Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Angel Aguayo filed a motion to terminate his removal proceedings, contending his state detention and transfer to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody was unlawful. Aguayo was a native and citizen of Mexico. In 1992, he entered the United States unlawfully. For over twenty-five years, Aguayo and his wife lived in Utah and raised four children. In March 2018, Aguayo’s daughter - a United States citizen - filed a visa petition on her father’s behalf. After U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) approved the visa petition, Aguayo lawfully remained in Utah and applied to become a legal permanent resident. In 2019, state law enforcement officers arrested Aguayo in Springville, Utah. He was later charged with two counts of possession of a forged document, use or possession of drug paraphernalia, and having an open container in a vehicle. At the time of his arrest, Aguayo also had pending misdemeanor state charges for issuing a bad check, shoplifting, possession or use of a controlled substance, and use or possession of drug paraphernalia. Aguayo was detained at the Utah County Jail. The day after his arrest, agents from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) encountered Aguayo during a routine jail check. DHS then issued an immigration detainer (an “ICE hold”) for Aguayo. He remained at the Utah County Jail for about five months. In June 2019, Aguayo pled guilty to some of the pending state charges. He was sentenced to thirty days in the county jail. He would be later sentenced to 364 days’ imprisonment on the forgery convictions, and an indeterminate term of imprisonment not to exceed five years on the bad check conviction. DHS initiated removal proceedings; Aguayo contested his removability. The Tenth Circuit denied Aguayo's petition: he did not show he was prejudiced—under any applicable standard—by the denial of his motion to terminate removal proceedings. View "Aguayo v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court awarding Mother sole legal and physical custody of the parties' minor child and making some of Mother's requested findings to support an application to obtain special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status for the child under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, holding that there was no abuse of discretion.Mother and Father were married in Mexico and had one child, Max. The parties later moved to Nebraska, where they separated. Mother filed a complaint for dissolution, requesting sole legal and physical custody of Max. The district court dissolved the marriage and awarded Mother custody. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err by refusing to make all the SIJ findings that Mother requested; and (2) Mother's second assignment of error was without merit. View "Hernandez v. Dorantes" on Justia Law

Petitioner initially entered the United States on a traveler’s visa, but he later became a permanent resident after marrying a United States citizen. Then, roughly a decade later, he and his accomplices robbed a delivery van belonging to “an ATM vendor.” Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery and spent five years in prison. Once immigration officials found out about the conviction, they started removal proceedings. As relevant here, the government argued he was removable because Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence. The immigration judge and the Board agreed and refused to waive inadmissibility.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Hobbs Act robbery requires proof of an “unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person . . . of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force.” Thus, Petitioner is removable for having committed a “crime of violence.” Moreover, the court wrote that the decision in Taylor “does not change our position” that a completed Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence. View "Garfield Green v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for panel rehearing and a sua sponte request for rehearing en banc in a case in which the panel: (1) held that the Board of Immigration Appeals legally erred by failing to conduct cumulative-effect review in assessing petitioner’s evidence of past persecution, and (2) remanded for the BIA to reassess the evidence under the correct legal framework. View "NERY SALGUERO SOSA V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen. The Board denied reopening based, in part, on Petitioner’s failure to include a new application for relief, as required by 8 C.F.R. Section 1003.2(c)(1).   The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded to the BIA for further proceedings. The panel explained that the changed circumstances Petitioner presented were entirely outside of his control and thus were properly understood as changed country conditions, not changed personal circumstances. The panel also held that these changed circumstances were material to Petitioner’s claims for relief because they rebutted the agency’s previous determination that Petitioner had failed to establish the requisite nexus between the harm he feared and his membership in a familial particular social group.   The panel explained that the Board’s previous nexus rationale was undermined by the fact that the threats, harassment, and violence persisted despite the lack of any retribution by Petitioner family against his uncle’s family for at least fourteen years after Petitioner’s father’s murder, and where multiple additional family members were targeted, including elderly and young family members who would be unlikely to carry out any retribution. Thus, the panel held that the Board abused its discretion in concluding that Petitioner’s evidence was not qualitatively different than the evidence at his original hearing. The panel also declined to uphold the Board’s determination that Petitioner failed to establish prima facie eligibility for relief. View "FRANCISCO REYES-CORADO V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction for having knowingly procured her naturalization contrary to law in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1425(a). Defendant made several false statements in procuring her naturalization. The issues on appeal are whether the government met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the false statements were material, as that element of the Section 1425(a) offense was defined in Maslenjak v. United States, 582 U.S. 335 (2017), and whether they were made “under oath.”
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant argued that the false statements were immaterial because they did not necessarily establish she lacked good moral character. The court disagreed, reasoning that 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(f) provides that “no person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good moral character who” gives false testimony to obtain an immigration benefit in violation of Section 1101(f)(6). Moreover, Defendant argued that “false testimony” is limited to false statements given verbally under oath. As the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the false statements in her N-400 Application for Naturalization were given orally and under oath, the government failed to present sufficient evidence, and we “need not even address materiality.” The court explained that the district court t was free to find the testimony of a USCIS supervisory officer more credible than the contrary opinion of Defendant’s expert, who admitted she had never attended a naturalization interview in Des Moines. Accordingly, the court concluded that a reasonable factfinder could find she acted to obtain immigration benefits for her spouse. View "United States v. Deanah Cheboss" on Justia Law

For over four decades, immigration judges employed by the Executive Office for Immigration Review have collectively bargained through a certified union. Four years ago, that office asked the Federal Labor Relations Authority to determine that immigration judges are management officials barred from inclusion in a bargaining unit. The Authority agreed. Following an unsuccessful reconsideration motion, and with a second reconsideration motion still pending before the Authority, the union petitioned this court for review of both the Authority’s initial decision and its decision denying reconsideration. The union contends that, in issuing those decisions, the Authority violated the union’s substantive and procedural due process rights.   The DC Circuit dismissed the petition. The court explained that the Union’s petition for review was incurably premature—including with respect to the Initial Order—even though the Union’s second reconsideration motion sought reconsideration of only the First Reconsideration Order, not the Initial Order. The court wrote that a contrary conclusion would disserve the central purpose of the incurable prematurity doctrine. “There is good reason to prohibit any litigant from pressing its cause concurrently upon both the judicial and the administrative fronts: a favorable decision from the agency might yet obviate the need for review by the court.” And here, as in Tennessee Gas, a favorable agency decision on the second reconsideration motion pending before it could have obviated the need for judicial review of both the order initially denying reconsideration and the underlying order. View "National Association of Immigration Judges v. FLRA" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the denial of his habeas petition to vacate his 2006 guilty plea, conviction, and sentence. Defendant asserted that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer did not warn him of the risks of denaturalization and possible subsequent deportation arising from his guilty plea.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. Effective assistance includes warning defendants of the “direct” consequences of pleading guilty, such as the offense’s maximum prison term and the likely sentence as set forth in a plea agreement. However, the court explained that it has long held that an attorney need not warn of every possible “collateral consequence of conviction. And such collateral consequences are “categorically removed from the scope of the Sixth Amendment.” Thus, a defendant can only establish an ineffective assistance claim as to a collateral consequence if his attorney affirmatively misadvises him. Failing to warn of the collateral risk alone is not enough. The court explained that the instant appeal is resolved by the straightforward application of this direct/collateral framework. Accordingly, the court held that the distinction remains valid, that it applies to civil denaturalization, and that such denaturalization is a collateral consequence of the conviction, and so is not covered by the Sixth Amendment’s right to effective assistance of counsel. View "Farhane v. United States" on Justia Law

Wojciechowicz came to the U.S. in the 1980s. In 1999 he married a U.S. citizen, with whom he has two children. He became a lawful permanent resident in 2004. Wojciechowicz stole over $100,000 in connection with window installation jobs. He pleaded guilty to state charges in 2011 and was sentenced to two years of probation and restitution. In 2019 Wojciechowicz traveled to Poland for his sister’s funeral. When he attempted to reenter the U.S., Customs officials determined his convictions constituted crimes involving moral turpitude and rendered him inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). In removal proceedings, Wojciechowicz unsuccessfully sought a waiver of inadmissibility. An IJ concluded that he had failed to show extreme hardship and that the severity of his prior crimes weighed against waiver as a discretionary matter. The BIA affirmed; the Seventh Circuit dismissed a petition for review for lack of jurisdiction.Days before his removal date, Wojciechowicz received a pardon from Governor Pritzker for his convictions. The BIA stayed his removal but declined to reopen removal proceedings. ICE—in violation of the stay and with no explanation— removed Wojciechowicz to Poland. The Seventh Circuit denied a second petition for review. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, a pardon does not make an otherwise inadmissible noncitizen admissible, even if a pardon can save a resident noncitizen from being removed. View "Wojciechowicz v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied the petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) brought by Petitioners, several Peruvian nationals who were ordered removed from the United States, holding that Petitioners were not entitled to relief on their claims.Petitioners brought claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection pursuant to the regulations implementing the Convention Against Torture, contending that, if returned to Peru, they feared being seriously physically harmed or killed due to their former involvement with the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) political party. An immigration judge (IJ) ordered Petitioners removed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioners' petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the agency's ruling that Petitioners had failed to make the requisite showing regarding government involvement. View "Vila-Castro v. Garland" on Justia Law