Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the appointment and removal process for Immigration Judges and members of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).   The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review of a decision of the BIA, the panel held that the appointment and removal process for Immigration Judges and members of the BIA comports with Article II of the Constitution. The panel rejected Petitioner’s suggestion that Immigration Judges and BIA members are principal officers who, under the Appointments Clause of Article II, must be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Rather, the panel concluded that they are inferior officers (whose appointment may be vested in the head of a department) because the Attorney General ultimately directs and supervises their work. Thus, the panel held that the Appointments Clause allows Congress to vest their appointment in the Attorney General. The panel next held that the removal process for Immigration Judges and BIA members satisfies Article II, which requires that officers remain accountable to the President by limiting restrictions on the removal of the President’s subordinates. The panel explained that the Attorney General has the power to remove Immigration Judges and BIA members and that nothing restricts the Attorney General’s ability to remove them at will. Thus, these officers remain dependent on the Attorney General for their positions—and by extension, on the President. View "FORTUNATO AMADOR DUENAS V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioners petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) June 17, 2022, decision denying their motion for reconsideration of the Board’s July 29, 2021 decision. In the July 29, 2021 decision, the Board granted the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) motion to reinstate Petitioners’ removal proceedings and reissued the Board’s prior October 15, 2013 decision, which dismissed Petitioners’ appeal of a decision denying their applications for asylum and related protection.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it discerned no abuse of discretion. The court explained that the Board offered a rational explanation for rejecting Petitioners’ request for clarification. The Board’s July 29, 2021 decision—by Petitioners’ own acknowledgment—reissued the October 15, 2013 decision. This decision, in turn, permitted voluntary departure consistent with the IJ’s February 9, 2012 decision. Both the Board’s October 15, 2013 decision and the IJ’s February 9, 2012 decision warned Petitioners of the consequences of filing a motion for reconsideration: automatic termination of voluntary departure and immediate effect of the alternative order of removal. Here, Petitioners chose to move for reconsideration. Their action automatically terminated the voluntary departure that the October 15, 2013 decision authorized. View "Tsatsral Bekhbat v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

After DHS reinstated prior removal orders and initiated another removal proceeding, Mejia sought withholding of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3), and protection under the Convention Against Torture. He claimed that if returned to Mexico, he would face violence from the criminal gang, Union of Tepito. When Mejia initially refused to transport drugs for Tepito, the gang beat him and mocked his religion; police were nearby and ignored the beating but Mejia could not say whether they saw it. Mejia capitulated but, after a few drug deliveries, he relocated to a different area on the outskirts of Mexico City. The gang found him, hit his head with a gun, and threatened to kill him. Mejia fled to the U.S. He testified that he believed he could not relocate within Mexico because he did not know if other gangs were affiliated with Tepito and feared people would discriminate against his Mexico City accent.The IJ found Mejia credible but denied relief, finding that the gang’s prior attacks did not qualify as persecution or torture; Mejia failed to demonstrate future persecution would be likely, that his persecution was tied to membership in a qualifying social group, or that Mexican officials would be unwilling or unable to protect him. The IJ decided that Mejia could avoid the gang by relocating within Mexico. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Mejia’s counsel had not disputed the relocation finding. View "Mejia v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming a decision of an Immigration Judge (IJ) that denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture and ordered him removed from the United States. The IJ’s decision was based, in part, on its finding that Petitioner was not credible.   The Second Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review and vacated the BIA’s decision. The court remanded, concluding that certain reasons for that credibility finding were erroneous, and the court cannot be confident that the IJ would have made the same determination absent those errors. The court concluded that the agency improperly relied on a number of trivial omissions and inconsistencies to find that Petitioner was not credible. First, the details Petitioner provided in his testimony about his encounter with the police at the police station were also referenced in his prior asylum statement. And even if they were not, they would merely supplement rather than contradict the asylum statement and would thus not alone support an adverse credibility determination. Second, most, if not all, of the inconsistencies in Petitioner’s description of his relationship with his wife were trivial. Third, although any inconsistencies relating to Petitioner’s interactions with his cousin may be non-trivial, the court wrote that it cannot “confidently predict” that the IJ would have made the same adverse credibility determination based on those inconsistencies alone. View "Chen v. Garland" on Justia Law

Discover Bank seeks to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate her claims that Discover Bank unlawfully discriminated against her based on citizenship and immigration status when it denied her application for a consolidation loan for her student loan. Discover Bank argues that two arbitration agreements—one Plaintiff made in connection with the student loan and one she made in connection with the application for the consolidation loan—require arbitration here. The district court declined to compel arbitration, finding that neither agreement required arbitration.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order declining to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate. The panel held that Discover Bank was judicially estopped from arguing that Perez did not opt out of the Discover Bank agreement. The panel determined that Discover Bank’s past position clearly contradicted its current position that the opt-out would only apply to Plaintiff’s future discrimination claims, Discover Bank persuaded the court to accept its previous position, and Discover Bank would derive an unfair advantage absent estoppel. Citing Revitch v. DIRECTV, LLC, 977 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 2020), the panel further held that Perez and Discover Bank never formed an agreement to arbitrate her discrimination claims involving her application for a consolidation loan via the Citibank agreement. View "ILIANA PEREZ, ET AL V. DISCOVER BANK" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioners' petition for review of their asylum and withholding of removal claims and concluded that Petitioners waived any argument regarding relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that substantial evidence supported the immigration judge's (IJ) factual determinations and that the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) committed no errors of law.In their application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief, Petitioners argued that they experiences in El Salvador established persecution and that they belonged to two separate particular social groups that were threatened by gang members. The IJ denied relief, concluding that Petitioners failed to establish persecution and did not meet their burden as to the two separate particular social groups they claimed. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied review, holding that the BIA and IJ did not err when they concluded that Petitioners did not meet their burden with respect to persecution on account of a protected group and withholding of removal. View "Sanchez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc after a request for a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc, and the matter failed to receive a majority of the votes of the nonrecused active judges in favor of en banc consideration, in a case in which the panel held that: (1) where the adjudication of a non-citizen’s visa application implicates a citizen’s constitutional rights, due process requires that the government provide timely and adequate notice to the citizen of a decision that will deprive the citizen of that interest; and (2) because the government failed to provide timely notice here, it was not entitled to summary judgment based on the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. View "SANDRA MUNOZ, ET AL V. DOS, ET AL" on Justia Law

An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Petitioner asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, and Petitioner petitioned for review.
The Fourth Circuit granted in part, denied in part, and remanded. The BIA properly held that Petitioner was not eligible for CAT protection, and so the court denied the petition for review as to the CAT claim. But the BIA erred in not recognizing the nexus that Petitioner established between the persecution she suffered and her religion. As a result of that error, the BIA erred in determining that Petitioner was not a refugee eligible for asylum. The court explained that when Petitioner left the country 12 days after her initial police report, Petitioner had not been harmed, and she did not offer any evidence that the police colluded with MS-13 or otherwise acquiesced in the gang’s activity. With no such evidence, a reasonable adjudicator could find that there was no government acquiescence in her persecution. View "Odalis Chicas-Machado v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Sudan and citizen of South Sudan, petitions this Court for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order affirming the immigration judge’s (IJ) decision ordering Petitioner removed and reversing the IJ’s decision granting Petitioner deferral of removal to South Sudan. Petitioner argued that the BIA erred by (1) limiting its review on remand to address only whether he had been convicted of a theft offense, (2) determining that the Nebraska shoplifting statute constitutes an aggravated felony as a theft offense, and (3) reversing the IJ’s grant of deferral of removal to South Sudan.   The Eighth Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded the matter to the BIA for further proceedings. The court explained that for Nebraska’s shoplifting statute to be a categorical match to the generic definition of theft, it must criminalize only those who act with the specific intent to “deprive the owner of the right and benefits of ownership.” The court wrote that contrary to the BIA’s order, that appropriation “necessarily deprives the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership” does not mean that the offender acted with the specific intent for that deprivation to occur. Accordingly, the BIA erred in finding that Petitioner was removable for having committed a theft offense—and, thus, an aggravated felony—based upon his Nebraska shoplifting convictions. View "Ruachkuoth Thok v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review from two orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and denying his request to reopen and reconsider the denial of his applications.   The Eighth Circuit denied the petitions. The court explained that although Petitioner argued the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s denial of his asylum application, Petitioner failed to challenge before the BIA the IJ’s alternative, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to asylum because his application was untimely, and the BIA deemed that this argument was waived. Further, the court wrote that Petitioner similarly failed to offer any argument regarding the timeliness of his asylum application before this Court. And, in any event, the court wrote that it will not disturb the BIA’s conclusion that this issue has been waived and is dispositive of the asylum application. View "Alexander Arroyo-Sosa v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law