Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner and her minor son were ordered removed in absentia. The immigration judge denied their motion to reopen the removal proceedings, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed their appeal. The BIA concluded that Petitioner had “not rebutted the slight presumption of delivery and receipt of the hearing notice at the address she provided.” Petitioner petitioned for review.   The Fourth Circuit granted the petition and vacated the dismissal by the BIA. The court explained that the statutory scheme contemplates a notice to appear that fully complies with the requirements of Section 1229(a)(1). The Supreme Court has emphasized that this notice must be a “single statutorily compliant document.” That is because the original notice to appear, by itself and regardless of any future need for a change in hearing, is a critical document, “the basis for commencing a grave legal proceeding” with profound implications for people like Petitioner and her son. If the government holds the original removal hearing as envisioned by the satisfactory notice to appear, there is no need for further notices. Of course, “if logistics require a change,” the government has statutory flexibility to send a change of hearing notice. But that flexibility does not excuse the government from its obligations to provide a valid notice to appear in the first instance. That did not happen here. Nor did Petitioner receive proper notice under Section 1229(a)(2). The court concluded that because she did not receive the “written notice required under paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a),” Petitioner is entitled to the reopening of her proceedings and the rescission of her removal order. View "Azucena Lazo-Gavidia v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision (1) affirming an Immigration Judge’s denial of his application for cancellation of removal and (2) denying his motion to remand. The BIA rejected Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, declined to remand for consideration of additional hardship relating to his cancellation application, and declined to remand to await adjudication of his U visa application. Petitioner argued that the BIA (1) applied an incorrect standard when reviewing his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, (2) overlooked and mischaracterized his new hardship evidence, and (3) failed to follow precedent when denying his request for remand.   The Second Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review, vacated the BIA’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that it does not matter whether Petitioner initially requested a continuance from the IJ or whether his motion to remand was filed while proceedings before the IJ were ongoing. Petitioner only became aware of prior counsel’s alleged misconduct the premise for his U visa application—after the IJ had issued its decision and Petitioner sought advice from other counsel. Thereafter, he appears to have diligently pursued his U visa application and presented proof of his submitted U visa application to the BIA while his appeal was still pending. The BIA has advanced no reason why Sanchez Sosa should not apply under these circumstances. Therefore, the court concluded that the BIA should have applied the Sanchez Sosa factors in considering Petitioner’s motion to remand as it pertains to his U visa or explained its reasoning for not doing so. View "Paucar v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, has twice traveled unlawfully into the United States — first in 2012, and again in 2016. In both instances, Petitioner fled threats to his life, and attacks were carried out against him by the 18th Street Gang and the Salvadoran police. After seeking protection from removal before an immigration judge (the “IJ”) in 2016, Petitioner was afforded relief — in the form of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (the “CAT”) — by three separate IJ rulings. On each occasion, the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”) reversed the IJ rulings. Petitioner, for his part, was removed to El Salvador in May 2022 and has awaited further developments in these proceedings from his home country. In this appeal, Petitioner challenged and sought reversal of three rulings made by the BIA.   The Fourth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review and reverse the BIA rulings in part, affirm them in part, and vacate them in part. The court otherwise remanded to the BIA for such further proceedings. The court explained that the BIA declined to “interact seriously” with the record before it in reviewing Petitioner’s claim for CAT protection, and its failure in that regard requires a remand. Petitioner’s evidence, to be certain, is strongly supportive of his CAT claim — he has, after all, already been subjected to “cruel and inhuman treatment” after being initially removed to El Salvador. But the court declined to resolve whether Petitioner is entitled to CAT protection. Instead, the court vacated the BIA’s 2021 Reversal Order with respect to its CAT ruling and remanded for the BIA to fully and properly assess Petitioner’s CAT claim in the first instance. View "Christian Santos Garcia v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a native of El Salvador. He first entered the United States around 2003 and was ordered removed in 2007. He then returned three more times—in 2010, 2018, and 2019. This appeal concerns his 2019 visit. In September 2019, the federal government reinstated Petitioner’s 2007 removal order. Petitioner sought withholding of removal and CAT relief. An immigration judge denied his application and, on April 27, 2022, the BIA dismissed his appeal. Petitioner petitioned for review on May 26, 2022.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that Congress has limited the court’s jurisdiction to final orders “concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.  And it imposed another condition: the petition must be filed within 30 days of that order. The BIA’s denial of Petitioner’s application for withholding of removal and CAT relief is not a final order of removal. And his petition is untimely because it was filed over 30 days after his reinstatement order became final. View "Argueta-Hernandez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The immigration judge (“IJ”) denied his application, explaining that while he had left El Salvador because of a genuine fear of gangs, neither he nor his family had had any encounters with gang members. Because the basis for his fear was simply a “generalized” fear of criminal gang members and violence in El Salvador, the IJ found that he was ineligible for relief.On appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), Petitioner argued that he had proceeded pro se before the IJ and that the IJ had failed to develop the record, as required by Quintero v. Garland, 998 F.3d 612, 622 (4th Cir. 2021). The BIA concluded, however, that the IJ had fulfilled the requirements of Quintero and affirmed.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that the BIA's conclusions were not legally erroneous or lacked evidentiary support. View "Jose Trejo Tepas v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

The United States’ war in Afghanistan required regional allies willing to aid the effort. One such ally was Petitioner, a Pakistani businessman who sold supplies to coalition forces. This invoked the wrath of the Pakistani Taliban, which demanded exorbitant payments from Petitioner under threat of death. Petitioner repeatedly refused, and the Taliban attempted to carry out its threat, promising to hunt him until it succeeded. After losing his business, home, and nearly his life, Petitioner fled to the United States seeking asylum. The Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals both recognized that Petitioner suffered past persecution, entitling him to a presumption that the Taliban would continue to target him if he returned to Pakistan. But they agreed with the government that because Petitioner lived in Islamabad (the capital of Pakistan) for a few weeks without the Taliban finding him, he could live in a new area of the country without fear of reprisal.   The Fourth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review, reversed the Board’s denial of Petitioner’s preserved claims, and remanded with instructions that the agency grant relief. The court explained that Petitioner’s brief sojourn to Islamabad—where he never left the house— doesn’t rebut the presumption that a notorious terrorist organization continues to imperil his life. The court granted relief since the record would compel any reasonable adjudicator to conclude Petitioner faces a well-founded threat of future persecution. View "Shaker Ullah v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a native of China admitted to the United States on a student visa in 2009. Petitioner sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals order denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. If removed to China, Petitioner fears, he will be persecuted and tortured by Chinese authorities, who in 2008 allegedly imprisoned and violently beat him because of his Christian beliefs and practices.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the Board’s decision and remanded for further explanation. In denying relief on Petitioner’s withholding claim, both the IJ and the BIA relied at least in part on Petitioner’s failure to provide affidavits from his minister or fellow church members from China, attesting to his “activities as a Christian” and his arrest during home church services. But Petitioner repeatedly explained during his hearing why such evidence was not available: his minister and co-religionists feared reprisal from Chinese authorities if they came forward on his behalf. And neither the IJ nor the BIA made any finding as to the sufficiency of that explanation or the reasonable availability of the affidavits hypothesized by the IJ, or even noted Petitioner’s explanation in their opinions. The court left it to the agency on remand to evaluate Petitioner’s explanation and determine whether evidence from his co-religionists in China was “reasonably obtainable.” View "Zuowei Chen v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a rancher from Mexico who fears returning. He gives several reasons why. Twice, his uncles were kidnapped and held for ransom. The second time, the kidnapping was reported to the police. And though the police said they would “try to help,” they were ultimately unable to “do anything.” On another occasion, someone took pictures of Petitioner’s family home and then demanded money and threatened to kidnap a family member. And once, when he was driving from his family’s ranch to his home, two vans began chasing him. Shortly after Petitioner entered the United States, the Attorney General began removal proceedings against him. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied his applications.  The BIA explained that it agreed with the IJ’s social-group-recognizability and nexus rulings, as well as the IJ’s determination regarding CAT relief.   The Eighth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition. The court explained that here, the record does not support Petitioner’s contention that the Mexican government has turned a blind eye to criminal-gang-inflicted torture. When one of Petitioner’s uncles was kidnapped, the police offered to help. The fact that they were unable to “do anything” does not evidence acquiescence. And when Petitioner sought help from the police after the car chase, they provided it. Petitioner counters that country conditions reports show that criminal organizations have infiltrated the Mexican police and government. Yet he does not explain how this “general infiltration” makes the Mexican government “likely to acquiesce in his torture.” View "Efren Uriostegui-Teran v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Peru, appeals the Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that she is ineligible for relief under 8 U.S.C. Section 1229b(b)(2), a provision whose language was originally adopted as part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 and that outlines the conditions under which certain “battered spouses or children” qualify for discretionary cancellation of removal. As relevant here, it requires a petitioning alien to show that she “has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty” by her spouse or parent. Petitioner contends that the Immigration Judge and the BIA made two errors in refusing her cancellation request. First, she maintains that, as a matter of law, they misinterpreted the statutory term “extreme cruelty” to require proof of physical—as distinguished from mental or emotional—abuse. And second, she asserts that having misread the law, the IJ and the BIA wrongly concluded that she doesn’t qualify for discretionary relief.   The Eleventh Circuit granted her petition for review and remanded it to the BIA for further consideration. The court explained that it agreed with Petitioner—and held— that the BIA misinterpreted 8 U.S.C. Section 1229b(b)(2). The term “extreme cruelty” does not require a petitioning alien to prove that she suffered physical abuse in order to qualify for discretionary cancellation of removal; proof of mental or emotional abuse is sufficient to satisfy the “extreme cruelty” prong of Section 1229b(b)(2)’s five-prong standard. View "Esmelda Ruiz v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc after a request for a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc, and the matter failed to receive a majority of the votes of the nonrecused active judges in favor of en banc consideration in a case in which the panel held that: (1) subject only to a very limited form of habeas corpus review that is inapplicable in this case, Section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), “clearly and unambiguously” precludes judicial review of expedited removal orders, even with regard to constitutional challenges to such orders; and (2) as applied in this case—which involved an arriving alien with no previous ties to the United States—that denial of all judicial review was constitutional. View "HEVER MENDOZA LINARES V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law