Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Elsy and Isai Diaz-Hernandez, siblings from El Salvador who illegally entered the United States and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. They claimed that they had suffered harm or fear of harm in El Salvador from their maternal uncle, who abused them to avenge his earlier deportation from the United States, for which he blamed their mother. The Immigration Judge (IJ) found that revenge was not a central reason for the uncle’s abuse of Elsy and Isai but at most a “tangential reason.” The IJ concluded that Elsy and Isai failed to establish the required nexus between their harm and a protected ground and therefore the requirements for either asylum or withholding of removal.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision and dismissed the appeal. The BIA rejected the petitioners’ argument that the evidence showed that their relationship to their mother was “at least one central reason” for the uncle’s abusive behavior against them. The BIA noted that the IJ’s finding that the petitioners failed to demonstrate the necessary nexus between the harm and a protected ground was “a classic factual question,” and after reviewing the facts, concluded that the IJ did not clearly err.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied the petitions for review, concluding that substantial evidence supported the agency’s finding that the petitioners failed to establish the requisite nexus between the harm they feared and their family tie. The court also rejected their argument that the BIA applied the wrong standard for assessing whether they met their burden to prove the required nexus with respect to their withholding of removal claims. View "Diaz-Hernandez v. Garland" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Antonio E. Gonzalez, was charged with assaulting his then-wife and their son. During the trial, the defense sought to cross-examine the wife about her application for a U visa, which is a visa for noncitizens who are victims of certain crimes and are helpful to law enforcement in the investigation or prosecution of criminal activity. The trial court ruled that the defense had not established a sufficient factual foundation for this line of questioning and thus it was not allowed. The defendant was convicted and appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred in precluding the cross-examination.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the trial court did err in this regard. The Court found that the defense had established a sufficient factual foundation for the cross-examination, as the wife had submitted a U visa application based on being a victim of the crime for which the defendant was on trial, and a member of the State’s Attorney’s Office had signed the necessary certification for the U visa. The Court reasoned that these circumstances could have led a jury to infer that the wife had a personal interest in the outcome of the trial or a motive to testify falsely.However, the Court ultimately concluded that this error was harmless and did not influence the verdict. The Court noted that the defendant had acknowledged committing acts that constituted the assaults for which he was convicted, and that the wife's testimony was consistent with other evidence presented at trial. Therefore, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Gonzalez v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of Afghan and Iraqi nationals who served the United States during recent armed conflicts and are now facing serious threats due to their service. They applied for special-immigrant visas, but their applications were delayed. Congress had authorized the Secretary of State to issue these visas and later mandated that the government should improve its efficiency to process the applications within nine months, except in cases involving unusual national-security risks. However, the plaintiffs' applications had been pending for more than nine months.The district court held that the government had unreasonably delayed processing these applications. In 2020, the court approved a plan requiring the prompt adjudication of applications filed by class members and pending for more than nine months as of May 21, 2020. In 2022, the Secretary moved to terminate or modify the plan based on changed circumstances in the two years since 2020. The district court recognized that changed circumstances warrant modifying the plan, but it refused to terminate the plan. The government appealed the refusal to terminate.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the district court reasonably responded to the changes and that some continued judicial involvement remains appropriate. The court also noted that the government's increased difficulties in processing visa applications cannot retroactively make past unreasonable delays reasonable. The court concluded that the district court permissibly balanced the various competing interests in declining to terminate the 2020 adjudication plan. View "Afghan and Iraqi Allies v. Blinken" on Justia Law

A transgender woman from Mexico, identified as A.P.A., who unlawfully immigrated to the United States as a child, faced deportation proceedings after being convicted of driving under the influence. In response, A.P.A. petitioned for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), citing past abuse by a custodial uncle in Mexico and fear of future persecution and torture due to her transgender status. The immigration judge denied these requests, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed the decision.The BIA determined that A.P.A.'s asylum claim was untimely and did not meet the exception to the one-year deadline based on "changed" or "extraordinary circumstances." The BIA also concluded that A.P.A. had not shown past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution in Mexico as a transgender woman. The BIA denied A.P.A.'s request for CAT relief for the same reasons.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of the asylum application based on its timeliness, as per the statute and previous court decisions. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s decision that A.P.A. was not likely to suffer future persecution or torture as a transgender woman in Mexico. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review in part and dismissed it in part. View "A.P.A. v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a defendant, Nelson Barros, who was charged with one count of assault and battery on a household member. Barros, a noncitizen, chose to represent himself during his arraignment and plea hearing. He signed a form acknowledging he had waived his right to counsel. The judge informed him of his right to counsel and confirmed that Barros wished to represent himself. However, the judge did not conduct any further inquiry to determine whether Barros' waiver of counsel was made knowingly and intelligently. Barros admitted to sufficient facts to warrant finding him guilty and was placed on one year of probation. Later, Barros was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers due to his admission to sufficient facts to find him guilty of assault and battery on a household member.The lower courts denied Barros' motions to withdraw his plea. The motion judge, who was not the plea judge, found that Barros' waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and voluntary. Barros appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted his application for direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the lower court's decision but on alternate grounds. The court held that Barros' waiver of counsel was invalid, in violation of his right to counsel under art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The judge did not conduct an adequate inquiry to determine whether Barros' waiver of counsel was made knowingly and intelligently. However, Barros did not challenge this waiver of counsel in his first motion to withdraw his admission to sufficient facts. Therefore, he must establish a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice to prevail on appeal. The court concluded that Barros did not raise a serious doubt that the result of the proceeding might have been different had his waiver of counsel been adequately informed. View "Commonwealth v. Barros" on Justia Law

Maria Elvia Smith, a Mexican citizen, was denied legal status in the U.S. by immigration authorities. Smith had been married to a U.S. citizen, Arlo Henry Smith, Sr., who filed a Form I-130 petition to classify her as his immediate-relative spouse. However, Arlo died while the petition was pending, and it automatically converted to an I-360, Widow(er) Petition. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the Board of Immigration Appeals denied Smith's I-360 petition, concluding that she failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her marriage to Arlo was bona fide for immigration purposes. This conclusion was based on evidence of Smith's continued relationship with her ex-husband and her inconsistent statements to immigration officials.Smith sued the United States Attorney General, USCIS, and the Board, alleging that they improperly denied her I-360 petition and violated her Fifth Amendment right to due process. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin dismissed her complaint, finding that she did not plausibly allege that USCIS and the Board acted improperly in denying her petition, acted without observance of the procedure required by law, or substantively violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the agencies had considered the evidence, applied the proper standards and burden of proof, and validly elected not to credit Smith’s statements in light of her past untruthfulness. The court also found that the agencies had complied with the procedures required by law and that Smith had received all the process due to her. Finally, the court rejected Smith's claim that the agencies violated her procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. View "Smith v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves Marlon Alonzo Smith, a native and citizen of Guyana, who was found removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. Smith challenged the authenticity and reliability of three documents the agency relied upon for its removability ruling: a Form I-213, Record of Deportable Alien; an FBI rap sheet; and a criminal judgment. He argued that these documents were not authenticated by any method and that an amendment to 8 C.F.R. § 287.6(a) made mandatory a requirement that domestic official records be authenticated.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) concluded that Smith had not preserved his challenge to the authenticity of three of the Government’s exhibits, and they sufficed to establish his removability. The BIA also rejected Smith’s due process arguments and concluded that substantial evidence supported the denial of relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Smith's petition for review. The court found that Smith did not preserve his challenge to the authenticity of the documents, and they were sufficient to establish his removability. The court also rejected Smith's due process arguments and concluded that substantial evidence supported the denial of CAT protection. The court did not resolve the issue of whether the amendment to 8 C.F.R. § 287.6(a) made mandatory a requirement that domestic official records be authenticated, leaving that analysis for another day. View "SMITH V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Gilfredo Lopez-Sorto, a Salvadoran native and former gang member, sought review of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) decision denying him deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Lopez-Sorto, who had been a lawful permanent resident in the U.S. since 1982, was convicted of second-degree murder and other charges in 1995, and served 26 years in prison. Upon his release, he was transferred to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody and removal proceedings were initiated against him. He did not challenge his removability, but sought deferral of removal under the CAT, fearing torture if deported to El Salvador due to his gang-related tattoos and criminal record.The IJ concluded that Lopez-Sorto had not established that he would more likely than not be tortured if he returned to El Salvador, and ordered his removal. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision. Lopez-Sorto appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, arguing that the IJ and BIA used the wrong legal standard to evaluate his claim, failed to aggregate his various asserted risks of torture, and ignored his experts’ testimony.The Fourth Circuit disagreed with Lopez-Sorto's arguments. It found that the IJ and BIA had applied the correct legal standard, properly aggregated the asserted risks of torture, and did not ignore the expert witnesses' testimony. The court therefore denied the petition for review. View "Lopez-Sorto v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Aleksandra Malgorzata Stankiewicz, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, who was convicted in 2003 for violating a New Jersey statute that criminalizes distributing a controlled substance on or near school property. In 2018, removal proceedings were initiated against her, with the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) concluding that her conviction was an aggravated felony, making her both removable and ineligible to apply for cancellation of removal.The BIA dismissed Stankiewicz's appeal, maintaining its reasoning that her conviction was an aggravated felony. Stankiewicz then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review of the BIA's decision.The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that Stankiewicz's conviction under the New Jersey statute is not an "aggravated felony" under federal law. The court applied the "categorical approach," comparing the state law to any federal controlled substance offense that is a felony subject to a prison sentence greater than one year. The court found that neither of the parties' proposed federal analogs categorically matches the New Jersey statute. The court therefore granted Stankiewicz's petition for review, vacated the agency’s ruling, and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Stankiewicz v. Garland" on Justia Law

This case involves two legal permanent residents, Carol Williams Black and Keisy G.M., who were detained by the U.S. government for several months without a bond hearing under the authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), pending the conclusion of their separate removal proceedings. Black and G.M. each sought habeas relief, asserting that their prolonged detentions without any bond hearing violated their Fifth Amendment rights to due process. The district court granted Black's petition and he was released, while G.M.'s petition was denied.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the court concluded that the constitutional guarantee of due process precludes a noncitizen’s unreasonably prolonged detention under section 1226(c) without a bond hearing. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment granting habeas relief to Black, concluding that the district court properly required the government to show the necessity of his continued detention by clear and convincing evidence. As to G.M., the court concluded that his detention had become unreasonably prolonged and reversed the district court’s judgment denying habeas relief. View "Black v. Decker" on Justia Law