consider it fully. View "Garcia-Cruz v. Sessions" on Justia Law

After the BIA determined that petitioner was an aggravated felon because of his conviction for attempted sexual abuse under Oregon law, Oregon Revised Statutes 163.427, the agency determined that he was deportable, terminated his asylee status, denied his request for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident, and denied waiver of admissibility. The Ninth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider any discretionary aspect of the BIA's decision to deny petitioner's application for adjustment of status and waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. 1159(b) and (c), as the Attorney General's discretion is specified in the statute. Applying the three-step process articulated from Descamps v. United States, the panel held that the Oregon statute does not categorically match the generic federal offense; the statute is divisible; and, under the categorical approach, a conviction under subparagraph 163.427(1)(a)(A) is sexual abuse of a minor within the generic federal definition and therefore an aggravated felony for purposes of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43). Therefore, the BIA did not err in concluding that petitioner had been convicted of a particularly serious crime. The panel dismissed the petition in part and denied it in part. View "Diego de Diego v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed in substantial part the district court's issuance of a nationwide injunction as to Section 2(c) of the challenged Second Executive Order (EO-2), holding that the reasonable observer would likely conclude EO-2's primary purpose was to exclude persons from the United States on the basis of their religious beliefs. Section 2(c) reinstated the ninety-day suspension of entry for nationals from six countries, eliminating Iraq from the list, but retaining Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.Determining that the case was justiciable, the Fourth Circuit held that plaintiffs have more than plausibly alleged that EO-2's stated national security interest was provided in bad faith, as a pretext for its religious purpose. Because the facially legitimate reason offered by the government was not bona fide, the court no longer deferred to that reason and instead may look behind the challenged action. Applying the test in Lemon v. Kurtzman, the court held that the evidence in the record, viewed from the standpoint of the reasonable observer, created a compelling case that EO-2's primary purpose was religious. Then-candidate Trump's campaign statements revealed that on numerous occasions, he expressed anti-Muslim sentiment, as well as his intent, if elected, to ban Muslims from the United States. President Trump and his aides have made statements that suggest EO-2's purpose was to effectuate the promised Muslim ban, and that its changes from the first executive order reflect an effort to help it survive judicial scrutiny, rather than to avoid targeting Muslims for exclusion from the United States. These statements, taken together, provide direct, specific evidence of what motivated both executive orders: President Trump's desire to exclude Muslims from the United States and his intent to effectuate the ban by targeting majority-Muslim nations instead of Muslims explicitly. Because EO-2 likely fails Lemon's purpose prong in violation of the Establishment Clause, the district court did not err in concluding that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim. The court also held that plaintiffs will likely suffer irreparable harm; the Government's asserted national security interests do not outweigh the harm to plaintiffs; and the public interest counsels in favor of upholding the preliminary injunction. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a nationwide injunction was necessary to provide complete relief, but erred in issuing an injunction against the President himself. View "International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump" on Justia Law

An illegal immigrant, Sanchez conceded his removability at a hearing before an immigration judge, but applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b), which required that he show that he had been physically present in the U.S. for at least 10 years, that during that period he was a person of good moral character, and that his removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his U.S.‐citizen children, ages eight years, six years, and 15 months. His wife also lacks legal‐resident status and Sanchez was the primary breadwinner for his family, having worked at the same pizza restaurant for 18 years. He admitted having been convicted four times in the past 16 years of driving under the influence, and that he had twice violated conditions of his bond. The immigration judge denied relief. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Seventh Circuit stayed his removal pending review of the BIA’s refusal to reopen in light of new evidence in support of Sanchez’ ineffective‐assistance‐of‐counsel claim, including evidence that his children do not speak Spanish and that one child has a disability. View "Sanchez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Guatemala, petitioned for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The BIA affirmed the decision of the Immigration Judge (IJ), concluding (1) the level of mistreatment Petitioner suffered did not rise to the level that could qualify as persecution to be entitled to a grant of asylum, and (2) Petitioner could not meet the requirements for withholding of removal and for protection under the CAT. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) Petitioner failed to provide the court with a basis for reversing the BIA’s ruling denying his application for asylum; and (2) Petitioner failed to offer any basis on which to conclude that he could satisfy the requirements for withholding for removal or for protection under the CAT. View "Morales-Morales v. Sessions" on Justia Law